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NOTICE TO READERS: * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

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Kapllani Departs for France, FRG

AU1206121590 Tirana ATA in English 0812 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Tirana, 12 June (ATA)— The deputy minister of foreign affairs of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, Muhamet Kapllani, left on a short term working visit to France and the FR of Germany, on June 11. He was seen off at the airport by functionaries of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Present were also the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the French Republic in Tirana, Michel Boulmer, and the charge d'affaires a.i. of the Federal Republic of Germany in Tirana, Werner Daun.

Politicization of Daily Life Protested

AU1006191690 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 3 Jun 90 p 3

[Perparim Xhixha article: "Politicization Mania"]

[Text] As is well known, there has been and always will be a mutual dependency between achieving results in the country's economic and cultural development and the level of the emancipation and democratization of relations among people. What is damaging these relations and what needs to be fought against? The "most ancient" things are inherited mentalities involving envy, intrigue, lack of sincerity and politeness, and so forth. Other kinds of thinking that sometimes more and sometimes less seriously damage relations among people are those which stem from people's many ties with the state administration, such as servility and careerism, conceit and arrogance, intellectualism, technocratism, peremptoriness, and the cult of certain officials who consider themselves to be "dug in," and so forth. Some economic, political, ideological, and cultural factors, which have uprooted the sources of these damaging ways of thinking, are also well known. Under the party's leadership, what must in the true sense of the word be called a colossal amount of work has been done. The increased sensitivity of public opinion and its independent response to things of this kind, legislative improvements in the civil field, greater prosperity, and higher educational and cultural levels are all a range of other factors which have continually been lessening the danger of these phenomena to interpersonal relationships, which are permeated by understanding, respect, mutual affection, civil sincerity and tolerance, and solidarity and restraint as noble human virtues. We could list many such virtues. However, we still encounter phenomena which in one way or another burden the human personality, inhibit its energies, and sap the vigor of those brave dreams people shape in their own spiritual world. Some of these things, which we have called and still call alien symptoms, sometimes collect and become a united force in a mania which we would call politicization or ideologization.

What is this mania?

Some time ago, a young cadre returned from a short course abroad. With truly rare joy he showed us what valuable books he had managed to bring back and donated them to the institute library. (He could have taken them home.) Besides this, he had managed, within the space of three weeks, to write and publish an article in TERMNET NEWS, the sole organ of the International Terminology Institute. Of course, his joy over this article stemmed from his patriotic feelings because he had affirmed a small part of his homeland's work in a periodical of international reputation. He told his colleagues. Some congratulated him.

"But my heart fell to my boots when the director called for me and said, 'Good, good.... But translate your masterpiece for us! Let's have a look at it....'" It was not difficult to realize what these words meant: Translate it so that we can see how you have slipped up! After this, I was in no condition to work for entire days. I had never suffered a worse insult. I also suffered pangs for another reason. Why had I not said a single word in reply? It would have been enough to say: One's convictions and patriotism, director, do not depend on the size of your office...."

Two or three weeks later, this same research worker came to our editorial office one evening. We talked about what had happened at his institute.

Our conversation was a long one, and its crux was academic work, its fruitfulness, and the not seldom observed patronizing attitude toward young people, the obstacles that are thrown up in the name of all kinds of politicized reasons, until they reach the point, for instance, that a young student is asked "Why did you type your dissertation on a state typewriter?!" Such cases circulate not only in the narrow worlds of academe, but also beyond it, in art, culture, sport, and so forth. How can this happen when we accept and fully realize that help, support, and incentives for young people in every field are major investments in the country's future? In whose name can an intellectual be asked: "Why are you typing your dissertation on a state typewriter?" In the name of nothing but routine, patronage, bureaucracy, and backwardness. You can bear the title of "professor" and represent progress in public opinion and a state office but still be an inhibiting influence in the full sense of the word in your relationship with your subordinates. Politicization stems from some "revolutionary" poses adopted by certain two-faced officials, who often ask others "to spin gold from straw," while themselves enjoying every one of the rights given to them by laws, directives, rules, judicial acts, and so forth. It is therefore clear that politicization is the misappropriation of the state's power by individuals and its use against the individual, making something of primary importance which is not of primary importance.

Politicization sometimes becomes a weapon of the incompetent, those who place their own petit bourgeois interests above those of society in general. It is also a "weapon" used by arrogant managers to keep on a leash their subordinates whose work, knowledge, and everyday active patriotism prompt them to "speak out," in other words, not to say "as you wish, at your service" day in and day out.

It is one thing to be a political person, subjecting every step and every act of judgment at work to the logic of whether it is in the interest of progress and in accordance with the logic of the workers class and the party, and another thing to be subject to the politicization mania. Everyone who travels on the Tirana buses is annoyed to see how buses put into service a year or so ago were attractive, while now what do you see? Torn upholstery everywhere! In short, there is carelessness, and excessive behavior to the point of vandalism against property. Such things show a lack of culture and civil education. But is not a matter of "finding these people and seeing what lies behind them," as some people politicize the issue. Apartment blocks are built and their surroundings sometimes remain for years, to put it bluntly, in a state to "make you throw up your hands in horror." The reasons for this negligence are well known, and it is unjustifiable. Nevertheless, there is no lack of voices to explain it more or less like this: "Who are these people who permit all this, and can such things be allowed in a socialist state?" Of course such phrases provoke hilarity in every civilized and cultured mind. Politicization is a kind of bureaucratic device whereby some citizens, cadres, and even cadres try to use phrases about "principle" to "frighten" to those whom they think have upset something, encroached on someone's interests, or trespassed on someone's petit bourgeois preserve. Such people are frightened of everything new and every change, and on each occasion "summon" to their aid all kinds of phrases, quotations, slogans, and bureaucratic instructions. If a specialist raises a problem in front of a decent-sized audience and makes some criticism, those who needlessly politicize matters will later, if not on the spot, tell him he is denying the achievements of the 45-year socialist epoch in the field of engineering, natural sciences, health, and so on and so forth. It sometimes happens that not only managers but ordinary people politicize matters. A worker recently came to our editorial office and presented us with this petition:

Come to the ministry if you like and ask what my job performance was like. It is true I am a driver, but I did the work I was given. How can they behave like this with a worker, a member of the workers class? They have cut my job as if there weren't enough bureaucrats!

It is clear that politicizing skills exist not only in the ranks of the intelligentsia, but among people in the production and service sectors. They prefer the "weapon" of politicization not only to unjustly obtain things they do not deserve, but to defend themselves in the psychological battle against politicization from above, waged by the brigade leader against the worker who exhibits "alien symptoms"; by the class teacher against the pupil "who will not sit still"; by the platoon commander against the soldier who "violates iron military discipline" by undoing a button; by the editor against the creative writer (usually a mediocre one); and by the official at the center against the official at the base.

Can we all be freed from this mania, this ideological disease? It is perfectly possible, and we must all learn just one very simple thing: to call things by their proper names and to use our heads before we use our tongues. It is enough not to confuse things because such confusion inhibits, saps, and buries great energies and potential which society is failing to exploit.

Youth Movement Stresses Patriotic Values

AU1206140790 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 2 Jun 90 pp 1-2

[Article by Lisen Bashkurti, first secretary of the Albanian Union of Working Youth Central Committee: "A Movement Matching Young People's Tasks to the Demands of the Times"]

[Text] The movement, "The Homeland Will Be Tomorrow What Youth Is Today," best matches the young people's tasks to the demands of the times. It acquired impetus from Comrade Ramiz Alia's meeting with young people and was nourished in its content by the documents of the 10th party Central Committee speech, especially the program speech by our dear leader.

The new youth movement and the 10th party Central Committee plenum are identical in content and share the same goal. Under these conditions and faced with these tasks, it is necessary for us, and especially us leaders, to familiarize ourselves now, at the very start of the new youth movement, with the 10th party plenum and to define objectives, stands, and viewpoints for youth work.

I. The new movement which has begun has certain general nationwide directions, regardless of district or category of young people.

Everybody must clearly and properly define these directions because they stem from the decisions of the 10th party plenum, the spokesman of the times in which we live.

What are these nationwide objectives?

1. The education of the young generation in the spirit of patriotism.

Good patriots support their country at all times. For this reason, the Albanian Union of Working Youth has always spoken out and worked for the patriotic education of the young generation. Today this task has assumed the shape of an imperative as a result of the situation in which we are living. More than ever before, Albania needs young people who will value and cherish in their inmost hearts its freedom, independence, sovereignty, and the distinctive socialist road which we have chosen and followed ourselves and which is written in blood, sweat, and countless sacrifices. But how can we accomplish this task well, in a way that will be attractive to young people and will leave traces in their awareness?

Our homeland is ancient and its people are equally so. We have survived the shocks and upheavals of history only with the help of the patriotism of the people who were born and died in this land. The past is a major school for the patriotic education of young people. Every family, neighborhood, village, and town has its past. Taken as a whole, these fragments of the past make up our national history. How can you embark on national history when you do not know the history of your own family and its genealogy, when you are unaware of the history of your neighborhood and district, and when you know nothing of the history of the town where you live? As is well known, knowledge proceeds from oneself and later includes others and moves from the near to the distant and from the particular to the general. It should be the same with knowledge of our homeland and therefore with our love for it. If you do not know and love your family, and do not know and love the history of your neighborhood, village, or town, it is hard for you to get to know your homeland and love it with all your heart. Divorced from love of oneself, one's family, neighborhood, village, and town, and divorced from nostalgia and respect for their past, the homeland and love for it remain, in my mind, abstract notions. Therefore, viewing matters from this angle, I would say that the youth organization, wherever it is active and making militant efforts, should try to spread propaganda among its members about the history of their neighborhoods, villages, and towns, attempting to unfold their historical values and to display them in various ways. In this context, a series of initiatives for improving the collections of museums and getting to know the traditions of local regions must be revived.

Knowledge of the past, apart from in the general sense that we have described, means first of all focusing attention on great events, key moments, and distinguished figures in history. At key moments of national history, the patriotism of the Albanian, his daring, courage, determination, love for the homeland, and his dedication and most sublime sacrifices for its freedom, independence, and progress have shone more brightly than ever. The heroism of Illyrian culture in its struggle for survival; the bravery of Arberia in the 15th century and the example of Skenderbeg; the peasants' uprisings in southern Albania and such heroes as Zenel Gjoleka and Rrapo Hekali; the incomparable heroism of the northern highlands in defending Albania's territorial integrity at the beginning of our century and the heroism of Mehmet Shpendi and Isa Boletini; the unprecedented struggle of Laberia and Selam Salaria against the foreign occupier; the bourgeois democratic June Revolution [1924] and the martyrdom of Bajram Curri, the dragon of Dragobi; and so on and so forth, are a priceless store of treasure for young people's patriotic education. There are such examples throughout the events of our history. A red thread of patriotism runs through them all, and they all nourish the young in love of the homeland. The youth organization must therefore organize constant and varied propaganda in order to make these great events and figures familiar to young people.

In the past, patriotism was manifested as a complex of values which included the people's spiritual and cultural traditions, besides the heroic and fighting traditions mentioned above. It was patriotism which impelled Barleti to write "The History of Skenderbeg" and "The Siege of Shkoder." Patriotism also led Buzuku to translate his "Missal" into Albanian. Patriotism pervades the works of Bardhi, Budi, and Bogdani. Patriotism inspired every stanza and line of the poets and luminaries of the Renaissance. Patriotism encouraged Abdyl Frasheri and Ismail Qemali in their diplomacy, Dhaskal Todri and Petro Nini Luarasi in their love for the Albanian school, Thimi Mitko in his devotion to folklore, and Noli in his dedication to world culture, and so forth. These cultural personalities and others like them showed the same patriotism and heroism as their companions in arms. Each in his own way and with his own weapons dedicated himself to the homeland and sacrificed himself for it. This is why the youth organization should refer to such values; it is through them and through implanting attractive and ineradicable emotional and cultural features that the patriotic education of young people can be accomplished.

Revealing and unfolding the past to young people requires finding rich and interesting theoretical and practical methods, or both things. Such methods as academic conferences and sessions, readings and discussions arranged with young people or cultural personalities, heroes, veterans, teachers, and lecturers have truly great value because they convey broad and deep information about the past. However, practical methods are also attractive to young people, who by age and temperament do not care for passive and oral methods. Let us therefore make more use of our museums, historical centers, and archives of photographs, recordings, and films, organizing concerts with popular, patriotic, mass, and revolutionary songs. Let us organize dramatic evenings with outstandingly patriotic poets and poems, let us enrich meetings of pioneers, the youth organization, and the party with patriotic material, and let us use more widely such national symbols as the flag and the national anthem in our surroundings, on our clothes, and in schools, military units, recreation camps, and in young people's various political and social activities. The program of the new youth movement should decide precisely what will be done in this respect and how it will be carried out.

The distinguishing trait of patriotism marked our people not only in the distant past but pervades our present epoch also. Our era did not of course begin today or yesterday. It started with the foundation of the Albanian Communist Party (today the Albanian Workers Party), which divided the 20th century in two. Patriotism has pervaded the whole epoch of the party. It must even be said that it was the homeland, the cares and concerns of its people, and the need to meet their historical needs which led the best sons of the people led by Enver Hoxha to embrace Marxism-Leninism. There is a series of formidable signs of the deeply patriotic policies of our party and Enver Hoxha from the first resolution of the communist groups in November 1941 which announced "the struggle for the Albanian people's national independence..." down to the party's continual care to consolidate our economy, to promote Albanian education and culture, to raise Albania in the international arena, and to incessantly strengthen the homeland's defense. The decisions of the recent plenums of the party Central Committee, particularly Comrade Ramiz Alia's speech at the 10th plenum, and the measures taken to perfect the economic mechanism, improve the legislation, and to develop Albania's relations abroad under new conditions show as clearly as day that the party and Comrade Ramiz Alia are continuing and at the same time renewing the domestic and foreign political line in full conformity with patriotic interests.

During this period, new heroes were also born. From Bardhok Biba, Ndrec Ndue Gjoka, and Pal Melyshi to Adem Reka, Shkurte Vata, and Ismet Brucaj, there is a whole pantheon of heroes of our era who confronted the enemies of the homeland's freedom and progress and various difficulties and obstacles, to the point of sacrificing their lives. These acts of patriotism in our epoch should always be placed at the center of young people's patriotic attention.

Our era has enriched the virtues of the people. Such characteristics as a spirit of collectivism, solidarity, nationwide moral and political unity, and so forth have been carefully cultivated in recent years and have fortified the citadel of patriotism. These virtues must be made known to young people and must become imperative demands for them, so that they may even carry them further forward.

Let us take moral and political unity. Even in the past, our people valued unity. The ancient proverb, "Unity brings strength," the experience of Skenderbeg in the League of Lezhe, the League of Prizren, and Pashko Vasa's mottoes, "Arise, Albanians, arise from sleep and All like brothers one pledge to keep" all show that the people themselves felt the necessity of unity, but for various reasons such as the development of feudal divisions, the religious factor, old customs, foreign influences, and so forth, they never achieved powerful and stable nationwide union. Only our era has fulfilled this aspiration of the people which Comrade Ramiz advises us to preserve as a hallmark of our recent history. Let us therefore at no time separate patriotism from unity. To achieve this, we must prevent all those causes and factors which bring division, from ideopolitical convictions, down to ethical and moral attitudes and mistaken practical activities.

2. The second general direction of our new movement is to consolidate convictions about the superiority of socialism in the history of our people.

It must be clear to us from the start that patriotism and socialism are for us an indivisible whole. The homeland cannot for a moment be abstracted from socialism, just as for us Albanians socialism cannot be in any way understood otherwise than as it is realized in our homeland. Seen through these eyes, the second direction of our movement is an objective result of the first, is indissolubly tied to it, and serves it.

Today, the task of consolidating convictions about our social order is more closely tied than ever to developments and situations in the world around us, which have led the anger of the bourgeoisie and reaction against socialism to assume unprecedented proportions. For this reason, we must oppose the antisocialist fury which rages in the world, and cannot fail to be felt and reflected in forms of pressure against our country and its people, with work to consolidate enduring convictions about the effectiveness of the socialist order in the history of our people.

For young people, this task of consolidating convictions about socialism also stems from some rather specific causes. Our young people did not experience the past and have not themselves lived through the stages of our development. As a generation, our young people have developed a slight tendency toward consumerism, without always reconciling it with real possibilities. There is a similar tendency to take things somewhat lightly and to judge matters sometimes more from appearances, facades, and advertisements than in their real and true essence. Taking all this together, today's world political situation and its possible effect on the characteristics of young people, one can see how imperative is the task of shaping young people's ideopolitical convictions about our socialist social order.

But how must this work be done in practice?

First, this is an ideological struggle and must be waged with ideological weapons. The ideological weapons of the era include new thinking and modern educational methods.

New thinking calls for arguments and not slogans and quotations; it needs culture, not mediocrity; quick wits, not closed eyes; balance, not extremism; realism, not false luster; national dignity, not phobias and manias. New methods call for debate, not monologues; tolerance, not imposed views; moderation, not nervousness and haste; small-scale work, not big crowds; direct contact with young people, not hierarchies; a gathering every day, not "twice in five years."

In fact, we have spoken and written a great deal recently, but improvements have been few, and there is stagnation in some places.

When we reach out to young people, we must all be well-prepared, and must review the literature, arrange our thoughts, compile our arguments, and not arrive with our hands in our pockets as if we knew everything, as cadres have recently been doing. The days of the "Olympians" have passed, if they ever existed.

Let all cadres and specialists at the center and in the districts join the "dance." The Tirana Youth Committee has set an example in the last four to five months by organizing a discussion or a reading involving political and cultural personalities somewhere almost every day.

Educational and propaganda work to consolidate convictions about socialism is effective when it is accompanied by keener vigilance toward some antisocialist symptoms and a deeper struggle against them. There is no room for us to make the slightest concession to such behavior as hooliganism, vagabondage, criminality, thievery, and the like. We should give them short shrift. Let us use social control groups, public criticism, exposure, caricatures, and court procedures.

The vigor of progressive examples also strengthens convictions about socialism. Let us not forget the educational maxim: Words teach, but examples inspire. Let us therefore take care throughout our movement to praise the best individuals and organizations and their achievements in propaganda, the press, and in spreading advanced experience. Let us make it a practice to collate data about the outstanding and the progressive everywhere and to always give them wide publicity.

3. The new youth movement demands young people's greatest possible commitment to the country's democratizing processes.

The decisions of the recent party Central Committee plenums have given a broad democratic inspiration to our country. Young people play a very important role in this process. What, in this respect, do I think we should bear in mind in this movement?

— Invigorating young people's free and advanced thinking; extending young people's participation in the open meetings of party organizations; young people's active participation in meetings for the free election of cadres; the successful conclusion of discussion by the youth organization about rights of study in secondary schools and the democratization of teacher-pupil relations; the successful conclusion of discussions about the appointment of new cadres in the college youth organizations and the democratization of lecturer-student relations; and the democratic distribution of certificates in pioneer camps (which will henceforth not be done by the trade unions but by the Albanian Union of Working Youth).

However, the process of democratization among us is inseparable from the process of revolutionization, which means that the youth organization's role must rise along with the level of fulfillment in all its tasks and the militant spirit of youth cadres.

4. A further general trend of the youth movement is the mobilization of the young generation to fulfill economic tasks.

It must be clear to all of us that the new economic mechanism is a wholly new concept in our economy's development. Economic laws lie at its foundation, sanctioned in the operation of independent enterprises, changes to the pay system, and in the stimulation and improvement of the pricing system.

These new mechanisms, despite their indisputable value for the economy, will again in the last analysis be effective only if they are understood by the masses and above all by young people. An entire program must therefore be drawn up before the end of the year with discussions, lectures, and special courses to explain these economic mechanisms to young people. Specialist cadres and especially young economists, who are numbered by the thousand, must be involved in this work. The young people's course in Durres must also be brought into this work before the end of the year.

The movement demands that the main mass actions of young people in the economy should be defined together with their objectives, schedules, and methods of organization. The experience of the Korce wheat mass action, the Shkoder and Fier district corn mass actions, the local mass actions in Tirana, and so forth, should serve as a model for the whole country this year. [in mass actions, the public workers work for free]

We must devote particular care to export production branches because these branches are assuming an increasingly strategic character for the destiny of our economy.

5. The new movement calls for more intense work from the youth organization for knowledge and culture.

The homeland requires very high levels of knowledge and culture, everywhere and on every front. This struggle for knowledge and culture must arouse special concern among student-age young people and the colleges. It is intolerable that the average mark of about one-half of our students should be between 5.5 and 6. What does this mean? It means a flagging of interest and enthusiasm, and it also means stagnation in the youth organizations and committees at the University and in the colleges. The Youth Committees of Tirana's First District, Shkoder, Korce, Elbasan, and Gjirokaster must penetrate more strongly and skillfully into the colleges with the aim of achieving a qualitative leap in students' acquisition of knowledge.

The field of knowledge and culture also involves young workers, cooperativists, and soldiers. We must all think hard how to encourage young people's interest in knowledge and culture, work with books, and academic activities. The experience gained in "Young Talent Week," "Book Month," "Science Month," and so forth has still not been spread in order to attract young people into these fields and to bring outstanding people from the country's cultural life into contact with young people.

Leisure, sports, and recreation are other nationwide fields for the youth movement.

Let us think of leisure as culture. This must mean devoting care and attention to it. Our young people have never been and never will be a simple labor force, nor a lost generation, just as the last 45 years have not in any way been time lost, but have been the most victorious years in our people's history. The young generation have the good fortune to live at a time when the economy, education, culture, and the entire society in general have been consolidated. For this reason, we now have more leisure and will have even more in the future. It is very important how we spend our free time under such conditions. Will we fail to organize it? Will we spend it on the boulevards, strolling like in a procession? Will we spend it in front of store windows, listening to and following up rumors? No. None of these things are true leisure. It is not only our people who say that time is gold. Leisure is gold also. Therefore, we must plan our leisure every day with more care, with enjoyable youth weekends and livelier sports activities everywhere, especially outdoors. Alongside this, we must plan and carry out youth mass actions for leisure and sports facilities in every district, neighborhood, and military unit.

II. Alongside these general nationwide fields, which must involve every district and young people of all kinds, the movement should assume special characteristics in every district, unit, enterprise, cooperative, school, and institution.

Shkoder is different from Korce, Tirana is different from Vlore, and Tropoje is different from Permet. These differences involve historical, geographical, economic, cultural, and psychological characteristics. The same thing must be said about categories of young people. Enterprises are different from schools, military units are different from agricultural cooperatives, and pioneers are different from students. These differences must inevitably be reflected in the youth movement because, in the last analysis, a patriotic and revolutionary young person is one who does his duty on the front entrusted to him.

Fulfilling these substantial tasks demands faster procedures on the part of youth organizations in the districts. There is a degree of sluggishness in the Berat and Elbasan organizations; the Kukes and Mat organizations are virtually standing on the sidelines; and the those in Gjirokaster and Kolonje are organizing a lot of meetings but fewer activities.

The movement "The Homeland Will Be Tomorrow What Youth Is Today" belongs to young people, but not to them alone. If Korce, Shkoder, and Sarande have done laudable work, this has also come from the serious support and commitment to the youth organizations shown by the Party Committees in these districts. We would like to be able to say the same of districts where the youth movement has remained more a matter of propaganda or where progress is slow. In my view, nobody can consider himself outside this new youth movement, which is an expression of young people's commitment to worthily taking up the baton from their parents and carrying it to the heights indicated by the 10th party Central Committee plenum.

Reporting of Partial Election Results Continues

Single-Member Constituency Results

AU1206134390 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1200 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Liliyana Yancheva report from the Central Election Commission headquarters—live]

[Text] [Yancheva] Dimitur Popov, secretary of the Central Election Commission is here to fulfill his promise and announce the single-member constituencies candidates who have been elected.

[Popov] Good day, I shall only read the name and the number of the constituency. [passage indistinct]
10th Karnobat constituency—Atanas Radev, Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP];
11th Aytos constituency—Yordan Stoyanov, BSP;
12th Tundzha constituency—Marko Markov, BSP;
13th Yambol constituency—Rosen Karadimov, independent;
14th Yambol constituency—Lyuben Kornezov, BSP;
15th Sliven constituency—Vasil Dolapchiev, BSP;
16th Sliven constituency—Stoyan Stoyanov, BSP;
17th Sliven constituency—Yovcho Rusev, BSP;
18th Sliven constituency—Dimitur Petrov, BSP;
19th Nova Zagora constituency—Manyo Manov, BSP;
23d Varna constituency—Nikolay Drumev, Union of Democratic Forces [SDS];
24th Varna constituency—Atanas Mochurov, SDS;
25th Varna constituency—Aleksandur Chirkov, SDS;
27th Varna constituency—Aleksandur Aleksandrov, SDS;
28th Georgi Traykov constituency—Krasimir Premyanov, BSP;
29th Devnya constituency—Ivan Mitev Dimitrov, BSP;
30th Provadiya constituency—Nikolay Todorov, BSP;
31st Balchik constituency—Todor Pandov, BSP;
32d General Toshevo constituency—Irina Bokova, BSP;
33d Dobrich constituency—Stoyno Atanasov, BSP;
34th Tolbukhin constituency—Nikola Zhelyazkov—BSP;
35th Tolbukhin constituency—Lyubomir Ivanov, BSP;
37th Novi Pazar constituency—Mitko Mutafchiev—BSP;
38th Kaolinovo constituency—Milan Yulianov—Movement for Rights and Freedoms [MRF];
39th Shumen constituency—Vasil Kolev—BSP;
40th Shumen constituency—Georgi Ivanov, BSP;
41st Shumen constituency—Gercho Atanasov, BSP;
45th Cherven Bryag constituency—Vasil Vasilev, BSP;
46th Dolna Mitropoliya constituency—Vasil Milkov, BSP;
47th Nikopol constituency—Lyubomir Draganov, BSP;
51st Pleven constituency—Svetlin Rusev Vulchev, BSP;
53d Levski constituency—Ginyu Ganev, Fatherland Union;
54th Lovech constituency—Nora Ananieva, BSP;
60th Pavlikeni constituency—Stanislav Stoev, BSP;
63d Veliko Turnovo constituency—Nikolay Minkov, BSP;
66th Strazhitsa constituency—Ivan Ivanov, BSP;
67th Vidin constituency—Blagoy Dechev, BSP;
68th Vidin constituency—Radoslav Gaydarski, BSP;
69th Kula constituency—Georgi Nachev, BSP;
70th Belogradchik constituency—Aleksandur Lilov, BSP;
71st Lom constituency—Rumen Georgiev;
72d Berkovitsa constituency—Emil Filipov, BSP;
73d Mikhaylovgrad constituency—Iliyan Iliev, BSP;
74th Mikhaylovgrad constituency—Aleksandur Tomov, BSP;
75th Vulchi Drum constituency—Ivan Kamenov, BSP;
76th Kozloduy constituency—Kuiril Nikolov, BSP;
77th Oryakhovo constituency—Nikola Tomov, BSP;
78th Byala Slatina constituency—Vrubka Orbetsova, BSP;
79th Mezdra constituency—Todor Todorov, BSP;
80th Vratsa conostituency—Krustyo Trendafilov, BSP;
81st Vratsa constituency—Dimitur Dimitrov, BSP;
82d Vratsa constituency—Ivan Dimitrov Velchev, BSP;
83d Karlovo constituency—Dimitur Yonchev, BSP;
85th Panagyurishte constituency—Petur Bashikarov, BSP;
86th Khisarya constituency—Vasil Mikhaylov, BSP;
87th Rakovski constituency—Angel Dimitrov, BSP;
88th Septemvri constituency—Nikola Todoriev, BSP;
89th Pazardzhik constituency—Ivan Murdzhev, BSP;
93th Peshtera constituency—Belcho Belchev, BSP;
96th Plovdiv constituency—Ivan Kostov, SDS;
97th Plovdiv constituency—Todor Tashev, SDS;
98th Plovdiv constituency—Andrey Andreev, SDS;
99th Plovdiv constituency—Khristo Markov, SDS;
101st Plovdiv constituency—Georgi Bunov, SDS;
102d Plovdiv constituency—Manol Zhurnalov, SDS;
103d Plovdiv constituency—Nikolay Bliznakov, SDS;
106th Devnya constituency—Filip Ishpekov, BSP;
107th Smolyan constituency—Dimitur Krustanov, BSP;
110th Purvomay constituency—Stoycho Shapatov, BSP;
111th Belene constituency—Nikodim Trifonov, BSP;
118th Kubrat constituency—Denis Kumanov, MRF;
121st Popovo constituency—Boncho Rashkov, BSP;
122d Turgovishte constituency—Teodor Gyaurov, BSP;
123d Turgovishte constituency—Krasimir Mirev BSP;
125th Isperikh constituency—Ibrakhim Tatarlu, MRF;
127th Silistra constituency—Kostadin Velkov, BSP;
128th Silistra constituency—Ekaterina Marinova, BSP;
129th Dulovo constituency—Ognyan mishev, MRF;
139th Pernik constituency—Mikhail Savov, BSP;
140th Radomir constituency—Boyko Dimitrov, BSP;
141st Kyustendil constituency—Pencho Penev, BSP;
143d Stanke Dimitrovo constituency—Emil Bozhanov, BSP;
145th Blagoevgrad constituency—Spas Dimitrov, SDS;
146th Blagoevgrad constituency—Ognyan Georgiev, SDS;
159th Stara Zagora constituency—Ivan Bozhkov, BSP;
160th Chirpan constituency—Trifon Mitev, BSP;
161st Radnevo constituency—Rusi Danev, BSP;

162d Dimitrovgrad constituency—Plamen Vlkanov, BSP;
163d Dimitrovgrad constituency—Ivan Tenev, BSP;
167th Kharmanli constituency—Kosta Andreev, BSP;
168th Svilengrad constituency—Klara Marinova, BSP;
170th Kirkovo constituency—Yuliyan Efremov, MRF;
171st Kurdzhali constituency—Yashar Bekirov, MRF;
173d Kurdzhali constituency—Bakhri Yumerov, MRF;
174th Momchilgrad constituency—Khasan Khasanov, MRF;
175th Sofia Sredets constituency—Stefan Savov, SDS;
176th Sofia Krasno Selo constituency—Dimitur Kumanov, SDS;
178th Sofia Vuzrazhdane constituency—Prof Konstantin Tsanev, SDS;
179th Sofia Oborishte constituency—Metodi Nedyalkov, SDS;
180th Sofia constituency—Aleksandur Karakachanov;
181st Sofia Poduyane constituency—Stefan Stoyanov, SDS;
182d Sofia Slatina constituency—Boyan Papazov, SDS;
184th Sofia Lozenets constituency—Ventseslav Dimitrov, SDS;
185th Sofia Triaditsa constituency—Krasen Stanchev, SDS;
187th Sofia Ilinden constituency—Pirin Vodenicharov, SDS;
189th Sofia Iskur constituency—Viktoriya Dimova, SDS;
190th Sofia Iskur constituency—Zakhari Karamfilov, SDS;
193d Sofia Studentski constituency—Stelyan Stoychev, SDS;
194th Sofia Vitosha constituency—Todor Kolev, SDS;
195th Sofia Ovcha Kupel constituency—Angel Akhryanov, SDS;
196th Sofia Lyulin constituency—Aleksandur Dzherov;
197th Sofia Lyulin constituency—Georgi Markov, SDS;
198th Sofia Vrubnitsa constituency—Mikhail Mikhaylov, SDS.

[Yancheva] Those are the names. I hope you did not find them too many for your attention. Mr. Popov wants to say something else.

[Popov] As you see, we were able to point out almost all the candidates of the single-mandate constituencies, who have been elected based on the majority system. At present the computers are working at full capacity calculating the election results in the 28 other multiple-candidate constituencies, where the additional 200 candidates will be elected.

Questions are being addressed continuously to our headquarters in the National Assembly. Obviously our work evokes great interest. The question always is the same—Why, why, why the delay? There also are reproaches, accusations, doubts, and simple human questions.

I would like to answer those compatriots, whom we like very much and whose sincere interest we understand. We must verify everything and announce correct and reliable results. We are working under great tension at the limits of human ability and with the computers' full capacity. The things must fit within their physical framework and conform to time and human ability dimensions.

Nowhere in the world are the results announced within 24 hours. In many places they need three, five, or even seven days. Let us recall that in Czechoslovakia the election process took two days.

The members of the commission and their aides do not distinguish between day and night. We promised to report the results within the shortest period possible, and we are doing everything possible to fulfill our promise. Let there be no doubt there is no delay. There is no delay. We are working beyond human capabilities and the computers' capacities. If someone wants to connect the delay with an attempt to change the results or correct them, let him understand there is no reason for this concern. Believe in the honesty of the Central Election Commission in which representatives of all political forces and the best technicians are employed.

Further Results

AU1306094290 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 0925 GMT 13 Jun 90

[Lili Yancheva report from the Central Election Commission headquarters at the National Assembly—live]

[Text] [Yancheva] Dimitur Popov, chairman of the Central Election Commission is standing next to me and he will announce the final results of the single-mandate constituencies elections.

[Popov] Good day. We are ready to announce the final results of the people's deputies who have been elected, their number and party affiliation, and the number of constituencies in which there will be a second round, as well as the number of the candidates in those constituencies and their party affiliation. This is to date:

Some 119 candidates have been elected as people's deputies. Of them 32 are candidates of the SDS; 75 representatives of the BSP; nine representatives of the MRF; one representative of the Fatherland Union; one representative of the Social-Democratic (Non-Marxist) Party; and one representative of the independent nonparty member candidates. All together 119 people's deputies.

The list will be immediately released to BTA for dissemination through its channels. It will be made known also to political forces and journalists who are interested. The list will be published in the press so every Bulgarian citizen can acquaint himself with it.

A second round will be conducted in 81 constituencies. The following representatives will compete: SDS—72;

BSP—77; MRF—seven; Fatherland Union—one; the Fatherland Labor Party—two; and three independent candidates.

The names of the candidates who will compete in the second round will also be published in the press. In addition, the percentage of votes they received in the first round will also be published, so that the candidates and the voters will know from what positions they are starting the second round.

BTA Reports Results

AU1206145990 Sofia BTA in English 1445 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Sofia, 12 Jun (BTA)—The Central Electoral Commission declared the official results of the voting for the 200 parliamentary seats distributed by a majority rule in single-member constituencies. The ruling Bulgarian Socialist (formerly Communist) Party (BSP) won 72 seats, the opposition Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) won 32 seats, and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms won 8 seats. One seat went to an independent candidate, one to a candidate of the Fatherland Union, and one to a candidate of the Social Democratic Party Non-Marxists. The results are still being calculated for another seven constituencies.

Seventy-eight seats will be decided in a second ballot on June 17.

The run-off election may lead to dramatic shifts in the distribution of parliamentary seats. Most of the 78 seats will be contested by candidates of the BSP and the SDS, and in several constituencies by candidates of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms and candidates of the BSP and the SDS.

Late tonight the Central Electoral Commission is expected to declare the official results of the voting in the 28 multi-member constituencies, on the basis of which another 200 seats will be distributed according to a proportional representation system.

SDS Lead Reported in Sofia

AU1206185490 Sofia BTA in English 1739 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Sofia, 12 Jun (BTA)—The majority-decision candidates who were returned to parliament in the first round of voting include Mr. Aleksandur Lilov, the leader of the ruling Bulgarian Socialist Party, Mr. Boyko Dimitrov, minister of foreign affairs, and the following members of the Lukanov administration: Mrs. Ekaterina Marinova, Mr. Pencho Penev, Mr. Ivan Tenev, and Mr. Belcho Belchev.

Mrs. Blaga Dimitrova, the well-known poetess, running for the SDS, was outvoted in her constituency by Mr. Vasil Mikhaylov, an actor standing for the BSP.

Of a total of one million eligible voters in Sofia, 883,000 exercised their franchise, which is equal to a voter turnout of 88 per cent, Mr. Dimitur Popov, secretary of the Central Electoral Commission, told a news conference here today.

The Union of Democratic Forces has a convincing lead in the capital city of 53.7 per cent in the proportional representation vote. The Bulgarian Socialist Party is second in Sofia with 38.9 per cent, and the Bulgarian Agrarian Party third with 0.5 per cent. The rest of the parties collected less than 1 per cent of the vote in Sofia.

Complete Results Expected 13 Jun

AU1306072290 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 0700 GMT 13 Jun 90

[Lili Yancheva report from the National Assembly—live]

[Text] [Yancheva] This morning at its meeting the Central Election Commission adopted an important decision. Mikhail Gorinov, head of the Press Center at the National Assembly will tell us about it.

[Gorinov] Actually, this is not a new decision, but only addenda to the Central Election Commission's decision of yesterday, with which it obliged the municipal people's councils in the districts where there will be a second round of elections, to prepare lists of the citizens eligible to vote in that round. What we added to this decision is that while preparing the lists the municipal people's councils should not include in them names of people, whose personal passports show that they last registered in the relevant district after 10 June 1990. The municipal people's councils throughout the country have already been notified of this decision.

In response to the great interest of all citizens in the results of the elections' first round, I can repeat what we have already said several times: The results of the elections in the multiple-mandate constituencies will be announced late tonight. The final results of the single-mandate constituencies, except for those where a second round is necessary, will be announced at noon today.

Reactions to Preliminary Results, Delays

BSP Supreme Council Declaration

AU1206144490 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] We have received a declaration of the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], which reads:

The first round of the Grand National Assembly elections has ended. The Central Election Commission already is reporting the election results. On this occasion the BSP Supreme Council appeals to all to calmly accept the results, which are an indication of the place and role the Bulgarian voters assign to the parties and movements in Bulgaria's social life. The reality must be soberly accepted as it is, precisely as the BSP has been doing since 10 November 1989. All information concerning violations of the Elections Law will be thoroughly examined. We think that there can be no difference in the way the law treats different cases. The Central Election Commission is the organ that will pronounce judgment on all the complaints. We can already say that the nature of the violations is such that they cannot cast any doubt on the election results and the character of the elections.

This has been confirmed in the numerous declarations made on Bulgarian Radio and Television by the foreign guests and representatives. There are some five days to go until the second round, which will take place on 17 June. However, let us also remember that after that date we shall continue to live and work together in the same country. The BSP Election Center appeals to all to remain calm. Let us not create problems for the normal functioning of society and let us thus ensure proper conditions for the successful completion of the elections.

Let us be worthy of courageously and responsibly assuming the country's fate in our hands, the BSP Supreme Council declaration reads in conclusion.

Simeonov Invited To Public Debate

AU1206185690 Sofia BTA in English
1800 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Bonn, 12 Jun (BTA)—Klaus Liepelt, director of the West German Institute INFAS invited Petko Simeonov, one of the Bulgarian opposition leaders, to a public debate on the significance of certain democratic values, as was told to a BTA reporter in Bonn.

According to Liepelt, his colleague sociologist Simeonov, who was against INFAS forecasts in Bulgaria, had absurd arguments. "As a sociologist he should know the significance of INFAS, which is an independent institute, while as a politician he should not have opposed the democratic coverage of elections by sociological research organizations," Liepelt said. He expressed a presumption that the Bulgarian opposition tried to stop INFAS from predicting the results as it intended to accuse the BSP of falsifying the elections if the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] did not win.

SDS Demands TV Carry Statement

AU1206185290 Sofia Domestic Service
in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] BTA submitted the following declaration of the SDS to us:

The SDS protests the refusal of the Television Committee chairman to let Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, chairman of the SDS Coordination Council, appear on the main television news program, called "Throughout the World and in Bulgaria" on 11 June and to read a declaration. As we know, the same program carried a declaration by Mr. Andrey Lukanov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, who will participate in the second round of elections, competing with SDS candidate Stefan Gaytandzhiev.

We insist that tonight, 12 June, the main news program "Throughout the World and in Bulgaria" should carry the statement by Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, chairman of the SDS Coordination Council.

The SDS has established that Bulgarian television has served the interests of the ruling party throughout the election campaign. For this reason we insist that Mr. Pavel Pisarev, chairman of the Television Committee, should be immediately released from this function.

In connection with the [words indistinct] occurred during the elections, which led to an exacerbation of political tension in the country before the first round's official election results have been announced, the SDS insists that the government should answer the following questions:

Who invited the INFAS institute to Bulgaria? Who signed an agreement with this company? Who paid $300,000 to the INFAS institute?

We insist that the Chief Prosecutor's Office deal with legitimizing the amount paid, the SDS declaration states.

CEC Holds News Conference

AU1206203790 Sofia Domestic Service
in Bulgarian 1930 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] In the second round of elections on 17 June, citizens will be entitled to vote only in their place of residence. It will no longer be possible for them to submit their voting documents at any place other than their residence. This was announced by Dimitur Popov, secretary of the Central Electoral Commission [CEC], at a news conference held at the People's Palace of Culture today.

He also announced the previously obtained results of the commission's work.

Answering a question on the possibility of [word indistinct] the elections, the representative of the CEC replied that such a problem is within the exclusive competence of parliament.

The data collected on certain violations which occurred during the elections are still under examination and will be submitted to the forthcoming National Assembly. Everyone should know that a large portion of the facts that have been reported do not represent deviations from the Electoral Law and do not influence the results. They contradict the Ethical Code and the rules of correct political behavior which were encroached upon by some political forces. This is also confirmed by the canvassing activities they conducted in some places on election day, Dimitur Popov stated.

Group 'Concerned' Over Delays

AU1206202090 Sofia BTA in English
1926 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Sofia, 12 Jun (BTA)—The Bulgarian Association for Fair Elections voiced tonight the results from the parallel counting of voices in 1,150 polling districts. They are 10 per cent of all districts and allow the making of forecasts by the majority system.

According to data 46.99 are won by the BSP, 36.13 by the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces], 8.19 by the BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union] and 6.31 by the Movement for Rights and Freedoms. The other parties and movements got under one per cent of the cast votes.

On the day of the elections collaborators of the Movement for Fair Elections have been present in nearly 8,000 polling districts from the beginning till the end of the election day.

According to this association's observers, among whom there are 70 experts from 14 countries, elections have passed calmly. At the same time, however, a number of infringements have been marked. Their number continues to increase after the juxtaposition of the election protocols and the results obtained.

The association is disappointed and concerned over the tardy voicing of the results. It expresses disagreement with the Central Electoral Commission which does not announce the infringements that have already been found.

The association is grateful to the U.S. National Democratic Institute for its free-of-charge cooperation. "Thousands of dollars have been paid for the other enquiry," it says, meaning the INFAS enquiry.

The association will work in the second round of the elections.

Election Chairman Makes Appeal

AU1306103090 Sofia Domestic Service
in Bulgarian 0945 GMT 13 Jun 90

[Statement read by Zhivko Stalev, chairman of the Central Election Commission, from the Sofia radio studio in Sofia—live]

[Text] Dear Compatriots,

We at the Central Election Commission are constantly receiving questions, reproaches, and even accusations and ultimatum demands, related to what people see as an unjustified delay in announcing the results of the Grand National Assembly elections. The people are talking about some kind of information blackout, manipulation of the results, attempts to cheat the Bulgarian voters, and a strange silence on the part of the Central Election Commission.

The impatience and suspicion of our compatriots is understandable after so many years of totalitarian regime in our country. However, I would like to tell you sincerely, Dear Compatriots: There is no unjustified delay in the work of the Central Election Commission. On the contrary. It works under tension which places its members at the end of human possibilities. They have not rested for three days and nights. The computers are working at full capacity. I implore you to understand the limits of the objective possibilities, because we need time to check the protocols signed after completing the elections. It takes time to transfer the protocols from more than 12,600 polling stations' commissions, 200 single-mandate commissions, and 28 multiple-mandate commissions. The transportation of the protocols from the section election commissions to the regional election commissions, and then to the Central Election Commission takes time.

In my conversations with foreign guests from Canada and United States we were assured that in those countries, where there is a multiparty system, the official results are announced not earlier than one to two weeks after the completion of the elections. How can a country like ours, which employs a much more complicated election system than that of the United States and Canada, be expected to announce the election results a day or two after the end of the elections?

I would also like to point out that the system of collecting, storing, and transferring the ballots, renders practically impossible any falsification or corrections and changes in the protocols.

The calculations are conducted by three independent teams using computers. A separate group of experts, in which there are members of the Bulgarian Socialist Party and the Union of Democratic Forces, is also checking the results of the multiple-candidate constituencies. Against this background it is impossible to expect that the results of the multiple-mandate constituencies could be announced earlier than late tonight.

As far as the other results are concerned, you were consistently informed about them, and now you already know the final results of the single-mandate constituency. From now on we can concentrate on processing the material related to the multiple-mandate constituencies, within the limitations of the computers. It is impossible to surpass the human limitations and computers' capacities and thus ensure quicker processing. We need time to check the results, because we cannot announce them before we are absolutely convinced that they are correct.

The Central Election Commission hopes that you will understand the situation in which it finds itself, will assess its efforts, so that its members will not be aggravated by absolutely undeserved reproaches. We implore you from the bottom of our hearts to provide us with a calm atmosphere for our work.

Thank you very much for your attention.

Election Protests, Investigations Continue

Students Occupy University

AU1206142190 Sofia BTA in English
1353 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Sofia, 12 Jun (BTA)—Striking students enrolled in Sofia's institutes of higher learning have occupied the building of Sofia University for a three-day sit-in. All entrances are closed with the exception of one through which the pickets admit students only. The whole campus is encircled by young people who go round chanting "SDS" (the Bulgarian initials of the opposition Union of Democratic Forces) and "We don't want communism, down with the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party]." Apart from the human chain, another large group of protesters obstructs the traffic at one of Sofia's busiest junctions.

The students demand that all complaints over electoral abuses and dishonest counting or reporting of the vote, received by the Central Electoral Commission, should be made public and investigated by the competent authorities. They urge the appointment of a commission of free-thinking journalists and members of the public to guarantee that the information provided about the elections is fair and complete.

Sofia University Professor Lyudmil Popov called Radio Sofia to say that the strikers were "a handful of people, 30 or 40 in all." A spokesman for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, however, put the number at 1,500 to 1,600. This morning Colonel General Atanas Semerdzhiev, minister of internal affairs, met with the strikers and tried to persuade them that this is no way to move towards democracy. Dr. Petur Beron, secretary of the SDS, was present at the meeting.

Mr. Steliyan Stoychev of the Federation of Independent Student Societies, who was returned to parliament in a Sofia constituency, said that the strike broke out spontaneously and was the first such form of protest. The strike could go on for more than three days, until all demands were met, he said.

More than 120 teachers and technical staff of Sofia University have joined the strike.

In a joint statement on Radio Sofia, Mr. Atanas Kirchev, president of the Federation of Independent Students Societies, and Mr. Todor Nikov of the Ministry of Internal Affairs denied that the students had anything to do with the group obstructing the road traffic near the university. Mr. Atanas Kirchev said that the strike committee will assist to the best of its power to the normalization of traffic in the adjacent streets and specified that the students would comply with any election results, irrespective of whether they are in favour of the SDS or the BSP, provided they are not manipulated in advance or fraudulent, and that they are protesting against electoral abuses and not against the results. According to Mr. Todor Nikov, the students strike is held in perfect order.

More on Students' Unrest

AU1206131590 Sofia Domestic Service
in Bulgarian 1140 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Excerpts] We received many phone calls asking about rumors of an incident between a militia bus and students.

Ivaylo Galevski, a student of Sofia University, who was a witness to the incident told us that this morning, around 0500, a militia bus full of militia personnel wearing helmets, passed through the group of students who had gathered in front of the National Assembly building and headed in the direction of Eagles' Bridge. A girl tried to stop the bus by standing in front of it, and trying to protect the girl, another male student hurt his arm. A young boy was also injured when he tried to stop the bus. Medical assistance was rendered.

The incident prompted a meeting of Minister of Internal Affairs Atanas Semerdzhiev and Petur Beron from the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS]. One of our reporters attended the meeting and from the recording you can hear that it was rather stormy.

[Begin unidentified student recording] We are asking why did the bus not stop and why did it not disperse us? [passage omitted on several voices speaking at the same time, one presumably Semerdzhiev's voice who said that the bus was not authorized to stop and disperse the demonstration] [end recording]

Let us now switch back to our radio station at the Sofia People's Palace of Culture where our reporter Aglaya Shamlieva has been reporting.

[Begin recording] [Shamlieva] Great tension also prevails at the press center of the People's Palace of Culture. The Ministry of Internal Affairs news conference on the situation in the country coincided with an improvised news conference of the Federation of Independent Students Association. We now meet at the People's Palace of Culture studio Lieutnant Colonel Todor Minkov and Atanas Kirchev, chairman of the federation. I would like to ask him in the first place: What do you want, what are you looking for?

[Kirchev] I do not intend to comment on what happened a short while ago. This was again a result of disinformation which, in my opinion, is deliberately created around the students' strike at the university, considering that the basic information about our action is submitted in the form of reports from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, I do not know why this is so.

I would like to explain the details of the strike. In the first place, let us examine the reasons for our strike: One of the main reasons is that the fragmentary data we receive from the central and the local electoral commissions inspire serious doubts about the reliability of the election results.

In the second place, we were prompted by the information blackout practiced by all mass media, such as press, the radio, and television about the current events in Sofia, and we would like to explain that the events are not organized, they are the result of mass people's dissatisfaction and distrust in the preliminarily election results. [end recording] [passage omitted on unidentified students' representative on election manipulations, complaining about radio and television coverage which identifies the demonstrators blocking Sofia streets with the students on strike, stating that they cooperate, on the contrary with militia forces, and asks Minkov to confirm this]

[Begin Minkov recording] I have no problems with the students for the time being. You see, when going to inspect the spot where the road was blocked I did not know any details about the incident and I thought that the students were responsible for it. The truth, however, turned out to be different. At the assignment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs leadership, I established contact with the students' committee and our talks first of all clarified the true state of affairs, and in the second place, they made it possible to reach a certain common view that the disruptions of traffic in the capital and the encroachments against public order do not help anyone at this moment, and we also reached an agreement that the students should assist the ministry's organs in their efforts to restore at least the traffic in the main Sofia streets. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Interior Ministry Comments

AU1206160990 Sofia BTA in English 1511 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Sofia, 12 Jun (BTA)—After the elections there were protests of the opposition in the region of Plovdiv, in Pazardzhik, Stara Zagora, Ruse and Lovech. This was announced by the spokesman of the Ministry of Interior Yordan Ormankov. He said that the larger part of the signals for infringements of social order are being checked.

The protests of SDS followers were against the falsifications of the elections results, according to their opinion. An initiative group for strike and civil disobedience was set up in Stara Zagora. An SDS rally was not permitted as the demand was a breach of the order on rallies and demonstrations. About 100 SDS supporters in Ruse "have shown disagreement" with the way of holding the elections. SDS activists in the cities of Lovech and Pleven have organized a car rally to Sofia.

In the country there are rumours about declaring of martial law or a state of emergency in Sofia.

Representatives of the Ministry of Interior rejected yesterday that in the centre of Sofia there have been two lorries with riot police. Around the National Assembly building, as they say, there were trucks but they were driven there to block the access to the building in which the Central Electoral Commission was and around which the demonstrators gathered.

A journalist from Radio Free Europe said that representatives of the Ministry of Interior have hampered his enquiry in front of the municipality where they were waiting for people from the electoral commission to bring the protocols with the results. Mr. Ormankov expressed his surprise and said that the bodies of order should have cooperated.

In was announced that the situation in the regions where there are Turkish people was calm. No objections against infringements of the election law were made there.

Most of the signals which the Ministry of Interior is checking refer to the behaviour of SDS activists. Journalists were cheered up by the story about a signal [tip-off] about a Belgian citizen of Bulgarian origin who allegedly promised 120 dollars to everybody in the city of Vidin who would cast his vote for the SDS. There was a similar reaction to the story about a cook who refused to give food to the BSP adherents. There was information about "gross propaganda" at some of the places to the avail of the SDS on the election day.

In Stanke Dimitrov there was an anonymous signal that if there is a rally in Sofia ERA-3 [Alternative Civic Parliament Movement] will throw there a bomb. In this city which is near the capital no activists of ERA-3 have been registered.

In Sofia there was an announcement that elections have passed without violations with the exception of a drunken man's hooligan behaviour.

After yesterday's SDS rally traffic in the city is hampered. At some places in the centre it is still suspended. In front of the SDS building there are sitting people with red and black banner. [as received] The SDS differentiated itself from this event.

It was said about the demonstrators in Sofia that "they are seeking clashes with the police," but they do not succumb to provocation and are showing tolerance.

ASP Supports Student Strike

AU1206203390 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1930 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] We received a declaration of the Alternative Socialist Party [ASP], which expresses its full solidarity with the Bulgarian students who are on strike. The ASP supports the students' demands expressed by the Strike Committee of the Federation of Independent Students Associations.

Demonstrations Enter Third Day

AU1306065390 Sofia Domestic Service
in Bulgarian 0600 GMT 13 Jun 90

[Text] Katya Chorova reports from Veliko Turnovo that for the third day running, a part of the main street in front of the Municipal People's Council is blocked by a group of young people who responded to the appeal for civil disobedience issued by the Union of Democratic Forces. During the day they are sitting in the street. The participants—mostly students from Veliko Turnovo University—also spent the night in the street, lying on blankets and sleeping bags. So far some 2,000 people have signed their appeal, which calls for the invalidation of the elections in the constituencies where manipulations have been established, and for the resignation of the president and the premier.

Attitudes toward the sit-down strike are completely polarized, our correspondent reports. They range from total support to total repudiation. Representatives of the local authorities used the local radio station to appeal to the public to keep calm and prevent further exacerbations of the situation in the city.

Nayden Rangelov reports from Stara Zagora that the sit-down strike continued throughout the night in front of the Municipal People's Council. It is an expression of civil disobedience. Several boys and girls below the age of 18 were among the young people who waved the national and SDS flags and chanted SDS slogans.

Nikolay Kolev—the Barefooted One, on whose initiative the strike began—said that the strike will continue until the participants receive an answer from the Central Election Commission to their inquiries concerning cases of Election Law violations.

Lyuben Antonov reports from Ruse that, after the improvised demonstration of SDS members and supporters in the streets and the sit-down strike of several dozens of young people in front of the Municipal People's Council, last night the citizens were invited to participate in a silent vigil in Freedom Square. From 2130 [1830 GMT] until almost midnight there were more than 1,000 people in the square. The impressive silent vigil was an expression of the SDS protest against the election results, and it continued until 2300 [2000 GMT]. Shortly before midnight a group of participants, mostly students, headed toward the building of the Angel Kunchev Higher Technical School, where the vigil now continues.

The silent vigil in the square is also continuing. Several dozen young SDS supporters are participating. It is expected that new participants will join the vigil.

The polarization of the political forces in Ruse, in which an organized opposition bloc against the Bulgarian Socialist Party has emerged, allows the assumption that the silent vigil will continue throughout the day.

Militia Major Comments

AU1306100290 Sofia Domestic Service
in Bulgarian 0915 GMT 13 Jun 90

[Text] Major Nikolay Nikolov, spokesman for the Sofia Directorate of Internal Affairs, reports on the situation in Sofia:

There are several hot spots in Sofia: the main road in front of Sofia University, where a group of about 200 supporters of the Committee on Civic Disobedience have congregated. Because of their presence on the main street and the temporary barricades, the traffic along the Ruski and Tolbukhin Boulevards and on Shipka Street continues to be blocked. The second hot spot is the Eagles Bridge crossroad, where there is a group of about 150 people. There is a third group on Lenin Boulevard, in front of the Printing Enterprise, which consists of about 120 people.

Because of the last two groups that I mentioned, and the temporary barricades, the traffic along Ruski, Klement Gottwald, and Bulgaria Boulevards has been completely stopped, while the traffic on Lenin Boulevard has been stopped at the section between Eagles Bridge and the Ropotamo Restaurant.

The demonstration in front of the Bulgarian television station continues. About 250 people are participating. They stand in front of the main entrance.

The People's Militia units are very busy and are taking the necessary legal measures to protect public order. We appeal again to Sofia citizens: Please show prudence and tolerance. In this way you will cooperate in normalizing the situation.

State of Emergency Rumors Denied

AU1206171390 Sofia Domestic Service
in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] BTA disseminated the following announcement by the Ministry of National Defense:

Following the Grand National Assembly elections held on 10 June, rumors are being spread among the public that preparations are being made to declare a state of emergency in our country.

The Ministry of National Defense declares that such rumors are ill-intentioned and stem from circles interested in maintaining tension among the population.

The regiments and units of the Bulgarian People's Army are conducting a normal training process in accordance with their established schedules and plans.

Parties Prepare for Second Round of Elections

BSP Appeals for Support

AU1206203190 Sofia BTA in English
1936 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Sofia, 12 Jun (BTA)—The elections have shown how deep the roots of the socialist ideas in Bulgaria are, reads the address of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] Supreme Council which was circulated here tonight. It expresses thankfulness to all who have backed the Socialists.

The BSP appeals to the electors to back its candidates in the second round. "The BSP is able to cooperate with the other political forces and take Bulgaria out of the crisis without any chaos or breakneck inflation, without large-scale unemployment without soaring prices," the address reads.

24,804 New Members Join BSP

AU1306113490 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian
8 Jun 90 p 1

[DUMA unattributed report: "24,0804 New Socialists"]

[Text] Within 60 days—namely within the period from 1 April to 1 June 1990—24,804 new members have joined the Bulgarian Socalist Party and were admitted at their request. A total of 13,210 of them are women. This increased the number of newly admitted BSP members from the beginning of 1990 to date to a total of 33,884—which is nearly twice as many as the number of new members admitted throughout 1989.

The influx of young people is a special guarantee for the party's future, for its renewal. Over one third of the new BSP members are younger than 29.

A total of 5,484 people have handed in their membership cards since 1 April 1990, but this is also a normal and understandable process.

Considering the fact that by 1 April 1990 the number of BSP members amounted to 986,434, we can assume that the one millionth member of the party will be admitted in the week following 24 May 1990.

Some Opposition To Support SDS

AU1206133390 Sofia BTA in English
1300 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Sofia, 12 Jun (BTA)—The Political Opposition Bloc-Centre called on its supporters to vote for the candidates of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) in the second round of voting of the parliamentary elections on June 17.

A similar appeal already came from the Bulgarian Agrarian Party (BZNS) and the Alternative Socialist Party. In the constituencies where it does not have candidates of its own, the ethnic Turks' Movement for Rights and Freedoms will also support the SDS. The movement's leader, Mr. Akhmed Dogan, recently made a statement to this effect.

The Political Opposition Bloc declared that it cannot accept the election results as unbiased. It voiced concern over the too low percentage of votes for the minor parties. It believes that the vote counting and reporting was rigged.

Independent Union To Support SDS

AU1306063990 Sofia Domestic Service
in Bulgarian 0500 GMT 13 Jun 90

[Text] After yesterday's declarations of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, the Alternative Socialist Party, the Political Opposition Bloc-Center, and the Nonparty Member Center Association, we have received another document with similar contents. This is the declaration of the Union of Nonparty Members, which appeals to its members and supporters and all nonparty members in the country, I quote, to vote without any hesitation on 17 June for the candidates of the united opposition [unquote]. The document is signed by Boyan Velkov, chairman of the Union of Nonparty Members.

No New Voters Eligible

AU1206194590 Sofia BTA in English
1803 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Sofia, 12 Jun (BTA)—At its regular session today the Central Electoral Commission adopted a resolution that in the second tour for the Grand National Assembly election (which will be held on June 17) it will not include in the additional register a voter whose last passport registration in the district region was done after June 10. (The first tour of the elections was on June 10.)

Commentary on Election's 'Road Toward Europe'

AU1206100390 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian
11 Jun 90 p 1

[Unattributed editorial article]

[Text] The calmest day since 10 November 1989 was perhaps 10 June. Perhaps it marked the beginning of true political tolerance and honest political cooperation, as the elections themselves were.

Let us finally fill the gap created by lack of mutual trust. May we quickly forget the election campaign gestures and begin to use our hands everywhere, not only in the squares.

This should happen because Bulgaria is above everything else. Bulgaria is the only thing we will leave to our children. Our passions, victories, and defeats have no meaning outside the borders of the entity we call motherland. We lived too long in a silent and concealed controversy. We will hardly gain anything if we replace it now with an overt and uncompromising mutual negation, which could be destructive for the country.

The date, 10 June belongs to all. Let us remember that we were together at the polling stations, that there was no gap between us, and no hatred in our eyes. We made our political choice. Now is the turn of our civil choice on which it depends how long the country's crisis will continue and until when our future will remain unclear.

The civic slogan of the Bulgarian Socialist Party is well known—cooperation. Cooperation with all those who are ready to overcome their narrow party interests in the name of the national interests. Cooperation not in the name of some abstract idea, but prompted by the necessity to utilize our entire public energy for the development of Bulgaria's democracy and prosperity.

The 10th of June was the most difficult step along our road toward Europe. Europe was here and saw with its own eyes how we made this step. Let us preserve the same dignity along the entire road.

Yesterday we all really won. Congratulations!

Gorbachev's Changes, Perestroyka Assessed

AU1206084590 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 9 Jun 90 p 4

[Ivanka Khlebarova article: "Restructuring—Pluses and Minuses"]

[Text] Upon his return, following his successful visit to the United States, Mikhail Gorbachev is likely to find a "huge amount of work on the domestic scene"— this is what some of his opponents forecast, not without a certain malicious satisfaction. New events, each with its own colorful shade and crucial importance, add to the stormy political life in the Soviet Union every day. Tension is growing. This has become the everyday life of that glorious country, and more and more often you can hear the anxious question: "Where are we going?"

Authoritative scholars assert that the economic crisis is gradually turning into a chaotic state of affairs, but Professor Abalkin once more defended the government's program, describing it as a "document prepared with great care for detail and including all important aspects of restructuring the Soviet economy on market economy principles."

"The nationality conflicts" represent a threat which draws attention constantly. At the same time, however, the opinion increasingly prevails that this huge country needs a new law responding to the interests of each republic—namely, that a new type of federation, or confederation is required.

Only a few months ago conservatives and radicals crossed swords in a fierce dispute concerning the presidential institution while their "camps" were regrouping to the very last moment. The famous "absolute majority" of the past no longer exists, but on the other hand, it is a fact that the presidential institution is already exceeding the full powers of the bureaucratic hierarchy of the party in the past.

Every reform seems to require much effort before it is achieved and this applies both to the elimination of Article 6 of the country's Constitution and to the introduction of the market economy. Various platforms are adopted only to be rejected after a short time, declarations are publicized, open letters are written. New parties and movements are emerging, various groups are merging. The spectrum of Soviet political life is quite wide. The USSR has turned into a country where pluralism, glasnost, and the multiparty system already belong to everyday life.

Today when the inexorable critics are directing their arrows against the initiators of Soviet perestroyka, no one should forget that these huge minuses are counterbalanced by great pluses. This is so because all these issues are closely interrelated. The main thing is to advance confidently toward the future. Progress in the Soviet Union is backed by the radical, democratic forces, and not by the party conservatives. The radicals are those who are most left wing and also those who are at the center, while the right wing forces are expected to regroup in the future. All these forces are expected to pursue their disputes in parliament and at future congresses. Their indomitable spirit will be a source of energy for further progress in the entire democratization process which is currently evolving in Soviet society.

French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas Visits

Received by President Havel

LD1006124290 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1200 GMT 10 Jun 90

[Text] Today in Lany, President of the Republic Vaclav Havel received French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, who was accompanied by Jiri Dienstbier, deputy federal prime minsiter and Czechoslovak minister of foreign affairs.

According to information given to CTK by presidential advisor Alexander Vondra, both representative talked about the planned trip to Czechoslvakia this year by French President Francois Mitterrand and Prime Minister Michel Rocard. They devoted a great deal of their attention to the situation in Czechoslovakia, the outcome of the elections, and the outlook for the political scene and the economic situaiton in Czechoslovakia during the next two years. Vaclav Havel also briefed his guest about the talks in Moscow, the future development of the Warsaw Pact, and the development of new security structures in Europe.

Dienstbier, Dumas on European Issues

LD1006134290 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 1300 GMT 10 Jun 90

[Text] Talks were held in Cernin Palace in Prague today between Jiri Dienstbier, deputy federal prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, and French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas. Both officials spoke in favour of creating a new European-wide security structure on the basis of the Helsinki process.

Jiri Dienstbier recalled that Czechoslovakia is supporting the development of cooperation among European countries not only in the political but also the economic, scientific, technological, and cultural areas. He described Czechoslovakia's entry into the EC as a priority issue. Jiri Dienstbier then went on to inform the guest about the results of the meeting of the political consultative committee of the Warsaw Pact member countries in Moscow. He confirmed, among other things, that Czechoslovakia is in favor of the Warsaw Pact continuing its existence for a certain period of time and of markedly strengthening its political role.

Roland Dumas briefed his counterpart about the integrational processes in Western Europe. He described the creation of conditions for bringing the processes in East and West Europe closer together as an urgent task. Regarding German unification he said, among other things, that the results of the two-plus-four talks should be submitted to a Helsinki summit meeting at the end of the year, which should then take a stand on the issue.

Both ministers also stressed that the future of Europe cannot be built without the participation of the United States and Canada, and that the Soviet Union must not be isolated from the European-wide processes.

Calfa, Dumas Discuss Ties

LD1006211790 Prague CTK in English 1607 GMT 10 Jun 90

[Text] Prague June 10 (CTK)—French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas said at his meeting with Czechoslovak Premier Marian Calfa here today that France fully supports Czechoslovakia's closest possible integration in the European Communities.

French assistance provided for Czechoslovakia in its return to Europe is most distinct in the program of expert training which will embrace 700 people by the end of this year. This will also give an important impulse to the development of bilateral economic cooperation which is still largely lagging behind possibilities.

It was stressed at the meeting that Czechoslovakia is interested, inter alia, in cooperation in the sphere of nuclear energy, especially because French nuclear powers plants are exceptionally safe.

The French minister, who arrived in Czechoslovakia yesterday, and Marian Calfa also discussed possibilities of cooperation in the automobile industry. Roland Dumas said that the firms interested in joint ventures, especially with the Skoda car works at Mlada Boleslav, Central Bohemia, include also the Citroen company which established first systematic contacts in this direction already three years ago.

Dumas on European Confederation

LD1006211990 Prague CTK in English 1702 GMT 10 Jun 90

[Text] Prague June 10 (CTK)—Visiting French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas told journalists here today that a free and democratic Czechoslovakia should prospectively join the European confederation the establishment of which was proposed recently by French President Francois Mitterrand.

Asked whether the results of the Czechoslovak elections will encourage the French capital to invest in Czechoslovakia, Roland Dumas answered affirmatively. But he added that Czechoslovakia must do a great deal in the sphere of legislation which would create scope for the activity of foreign entreprenerus and investors.

Roland Dumas said that the lifting of visas between Czechoslovakia and France should be expected in a very near future.

USSR Soldiers Withdraw From Sumperk

LD1206131790 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1030 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] A group of 20 bomb-disposal experts from our Army arrived on duty at all three locations in and around Sumperk from which Soviet troops withdrew in the past few days. Soldiers are also guarding the Sumperk barracks, consisting of 52 buildings, which were handed over to the National Committee on 11 June. Their future has not yet been decided.

According to (Ivan Kroupa), deputy chairman of the town National Committee in Sumperk, the damage caused by the military staying in and around the town amounts to more than 38 million korunas, and ecological damage worth some 10 million korunas has to be added to this.

Dubcek Backs Gorbachev Remarks on Invasion

AU1206163290 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 6 Jun 90 pp 1, 3

[Report on interview with Federal Assembly Chairman Alexander Dubcek by Igor Cibula; place and date not given: "Looking Straight Ahead"]

[Excerpt] Bratislava—CSFR Federal Assembly Chairman Alexander Dubcek has taken part in many preelection meetings and gatherings. Despite this, we asked him a few questions which are at the center of interest for the Slovak public.

[Cibula] You met Soviet President Gorbachev recently. Do you consider the 1968 events to be a closed chapter which will no longer burden Czechoslovak-Soviet relations?

[Dubcek] The year 1968 was one of the subjects of my talks with President Gorbachev. On the subject of the 1968 military intervention in our internal affairs, President Gorbachev said that for the new Soviet leadership this matter was closed by declaring that the intervention was not justified.

The error has been admitted late, he said. Better late than never, however. The Soviet Union had to change itself before it could make such an admission.

The meeting was satisfying to me and to all who were engaged in the reformist movement in 1968. It was also a recognition of the work and sacrifices, which were not wasted and which will also bear fruit in the Soviet Union itself. The year 1968 will not be one of remorse for us and for the Soviet leadership, but will be a permanent lesson that no force can suppress an idea which is truthful. [passage omitted]

Official on Border Troops' Replacement

LD1206204790

[Editorial Report] Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak at 1630 GMT on 12 June carries a four-minute recorded interview with Lieutenant Colonel Ondrej Petrzak, commander of the Bratislava border guards unit, by correspondent Igor Matlon.

Matlon notes that the replacement of border guards unit with a professional border police is planned beginning on 1 January 1993. He goes on to ask about the planned changes of the border guards organizational structure in the coming 30 months transition period. Petrzak replies that the guarding of Czechoslovak borders "will conform with the general laws and principles valid all over Europe. National service soldiers will gradually leave the border service and this means that protection by troops will be replaced with police protection of state borders. At the same time, the border police will fully protect state borders and ensure observance of all laws in the border area."

Speaking about the tasks of "the already established professional border police," Petrzak notes that the draft bill on border police and state border protection will be discussed by the Federal Assembly. He goes on to say that according to some existing ideas the tasks of border police should, in the first place, center on ensuring the sovereignty of the state, on protecting economic interests, and on safeguarding legality in border areas. It will be reminiscent of the tasks of the public security forces on the remainder of the territory of the state.

Petrzak is then asked to speak about the increasing numbers of attempts to cross the border between Uipelsky Sokolec and Morava-Dyje. Petrzak replies: "The attempts to cross the state borders have grown approximately three-fold in comparison with the past year. It is mainly the citizens of other nationalities, who are in the republic, that contribute to the pressure exerted at the state border. They are attempting to cross the state borders, perhaps for political or economic reasons. Up to yesterday 246 persons were detained in the section convered by our unit. Of them 68 were citizens of Vietnam, 39 citizens of the Republic of Poland, 31 citizens from Cambodia, 11 citizens of the Republic of Romania, and the remainder were from other countries, such as Syria, the Soviet Union, and so on. Seventy-five of our citizens attempted to cross the state borders, which is in line with the past and which means that the number did not increase, that it stayed on the same level," Petrzak concluded.

Military Budget Figures Announced

LD1306112390 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 1000 GMT 13 Jun 90

[Text] The Czechoslovak military budget is finally no secret anymore. (Vit Suchy), press spokesman attached to the secretariat of the Federal Minister of National Defense, said at a meeting with journalists that our military spending last year reached 35,062 million korunas. The sum of 31,180 million korunas is envisaged for this year.

Interior Minister on Security Problems

PM1206151990 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 7 Jun 90 p 9

[Report on interview with Interior Minister Richard Sacher by Michael Kuttner in Prague on 6 June: "Change in Czechoslovakia"]

[Text] Prague—A small man behind a large desk in an ugly concrete building in central Prague is currently trying, immediately before Czechoslovakia's first free elections for 40 years, to overcome a wave of terrorist threats and criminality the likes of which the country has not seen since World War II.

Interior Minister Richard Sacher arrives at his huge office every morning to receive a new pile of threatening letters, and his family is constantly disturbed by anonymous telephone calls from people threatening them with death and destruction. As the minister steps into the creaking elevator which takes him up to the chief's office on the fifth floor, he may also wonder to what extent he can rely on his aides.

In an exclusive interview with BERLINGSKE TIDENDE 48 hours before the 8 and 9 June parliamentary elections Richard Sacher confirmed that security in the country "has deteriorated significantly" and that robberies, thefts, and the use of violence are increasing dramatically. In addition there are also the extremist separatist tendencies in Slovakia, the southern part of the federation, racist attacks on gypsies and Vietnamese guest workers, and "elements of fascism."

Sacher, who is leader of Czechoslovakia's People's Party, which chiefly comprises Catholics from Czech Moravia, called all this "a phenomenon which surfaces in countries on their way to democracy." He pointed to similar experiences in Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet Union.

But the bomb on 2 June in Old Town Hall Square in Prague which wounded 19 people seems to suggest that Czechoslovakia's non-Communist leadership, which took power during the peaceful revolution in November, is up against very particular forces. Since 1 January the authorities have received 600 terrorist threats and the explosion last weekend—the first of its kind since World War II—had a professional touch about it.

The bomb was probably detonated by remote control, and as yet the police have found neither it nor those responsible. However, the authorities are engaged in a round-the-clock investigation and at present are working on "five or six theories, two of which have foreign connections," the interior minister said.

"But the action has had the effect," he said, "that the people now realize you cannot build up democracy without a security apparatus."

The Czechoslovaks had lost confidence in that apparatus after the secret police persecution of dissidents during 40 years of Communist rule. Now the majority of the 8,500 secret agents have been dismissed and their organization, the State Secret Police [StB], has been disbanded, Richard Sacher said.

Sacher himself has been criticized for being too slow with the dismissals. But it has been a "complicated process," he said—a reference to the fact that the government has been anxious about provoking desperate actions by the now superfluous agents.

All 8,500 men have had their past histories investigated, and those who have not committed criminal acts can make the switch to ordinary police work. However, they are not having any contacts with the new security policy which is being built up, and whose strength Richard Sacher was unwilling to discuss. "There is hardly an interior minister in the world who would want to discuss that," he said. "But it will be a lot smaller than the StB," Sacher reassured me.

Does the 47-year-old interior minister trust his own personnel, some of whom served under the Communist regime?

"You cannot do anything without trust. But I do have a certain ingrained distrust. I trust people because of their behavior and not on the basis of what they say. I also rely on my intuition. It has never let me down. And it is the most important thing to have in this branch, where there is often a very big difference between what people say and what they do."

Former Slovak Premier Colotka Detained

LD1206161590 Prague CTK in English
1440 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Bratislava June 12 (CTK)—Former Slovak Premier Peter Colotka was detained on June 11, in connection with investigations into his alleged criminal activity; abuse of power of a public official, embezzlement of funds and larceny.

The public will be informed about the course of the investigation.

Bartoncik Accuses Officials of 'Lying'

LD1306084190 Prague CTK in English
0725 GMT 13 Jun 90

[Text] Prague June 13 (CTK)—Chairman of the Czechoslovak People's Party Josef Bartoncik accused today Prosecutor-General of the Czech Republic Pavel Rychetsky, adviser of the Czechoslovak President Jiri Krizan and de facto also President Vaclav Havel of lying.

In an interview published by the youth daily MLADA FRONTA Bartoncik, who has been accused before the June 8-9 parliamentary elections in Czechoslovakia of 17-year collaboration with secret police, rejected the accusations.

At a press conference on June 9, Czechoslovak Deputy Interior Minister Jan Ruml, Czech Prosecutor-General Pavel Rychetsky and presidential adviser Jiri Krizan provided concrete data connected with the activities of Josef Bartoncik. According to the People's Party chairman, Jiri Krizan distorted facts concerning his discussion with President Havel which took place at the beginning of the last week.

In the interview Bartoncik stressed his innocence, pointing out that all accusations voiced by Ruml, Rychetsky and Krizan are fabrications. He claimed that he has never signed anything for secret police and that the testimony of a former security police member is a fabrication as well. He said he had the impression from the discussions with the president that a mafia is going to undermine the elections and that the president only wanted him not to run for the function of the Federal Assembly chairman or other high state function.

He described the whole affair as unprecedented bestiality covered by ridiculous phrases, commenting on the press conference on June 9, he said: "If I should not consider it a completely extraordinary excess I must voice the opinion that people will be forced to emigrate from this country soon again."

CSL Daily Reacts to Bartoncik Affair

AU1206200690

[Editorial Report] Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech, the daily of the Czechoslovak People's Party, CSL, publishes in its 7, 8, 9, and 11 June issues a number of items responding to the referent statement by Jan Ruml, deputy minister of interior, regarding CSL Chairman Josef Bartoncik and his alleged forfeiture of the right to serve as deputy in the Federal Assembly. The CSL daily devotes the following material to the affair.

On 7 June, on pages 1 and 4, LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE carries a 1,200- word "ld"-signed commentary entitled "Gangster-Like Methods in Political Practice." The commentary compares Ruml's "gangster-like methods" with those practiced by Communists before their seizure of power and voices the suspicion that the statement was motivated by Ruml's ambition to take over the post of minister of interior. It points out that, by issuing his statement, Ruml showed that he "does not care a bit for agreements, ethics, and decency" because, according to the parties' agreement, the results of the screenings of candidates for the elections were to be passed to the leadership of the respective parties and not to the public. According to the LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE commentary, the statement was timed so that Bartoncik, who is currently hospitalized, would not have a chance to defend himself before the elections. In conclusion, the commentary states that "those claiming to pursue the aims of the velvet revolution and speaking of themselves as its guarantee are beginning to dig its grave." It affirms that "regardless of whether some functionary failed or not" the ideals of the Christian and Democratic Union, KDU, remain unchanged and appeals to voters to vote for the KDU because "this may be their last chance to prevent another one-party rule."

Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech on 8 June devotes the following items to the Ruml-Bartoncik affair.

On page 1, it carries a 600-word commentary by Jiri Cerny, CSL general secretary, entitled "Are We Returning to Totalitarianism?" Cerny says that Ruml "misused his post and state media to influence the election results" and that his conduct violated the election law, which bans the use of state-controlled media for campaign purposes 48 hours before the elections are due. Cerny also protests against the fact that, while Ruml's statement was broadcast as part of the main news program, his own response was broadcast late in the evening when very few people watch television. Moreover, in order to publish his statement, CTK deputy chief editor Holubec forced Cerny to delete from it all references to the CSL and to formulate it as a "personal protest." Cerny believes that this "was no coincidence" and points out that both CTK director Petr Uhl and Czechoslovak Television director Jiri Kanturek are Civic Forum members and that Jan Ruml's close ties to the Civic Forum are also "beyond doubt." Cerny asks voters to consider whether by "giving their trust to the Civic Forum" in the elections they will not make it possible for a "predatory force to seize uncontrolled power again, as happened in 1946."

On page 1, LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE also carries a 300-word "MD"-signed report entitled "Dr. J. Bartoncik's Testimony." The report provides Josef Bartoncik's replies to LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE questions concerning Jan Ruml's statement. Bartoncik conveyed his replies through his personal secretary A. Pukowiecova, "one of the few persons who has had access to him" since his hospitalization. Asked whether he promised Jan Ruml that he would leave the political scene and withdraw his candidacy, Bartoncik says: "I have not promised Mr. Ruml anything of the sort. I do not know him, have never met him, and have never issued any statement to this effect." According to Bartoncik, the only talks he had held before his sudden hospitalization on 5 June were with representatives of the Civic Forum Coordinating Center and the president. These discussions concerned the "composition of constitutional bodies after the elections." Asked about his reaction to Jan Ruml's accusations, Bartoncik says: "I reject all facts which Jan Ruml indicated as related to my person and regard them as fabricated. The decision on whether I can work in the Federal Assembly should be made by the voters."

Also on page 1, LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE publishes the "texts" of letters which Josef Bartoncik sent to Jan Ruml and Federal Assembly Chairman Alexander Dubcek. In the 100-word letter to Ruml, Bartoncik calls on the deputy interior minister to "furnish evidence" of his accusations and to present this evidence to Bartoncik personally. In the 150-word letter to Dubcek, Bartoncik asks for the provision of "protection" against "unprecedented attacks" on his person, protection which is due to him as a "constitutional official." On the same page, LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE also publishes a 100-word communique on Josef Bartoncik's state of health. It states that Bartoncik was taken to the hospital on 5 June because of "suspicion of a heart disease." Even though subsequent examinations "confirmed the suspicion, the state of health of the patient can be described as stable." LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE's front page on 8 June also features the following items related to the affair:

A 200-word statement by the Central Electoral Commission, which qualifies the publication of Ruml's statement on Czechoslovak Television and by CTK as a "gross violation" of the election law; a 200-word letter by Jiri Cerny, CSL general secretary, to President Havel announcing that a complaint against the violation of the election law had been lodged with the Council of Europe and drawing attention to the "serious consequences of the intolerable conduct" of Jan Ruml for the "stability of our domestic political situation;" a 100-word report on talks between the KDU coalition partners held on 7 June, which "confirmed the absolute unity of the coalition partners, especially in connection with the efforts of some forces to disrupt this unity and to enter into separate negotiations;" as well as a 350-word report on a 7 June session of the CSL Presidium which sums up the CSL's objections to the publication of Jan Ruml's statement as well as the steps taken by the party leadership in the matter (complaint filed against Jan Ruml, complaint against the violation of the election law lodged with the Central Electoral Commission and with the Council of Europe, and negotiations with the CSL's coalition partners).

On the same day, on pages 1 and 3, LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE carries a 1,000-word "ld"-signed report on a news conference given by the CSL leadership on the affair. According to the LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE report, CSL deputy J. Macek told the news conference that "at least two weeks before this incident, he had received information from within the Civic Forum Coordinating Center about the demand to remove Dr. Bartoncik from political life." The report concludes from this statement that Jan Ruml's "action had been prepared for a longer time" and that its aim was to discredit the CSL.

On 8 June, on page 3, LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE carries a 300-word report on a statement made by Vaclav Benda, chairman of the Christian Democratic Party, one of the CSL's coalition partners, on the Bartoncik affair. Benda says that he regards the "whole matter" as "very unfair" and as a transgression of the election law. In Benda's opinion, the attack was timed for a moment when the attacked party had no chance of defending itself. "It is a clear continuation of the election campaign after it had ended," Benda says.

On the same day, on page 3, LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE also publishes protests by members of Bartoncik's family against the "misinformation about and insults" of Josef Bartoncik. Maria Bartoncikova, his wife, states for example that her husband had been "fully involved in activities against the totalitarian regime" and used to play host in his own apartment to signatories of Charter 77 and other "fighters for human rights." Bartoncik's brother Alois compares the "psychological terror" applied against his brother with the communist regime's attempts in the fifties and sixties to "liquidate" the Bartoncik family.

On 9 June, on page 1, LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE carries a 200-word report on a session of the Central Electoral Commission on 8 June "late in the evening," which was convened at the request of the CSL. According to the report, the CSL protested against statements made by President Havel in the Bartoncik affair and asked the commission to "draw the strictest consequences from the conduct of Jan Ruml" and "all other cases of gross violation of the election law."

On the same day, on page 3, LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE carries a 500-word interview with Michal Lakatos, an expert working in the State and Law Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, who describes Jan Ruml's course of action in the Bartoncik affair as "illegal." He points out that in every state based on the rule of law, evidence must be presented first and the verdict can only be passed afterwards. Only in a "totalitarian state" can a minister or a deputy minister determine who is or is not qualified to run for parliament, Lakatos says. The legal expert adds that if Jan Ruml remains in charge of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Democracy he will consider emigrating to some other country.

On the same page, LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE also carries a 600-word Jan Kastanek commentary entitled "The Scandal Had Been Prepared—Who Wrote the Script?" The commentator expresses his suspicion that the Bartoncik affair had been prepared by high-ranking officials of the State Secret Police. As he points out, it is easy for members of the former State Secret Police to prepare "compromising material" about someone they want to discredit. Kastanek says that, at the moment, it is impossible to determine "the author of the script" of the "disgusting play" involving Josef Bartoncik but he is confident that the answer will eventually come to light.

On 11 June, on page 3, LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE carries a 350-word report on a news conference given by Vaclav Benda, chairman of the Christian Democratic Party, one of the CSL's coalition partners, in Prague during the weekend (the date of the news conference is not given). While Benda affirms his criticism of the "unfair" attacks on Bartoncik and describes the documentary evidence against him as "not really convincing," he also suggests that Bartoncik should withdraw from active politics "until he manages to clear himself of this scandal." Asked whether Bartoncik "still enjoys his trust," Benda says that Bartoncik never enjoyed his trust "100 percent" because of his past work in "official structures."

The Bartoncik affair is also the subject of a 700-word interview with Richard Sacher, federal minister of interior, published by Bratislava SMENA in Slovak on 9 June, on pages 1 and 2. Sacher says that he does not deem it "suitable" to comment on the affair because of his membership in the CSL. He reveals, nonetheless, that he "identifies" with the statements issued by the CSL leadership on the affair and adds that he expects Jan Ruml to furnish "irrefutable evidence" of his accusations, including evidence that his material is not "forged or manipulated." Sacher stresses that he has been trying to remain "impartial" in his function as minister of interior; were this not the case, he would have had the chance to "liquidate all materials concerning members of our party, including Bartoncik."

Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 11 June on page 2 publishes a 300-word statement by the CSL Municipal District Committee in Prague 1, which criticizes the CSL leadership's course of action in the Bartoncik affair. The statement expresses CSL members' "shame" about the disclosures about Bartoncik's past and deplores the fact that CSL members did not "learn the truth about Dr. Bartoncik" from their own leadership. The signatories of the statement demand the expulsion of Josef Bartoncik from the party, the resignation of the entire CSL Central Committee, personnel changes in the party apparatus, as well as disciplinary proceedings against those party functionaries who are responsible for the "dilettantish" compilation of the list of CSL candidates for the elections.

Slovak National Council Seats Reported

AU1206114790

[Editorial Report] Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech on 11 June on pages 1, 2, and 3 publishes CTK-attributed tables showing the "preliminary results" of elections to both Federal Assembly chambers and the Czech and Slovak National Councils. Preliminary distribution of seats in the Slovak National Council are as follows:

According to this table, the Public Against Violence movement won 46 seats; the Christian Democratic Movement, 30 seats; the Slovak National Party, 21 seats; the Communist Party of Slovakia, 20 seats; the Coexistence/Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement coalition, 12 seats; the Democratic Party, 6 seats; and the Green Party, 3 seats. The remaining 12 seats (the Slovak National Council has 150 seats) will be distributed after the second count.

CPCZ Statement on Election Results

AU1306111390 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 11 Jun 90 pp 1, 2

[Statement issued by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Central Committee Executive Committee at its session on 10 June; place not given]

[Text] We thank all communists and supporters who gave us their vote in the elections to the Federal Assembly and to the Czech and Slovak National Councils. We thank the thousands of party members, primary organizations, communist clubs, party organs, and all those who unselfishly participated in the preparations for the elections and who played an energetic part in the formulation of the election programs and in the activity of the electoral commissions. We thank those who devoted themselves to organizing preelection meetings and to working for the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ]. We also thank those who contributed to the party's electoral fund which has already exceeded a total of almost 15 million korunas.

We especially appreciate the fact that we have succeeded in fulfilling what we promised to fulfill six weeks ago. We promised to enter into the elections openly and in a business-like manner; however, we also promised to do so decently and correctly. At the same time, we went through the election campaign under extremely difficult conditions. Many political parties and movements used it to unleash anticommunist feelings and sentiments, which also included attempts to ban the CPCZ or to suspend our activity. It has been proven just how false the statements by some parties and movements about the preelection campaign have turned out to be.

All those who gave their votes to the Communist Party, all its supporters, and all its members have thus expressed their expectation that the party will fulfill what it promised to fulfill at its extraordinary congress in December and in its Action Program. They have thus placed their trust in the party's new policy and in its comprehensive renewal. We will continue along this road.

We have offered voters candidates as deputies whom we are convinced, at this moment, are the best and the most suitable. They are capable, competent, and honorable people who have natural authority. They are courageous people who are not afraid to defend their views and who will fulfill their voters' interests in parliament. We believe that even those candidates who were not elected will continue to work actively for the party. We thank all our candidates without differentiation.

Our country is entering a new era. It will not be easy or simple. The CPCZ election program obliges our deputies to support whatever is beneficial to society and whatever will help to rectify past errors. However, our deputies must not remain isolated. Therefore, we appeal to all our supporters and to communists to accompany our activity with their preelection initiative and generosity in future weeks and months.

The election results have confirmed that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia has a justified place in our society. Let us use this to participate—as the equal partner of the other political parties and movements—in making decisions about this country's future fate in a democratic and pluralist contest of views.

We want to become a party of work and democratic socialism which will think primarily about the individual, about the possibilities for implementing his capabilities, and about all his rights, interests, and social guarantees. We want to become a party which will consider justice for everyone.

Every citizen will be able to evaluate how our party and all the other parties fulfill their preelection resolutions. We are convinced that communists and Communist Party deputies will be among those who keep their word.

Civic Forum Spokesperson on Movement's Future

AU1206195290 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 7 Jun 90 p 2

[Dalibor Macha report: "What Will Happen to Civic Forum?"]

[Excerpt] Prague (from our correspondent)— The prospects of Civic Forum in its present form are that it will not last much longer than a few years. Let us say five. These were the closing words of Jana Ryslinkova, Civic Forum's Coordinating Center spokesperson, at the 6 June news conference in Prague. The conference was held mainly for the foreign journalists who came to our country to observe the elections.

The form which Civic Forum will take after the elections will be decided at a meeting of all those who committed themselves to Civic Forum's work. A number of scenarios have been prepared. The extreme ones assume that Civic Forum will cease to exist at all, or that it will become a classical political party. Some of the "middle" scenarios are more probable. For example, elected Civic Forum members of the representative bodies (from federal to local ones) will form themselves into political circles of one form or another and these circles will be administered by a kind of managerial structure. This will be a paid part of Civic Forum, deprived of the possibility of making political decisions. In a sense, this structure is similar to the structure of modern American political parties.

The assistance which Civic Forum received from abroad was estimated by the spokesperson to be worth about $150,000. Two-thirds of it was used to buy technical equipment. [passage omitted]

Calfa on Reform, Ties With Poland

AU1206155890 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 4 Jun 90 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Premier Marian Calfa by Janusz Durmala; place and date not given: "Poland and Czechoslovakia—Without Burdens and Dogmas"]

[Text] [Durmala] Mr. Premier, you head a government of national consensus that has been in power for only several months. In your opinion, do you think your cabinet has conducted itself well?

[Calfa] The government has only been in power for the last few months and in the next few days it will present the results of its activities for future analysis by historians. This government's mandate is about to expire. The way that its period in office is expiring is also one of its successes. One of the main goals the government set itself when it was inaugurated, was to prepare free elections. On 8 and 9 June 1990, the citizens of our country will go to the voting stations and cast their votes for their chosen candidates, the future representatives at the Federal Assembly and the republic councils whose candidature has been put forward by 22 political parties and social movements. This number reflects only a section of all movements that are active. Almost 70 political groupings have sprung up and there are 600 various organizations that have registered.

The government has contributed much to these upcoming elections and it has succeeded in creating an atmosphere of mutual tolerance and equal opportunity for all political forces, including material support. It adopted many legislative initiatives that laid the groundwork for the freedom of the press, freedom to organize, and to form associations. I believe that both our society and the international observers will unanimously agree that the government has conducted itself well. Our second success stems from the fact that we elaborated a base for the implementation of radical economic reforms in our country.

[Durmala] The political changes have far outpaced the economic ones. Does this pose a potential danger to social stability?

[Calfa] They have outpaced the economic ones, but it could not have been otherwise. Democratic changes in the political sphere are far easier to introduce than economic changes. I think you are aware of this fact from your own experiences. To give or restore political and civic rights to one's citizens can be done simply by adopting legislation. Transforming a planned economy into a free market one is a much longer process.

The multifaceted economic problems that we inherited and the government's often limited scope for action have only enabled us to prepare for the economic reforms and formulate the concepts of such reforms. Given the present time scale of the political and economic changes I do not see any contradictions: the political reforms, laying stress on the rights of the individual, decentralization, and the possibility of establishing new international contacts have given us the required space for the implementation of a program of radical economic reforms. On the other hand, I am convinced that only a successfully concluded program of economic reforms will be able to guarantee the permanence of political reforms. The political and economic joint responsibility of the citizen for the fate of the country forms the foundation of democracy.

[Durmala] The government is urgently working on a strategic and unique concept to enable the transition to a free market economy. In your opinion, do you think you will be able to do it in an evolutionary way, without any violent upheavals?

[Calfa] Our government has already adopted a radical program of economic changes that aims to ensure a rapid and an effective passage of the Czechoslovak economy to a free market economy. We fully realize the significance of these decisions whose economic and especially social consequences will decisively influence the conditions of life in our country. We are making these decisions at a time when there is no safe model to imitate when one wants to transform a centrally administered economy in a former socialist country into a free market economy.

[Durmala] Mr. Premier, let us now consider some more detailed solutions which are of interest to the Polish reader. Is it already known what shape the process of privatization will take? What about unemployment, and will you be able to contain inflation? What pace of changes are the authorities considering?

[Calfa] I will begin with the last point. Let us assume that decisive steps will have to be taken at the beginning of the next year at the latest, along with the necessary involvement of the center in things like price levels and the adoption of an appropriate exchange rate for our currency to protect its internal exchangeability. We want to end this process with a general reform of the tax system which it is hoped will be introduced in 1993. Thus, this defines the general time scale for the reforms, although obviously the content of the reforms and their development will not yet have been fully implemented.

Your question touches on various aspects of the reforms and the risks that accompany them: that is to say, the possible increase in unemployment, inflation, indebtedness, and stagnation. We are conscious of these dangers and I say this openly that there are no existing guarantees that, given the radical nature of our economic reforms, we will be able to avoid these risks. I fear that in many cases these painful symptoms will appear in our enterprises and in society generally.

The program of reforming the economy is considered as being open; that is to say, it has to be supplemented and corrected depending on the situation and the experiences gained, both at home and in the neighboring countries that are grappling with similar problems. On the other hand, we have many reserves, which, when applied appropriately can alleviate undesirable consequences stemming from the transformation of our national economy. Here, I am thinking of the very high qualifications of our people, their industriousness, and their desire to make the most of our social potential, our low rate of inflation, our moderate foreign debt, and our reserves of previously unutilized productive capacity, as well as other reserves.

The greatest problem that I see is the possibility of the growth and increase in unemployment, which to date has been unknown in our country. A free market economy will undoubtedly divide enterprises and workers into those who can adapt to the difficult conditions, foreign competition, and thrive on it, and those who cannot. In such cases our country's social policy will have a crucial role to play. We have to prevent such situations from arising, but we also have to prepare for such eventualities and prepare solutions on the local, professional, and product sectors.

We want to assist in retraining people, to relocate them to other enterprises, and to provide adequate social assistance. I can say that we have already prepared the necessary legislative and organizational plans.

[Durmala] You once said that in the past we gave each other two great monuments, namely, Stonava, near the Polish-Czech border, and Gabcikovo near the Danube. Today, nobody knows what to do with them. In May, the experts were to present their recommendations on Stonava. Have any decisions been made?

[Calfa] Since my April visit to Stonava and according to the request of the federal government, preparatory studies aiming to produce a final decision on the new coking plant in Stonava have been started. The problem has many aspects and is linked to other strategic aspects that are linked to the reconstruction of our economy and making it more environment friendly.

First, we have to agree on the future shape of the global base of the fuel and energy policy of Czechoslovakia. From this will emerge our total coke requirement, and this will have a bearing on the production capacity of our coking plants. All this will depend on the quantity of steel produced and the demand for coke as an ecologically clean heating fuel. The relevant ministries are currently holding intensive consultations on this point. As regards the technological readaptation of coking plants into modern and ecologically acceptable plants then these studies have now been completed. By integrating several imported parts in the process we are in a position to guarantee that the new coking plant will be capable of functioning within acceptable parameters, which will be similar to the performance of the new coking plant currently nearing completion in Dortmund, in the FRG. The government's final decision will seriously take into account all factors, including the need to improve the ecological situation in the Ostrava valley, the proximity of the Polish border, as well as the residents' social and ecological demands. We also want to draw on Polish experiences, especially in the sphere of modern coking plant construction.

[Durmala] To conclude I would like to ask a question that has wider implications. Despite the fact that both our countries are very preoccupied with making their way back to rejoin Europe, as neighbors we have very favorable political conditions to increase our cooperation. How do you see this cooperation developing in the coming months and years?

[Calfa] The political leadership of our country and our society consider that the most important goal of our foreign policy should be to include the Czech and Slovak

Federal Republic in the process of general European integration. In our effort to become full members of this process we are applying for membership in international organizations. We have put forward many initiatives and suggestions. For example, I would just like to mention the proposal to set up a European Security Commission. I consider that Poland likewise has a similar goal. However, we can only achieve these goals as sensible partners. This challenge forces us to look at the traditional forms of our two states' cooperation in a different light.

The transition to world prices and transferable currencies in our mutual commercial transactions will transform our economic relations, and I am convinced will create a lasting basis for our cooperation in the future. After freeing themselves from the bureaucratic and ideological burdens and dogmas, our enterprising people, teachers, artists, and politicians at all levels will without doubt initiate various forms of cooperation. We know that opening up to the world does not mean shutting oneself off from one's neighbors. Our proximity and our historical experiences predispose us to strive for closer cooperation. I believe that the new government of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, a government that will arise as a result of the upcoming free elections, will see cooperation with the Polish Republic as a very beneficial thing for both sides.

[Durmala] Thank you for the interview.

CTK Provides Biography of Premier Calfa

LD1206161290 Prague CTK in English
1310 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Prague June 12 (CTK)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel today started political talks with the two strongest parties which emerged from the free parliamentary elections—the Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence.

All participants in the talks agreed that the task of forming a new Czechoslovak Government be entrusted to the thus-far premier, Marian Calfa.

Marian Calfa was born on May 7, 1946 in Trebisov, east Slovakia, into a family of a railwayman. After graduating from the faculty of law at Charles University in Prague in 1970, he became a lawyer at the Czechoslovak News Agency. Between 1972 and 1987 Calfa held various posts at the federal government's office. In 1987 he became a government minister and on December 3, 1989 he was appointed federal premier.

Havel Adviser Interviewed on Economy

LD1206141490 Prague CTK in English
1305 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Prague June 12 (CTK)—"Our aim is not socialism or capitalism, but a modern society, for which we must look for adequate methods and new approaches", said Czechoslovak president's economic advisor Richard Wagner in an interview for Czechoslovak economic daily "HOSPODARSKE NOVINY" here today.

He stated that the Czechoslovak economy is coherent and that the images of two isolated economies within a federal state, such as Czechoslovakia, are economically naive or politically motivated.

Richard Wagner stressed that it is imprudent to expect an easy and speedy entry of Czechoslovakia into the European communities and that the ten-year limit, during which time this entry could take place, is considered, even by foreign partners, as a very sensible and solid approach.

According to Richard Wagner, several issues will have to be resolved during this transitional period. One is Czechoslovakia's relationship with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the other is the relationship with the CMEA countries especially economic cooperation with Poland and Hungary. Czechoslovakia must find a place in Europe adequately corresponding to its economic, political, cultural and other levels.

In another part of the interview the president's economic advisor pointed out the insufficient coordination between political and economic activities. It is being caused by the hitherto insurmountable transitional phase to a market economy and by bureaucracy which is hindering many actions.

Richard Wagner believes that Czechoslovakia's dealings with foreign partners are not sufficiently well thought out. He stated that the Czechoslovak economy should not direct its attention to small and medium-sized entrepreneurs, but concentrate on the large ones because these work with an eye to the future and are a guarantee for stability in Czechoslovakia's economic transition.

In his interview for "HOSPODARSKE NOVINY" Richard Wagner described cooperation between Czechoslovakia and the "Bata" firm as a realistic economic project. Talks on all levels have already taken place. (The "Bata" firm is a transnational shoe-making business corporation, established in the 20th century in Zlin (South Moravia). The second example of realistic economic cooperation are talks on car production between the firms of "Skoda" (Mlada Boleslav, a town 50 km north of Prague) and the "Volkswagen" firm, and projects have already been prepared.

KDH's Carnogursky Explains Coalition Plans

LD1206174590 Prague Domestic Service
in Czech 1630 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Jan Carnogursky, chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement [krestansko demokraticke hnuti, KDH] and deputy premier of the federal government, spoke to a CTK reporter today about the KDH's attitude toward the coalition talks following the elections. He said that the KDH will not enter a coalition with Civic

Forum. This means that it will not participate in the federal government. For Jan Carnogursky this decision will not be changed by any possible official offer of the position of federal minister of interior. In his words, the KDH will go into coalition in Slovakia with Public Against Violence and the Democratic Party [demokraticka strana].

When speaking about the attitude of his party to the Slovak National Party [slovenska narodni strana], Jan Carnogursky said that it is part of the political spectrum, but it is in opposition to the KDH, which does not align itself with its goals and methods. He also mentioned the equal status of the Czech and Slovak parties united in the Christian and Democratic Union [krestanska a demokraticka unie] and about the case of Dr. Josef Bartoncik. He described the timing of the affair as an inappropriate and conscious act against the whole Union. If the accusations against Mr. Bartoncik are proved, the Czechoslovak People's Party [ceskoslovenska strana lidova] or Dr. Bartoncik himself will bear the consequences.

Slovak, Federal Bodies Disagree on Privatization

AU1206162290 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 5 Jun 90 p 5

[Interview with Michal Kovac, minister of finance, prices, and wages of the Slovak Republic, by Jan Comaj; place and date not given: "Three Questions for the Minister"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted on first question and answer explaining the meaning of the terms denationalization and privatization] [Comaj] Our readers have noted that there exist differences between the ideas of the Federal Government and the Slovak Government on creating a national property fund and solving basic strategic questions of a radical economic reform. Wherein do you see these differences and what is the position of the Slovak Government and your ministry?

[Kovac] The solution to all the complex problems we are facing, including the problem of the strategy of a radical economic reform, will not be straightforward and devoid of conflicts.

The Federal Ministry of Finance has worked out two scenarios [varianty] for dealing with the privatization of national property as one of the crucial aspects of the strategy of a radical economic reform.

Scenario A foresees the division of existing national property into three categories. The first category would comprise national property which would not be privatized at all in the initial stages (i.e., natural resources, railroads, communications, some industrial enterprises, and the like). The second category would comprise national property which will be entrusted to joint stock companies. The privatization of this property should take the form of the sale of shares to both employees and other citizens (financed by savings or credits or by property coupons) or to domestic as well as foreign legal persons. The third category would comprise communal assets owned by communities. Some of these assets would be transferred directly into the private ownership of Czechoslovak citizens (for money and property coupons) or leased out to domestic or foreign subjects. To execute the ownership right with regard to property in the second category, the founding is foreseen of an Office for the Temporary Administration and Privatization of National Property. In the opinion of the Federal Ministry of Finance, this should be an office at the federal level. The Federal Ministry of Finance argues that state property is federal property and that the republics only have the right to manage this property.

In our ministry's opinion, national property located on the territory of a republic belongs to the respective republic. At the same time the republics can delegate certain legal powers to the federal level.

Scenario B of the Federal Ministry of Finance, which foresees the founding of a National Property Fund, entails a similar problem. This fund should be constituted as an independent legal person that would discharge in the name of the state the functions of the owner and administrator of national property. The fund would administer national property up until its complete privatization.

As regards the proposal which was submitted to the Government of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic by Mr. Vaclav Vales, the deputy premier, the differences of opinion primarily concern:

—the execution of the administration of ownership rights toward national property. Mr. Vales' proposal entrusts the administration of these rights to the National Property Fund, which is in direct integration [v priame integracii] of the representative bodies.

—the method of carrying out the privatization of national property. This proposal proceeds from the premise of a commercial valorization of capitalized national property through its gradual privatization, i.e. through increasing the share of property in private ownership at the expense of national property in state ownership by means of sale, increasing the proportion of employee- owned shares, and lease.

[Comaj] Changes in the economy, in international trade, and in direct contacts of our citizens with foreign countries have assumed such dimensions that the question of our koruna's convertibility is becoming increasingly topical. How do you view the prospects of its convertibility?

[Kovac] In the course of this year some fundamental prerequisites should be established for the so-called internal convertibility of our koruna. By this we mean the free purchase of any foreign currency for the Czechoslovak koruna—for imports and for travel abroad. We will be moving closer toward internal convertibility by expanding foreign exchange auctions, which are organized by the Czechoslovak State Bank. At present these auctions are held once a month and only economic enterprises have access to them. In the second half of the year these auctions should be held more frequently and budget-funded organizations as well as physical persons, too, should participate in them. The supply of foreign exchange [offered at foreign exchange auctions] by the Czechoslovak State Bank is to increase by means of a 20 percent cut in the planned funds for foreign exchange expenditures from the central foreign exchange resources [sentence as published].

Within the framework of the acceleration of economic reform, it is foreseen that, as of 1991, the Czechoslovak koruna will be made fully convertible internally. This presupposes the obligation to offer 100 percent of foreign exchange proceeds to the Czechoslovak State Bank. An enterprise which has collected, for example, $1 million from exports will not be able to retain a certain percentage of this sum in the form of set foreign exchange retention quotas but will have to sell the entire sum to the center, to the Czechoslovak State Bank. In case the enterprise has to import something, on the other hand, and comes to the Czechoslovak State Bank with the demand for, let us say, $500,000, it will buy the foreign exchange it needs from the Czechoslovak State Bank for korunas, at the exchange rate valid at the time. The introduction is also considered of the obligation to deposit the sum in korunas in a special Czechoslovak State Bank account within a certain deadline (for example, a month before the intended purchase). The introduction of this new system should effectively combat the dollarization of the economy, an uncalled-for phenomenon to which we have been bearing witness thus far.

Role of Slovak Movement After Elections

AU1206092390 Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak 6 Jun 90 pp 1, 2

[Fedor Gal article: "The Public Against Violence Movement After the Elections"]

[Text] The elections are only a couple of days away. Now the time has come for us to answer the following question: What will happen to the Public Against Violence (VPN) movement after the elections? We have been discussing this dilemma since the very beginning and certain ideas have been presented to us.

We have managed to muster massive human potential and we have managed to win credit in society—we have no right not to utilize either the one or the other. We have no right to vacate the position which we have taken up at the center of the political spectrum. We have no right to give up our stabilizing influence on our—still unstable—political scene. On the contrary, we have a duty—which must be fulfilled as soon as possible—to construct a strong organizational structure which will carry our movement's legacy and ideals into future elections.

How do we view the specific implementation of this task? I think that before the local elections we have to present for public discussion the idea of a VPN political wing, the idea of a small—but highly professional—apparatus which will provide our deputies and people in government with political status and which will give a political dimension to our movement's existence. This will not be, naturally, a political party of the type we were used to in the past; that is, a political party with its own bureaucratic situation. However, neither can we give up the institution which, on a professional level, will guarantee a political platform for our movement and which will provide competent, politically imaginative, and capable people with a chance to implement our policy and to enter into real political activity on a full time basis, not only in Bratislava but everywhere in Slovakia where we have been successful in establishing local VPN cells and where we have been successful in finding people suitable for this kind of activity.

At the same time, it is absolutely necessary to realize that for the majority of the movement's activists and sympathizers the prospect of professional political activity is not the most suitable. Many of us are used to seeing our mission in providing people with specific services; for many of us a civic movement is, by its very nature, closer to our hearts than politics and political activity. We are prepared to continue to preserve our movement's legacy everywhere that it contributes to making people's everyday lives easier and to resolving the accumulating and continuously developing social problems. We are also prepared to organize and initiate various forums, special interest and self-help groups, and to found independent institutions—research centers, publishing houses, district newspapers, and so on. We want to provide people with an opportunity for a cultured life, with an opportunity to hold discussions and meetings, and with an opportunity to become involved in social events. For this purpose, we will use the premises we have acquired in past months, all the rooms, apartments, and houses where local VPN organizations evolved and operated after November 1989; we also want to use the material and technical resources which we have acquired during this period. We can call these places Civic Clubs. They will be colorful and useful for our movement's children. Entrepreneurial activity will enable our movement to survive and its cultural and educational activity will again mobilize our sympathizers miraculous potential at a time when new elections are approaching and when we have a feeling that society's healthy development is threatened.

However, at the same time, we will have to part company with everyone who has associated his appurtenance to the VPN with his personal careerist ambitions and with everyone who, under the Gentle Revolution's banner, has displayed uncivilized conduct, vulgarity, and a lack of tolerance. Our movement's character assumes that all those who associate their professional purpose with it and all those who want to carry out economic, cultural and educational, and political activities in our civic clubs will not only have to demonstrate their caliber from the revolutionary days, but will also have to demonstrate their professional competence. We consider the professionalization of the VPN's fundamental apparatus to be a necessary prerequisite for its further existence. The legitimacy of our movement's origin and victory is associated with the ethos of the revolutionary days and its prospects are associated with the ethos of professional work. This will certainly be painful and, for many people, it will also be a dramatic change, but we have to go through it.

In this connection, it would not be fitting for me to forget one of the most important tasks; that is, the task of democratizing the structure of our movement and the principles of its operation. We all know that those who came to the forefront in our coordination committees and centers during the November days knew their place from the very beginning. They were the natural leaders of our revolution—their legitimacy lay in this and these people's caliber lies in this and in everything that we have succeeded in achieving in past days. However, it is impossible not to give the people who will shape our movement's new image the right to form the specific shape of their institutions by democratic means and the right to choose for this new situation those whom they consider to be expert and morally competent representatives of their effort and of their endeavors. As we have asserted the enterprises' autonomy, self-administration for towns and villages, and tolerance and democracy in society, we must not leave our movement at the side of this effort. We consider this to be absolutely natural.

We consider it to be equally natural that as general a discussion as possible will develp in the pages of our daily about the ideas outlined above.

Republicans Expel Some Candidates

AU1306085090 Prague MLADA FRONTA in Czech 6 Jun 90 p 2

[Unattributed report from the "Briefly" column]

[Text] Miroslav Sladek, chairman of the Association for the Republic—Republican Party of Czechoslovakia, announced to CTK that the Presidium of the Association for the Republic—Republican Party of Czechoslovakia had expelled from the party and, at the same time, eliminated from the list of candidates several persons who had joined the party with the aim of breaking up the newly established party, disrupting its right-wing program, and threatening the unity of the CSFR. An important reason for their elimination was also the fact that these persons refused to be vetted.

Hungarian Writer in CSFR on Minorities

AU0906210290 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 1 Jun 90 p2

[Report on interview with Zoltan Fonod, secretary of the Association of Hungarian Writers in the CSFR, by Tibor Kis in Prague; date not given: "The CSFR Did Not Receive the National Minorities as a Booty"]

[Excerpts] The Presidium of the Association of Hungarian Writers in the CSFR issued a dramatic statement in which it called attention to the dangers inherent in the increase of chauvinistic and nationalistic passions.

[Kis] During the democratic turn last year, there were probably few people who thought that, within half a year, the Hungarian writers in Slovakia would fear the appearance of a "Karabach-syndrome." Is the situation really that serious?

[Fonod] With this document, we wanted precisely to do something against the appearance of the so-called Karabach-syndrome. We do not intend at all to present the situation as more tragic than it really is. However, we must not underestimate the dangers, and we must declare that we are worried about the incitement of hatred toward the national minorities carried out by some political circles, parties, and movements in Slovakia. The fact that some parties, like the Slovak National Block, focused on nationalism in their election campaign is part of this process. [passage omitted]

[Kis] What worries you most at present?

[Fonod] So far, the Hungarians in the CSFR have followed the events calmly and with restraint. However, it is one thing when extremist Slovak organizations can only gather a few dozen people on the streets, and it is another thing when a mass of ten thousand people participate in nationalist and separatist demonstrations. There were 10,000 people in the Bratislava demonstration recently. One must pay attention to this. It is the responsibility of the intellectuals to warn that every type of nationalism and anachronism in these areas could threaten the success of the road leading to Europe. [passage omitted]

[Kis] What can be done against this?

[Fonod] I am convinced that we must not allow the national minority issue to be treated as an internal Slovak affair, and the problems should be solved on a federal level and by constitutional means. We must make it clear that the national minority rights in our area should be treated in accordance with the historically-tested practice in Europe, and not as myths or old habits. The intellectuals can play a considerable role in this. [passage omitted]

Public Opinion Survey on Nuclear Plants

LD1206122390 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1000 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Summary] On the request of the Ministry of Fuel and Power, the Institute for Investigation of Public Opinion has carried out an opinion poll on nuclear power stations: The results have shown that 46 percent of those asked agree with them, and 41 percent are opposed. The results indicate that despite the concern over the Chernobyl catastrophe, the Czechoslovak public sees the production of electric power in nuclear power stations as more acceptable than producing it in coal-burning power stations.

Government Discusses Mines, Investment

LD1106201190 Prague CTK in English 1925 GMT 11 Jun 90

[Text] Prague June 11 (CTK)—Although the term of office of the Czechoslovak National Understanding Government is approaching the end, the government continues to work to the full extent until its resignation is handed to Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel, Czechoslovak Premier Marian Calfa said here today.

Addressing the government session, he stated that a recession program in the coal mines of Kladno, central Bohemia, is a certain model of what will be done in various spheres of the national economy within the radical reform. The program concerns four mines with an annual output of 0.5 million tonnes of black coal which are to be closed. Thus the 1989 loss of the Kladno concern is to be reduced by 380 million crowns in 1992 (amid today's prices). This program will have a direct impact on 2,700 workers. The majority will be requalified for another job in the Kladno concern or will retire. Only 630 workers will have to work in another enterprise.

In line with its promise of last December, the government has examined 50 selected investments projects and has found out that there are many investors lacking money to complete the construction of their projects amid constant pressure on starting new constructions. In the first quarter of 1990 the volume of projects under construction totalled 155,000 million crowns which is by 25,000 million crowns more than in the same period last year. It becomes evident that it will be necessary to seek new ways of regulating capital construction.

After the government's control the building of a new coking plant at Stonava, North Moravia, and of a nuclear reactor of the Slovak Technical University in Bratislava have been stopped. The investors' demands for the state's share in the 1990 constructions were cut by 6,000 million crowns, i.e. by 75 per cent.

The federal government decided at its session today that military service for university graduates would take 12 months.

The government approved a report on the results of the working visit by Premier Marian Calfa to the Commission of the European Communities which resulted in the signing of an agreement on trade and economic cooperation with the European communities.

The government determined to draw up a bill on radio and television broadcasting in Czechoslovakia as the present laws do not allow broadcasting by private radio and television stations in Czechoslovak territory.

Dienstbier on Gabcikovo, Temelin Dams

AU1006134190 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 2 Jun 90 p 3

[Unattributed report: "A Tangle of Contradictory Interests"]

[Excerpts] Mutual relations between the neighboring states of Austria, Hungary, and the CSFR regarding energy production are developing as a tangle of contradictory interests. Everyone wants to be a consumer and no one wants to be a producer. [passage omitted on differences between Hungary and Czechoslovakia regarding the Gabcikovo dam and between Austria and Czechoslovakia regarding the Temelin dam] Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier summarized the Czechoslovak standpoint in his conversation with NARODNA OBRODA:

We are destroying our environment by using coal—this must be stopped at all costs. Nuclear power stations are cleaner and hydroelectric water plants would be even better.

Hungarians do not want to hear anything about the hydro-project on the Danube nor do they want to hear anything about paying the bill which amounts to billions. The Austrians are willing to offer us attractive credits amounting to billions—which will have to be repaid—for the reconstruction of our energy base, in order to stop our nuclear program—but brown coal power plants are an obstacle for us.

Billions have been poured into Gabcikovo so let them produce energy for us, at least. If we are to do more work on narrowing the Danube in order to raise its level to its previous height then we have to count on spending more billions.

If we are not supposed to finish the construction of Temelin then someone must tell us what it should be replaced with. If the people decided that they do not need refrigerators, washing machines, etc., then the situation would be different. But the industrial demands are such that we would need about ten Temelins.

GERMAN REUNIFICATION

***Notice to Readers:** Reportage on German reunification may also be found in the Federal Republic of Germany section of the West Europe DAILY REPORT and pertinent sections of the East Europe JPRS Report. Third country comment is published as available in the appropriate DAILY REPORT or JPRS publication.*

RAF Terrorists Allegedly Lived in Dresden

LD1206175390 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1438 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Dresden (ADN)—According to research carried out by the DRESDNER MORGENPOST, the alleged RAF [Red Army Faction] terrorist Silke Maier-Witt lived for years in Dresden. The daily newspaper reported today [12 June] that the close friend of Susanne Albrecht lived under the name of Eva-Maria S. from 1983 to 1986. At first in a workers' hostel, and later in the Dresden-Prohlis new district.

Johanna Lohse (83), and Hilda Dittich (80), who lived on the same floor as her, recognized Silke and the RAF terrorist Sigrid Sternebeck, who is also wanted, from wanted persons photos. "Some time during the night the apartment was cleared out," the women said, after the tenant "had to go to the hospital and did not reappear."

The newspaper adds that the personnel officer of a Dresden large concern of ZENTRAG—the association of SED [Socialist Unity Party]-owned publishing and printing houses—had been instructed in 1983 to train one Eva-Marie S. from the FRG as a document photographer for the State Security Ministry. "It was clear that we were not to ask any questions," he now told the DRESDNER MORGENPOST. Frau S. qualified with distinction as of 6 April that year. According to an assessment of May 1984, which the newspaper holds, she is described as a "balanced and uncomplicated colleague....who has a positive view of the state and of the issues of the day."

In 1986, Eva-Marie S. left in order to "move to be with her boyfriend in Potsdam." Weeks later the personnel officer was instructed to send the personnel file to Cottbus, the newspaper claims.

Former Stasi Chief Wolf on Spies in FRG

LD1206223290 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 2102 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Paris (ADN)—Markus Wolf, until 1986 the chief of intelligence in the GDR State Security Ministry, has said that the number of GDR spies in the FRG was less than 3,000, based on his knowledge of three years ago. Apart from former CIA chief William Colby and the former DGSE [Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure] chief Pierre Marion, Wolf was one of the speakers on a live program on the role of the secret services broadcast by the French television station FR3 today. While the former major general [Wolf] was speaking from a studio in Berlin, as he was unable to travel to Paris because of the arrest warrant issued against him, Thomas Schmidt took part in the program in Paris as spokesman for the citizens' committee for the dissolution of the Stasi.

Asked by the interviewer how many people had been "physically liquidated" on his orders, Wolf answered: "Not a single person." He then answered a number of questions about the Guillaume case. The latter was not the real reason for Willy Brandt's resignation, as Brandt himself stated. Guillaume got close to Brandt more through coincidence. They never believed in Berlin that the Bonn security specialists could have approved of him.

Thomas Schmidt then outlined the mammoth work of the citizens' committee on the dissolution of the Stasi and on securing the mountain of files. He showed copies of Stasi files which demonstrated the extent to which GDR citizens were spied on, and demonstrated that the Stasi had the task of preparing internment camps in case of internal unrest. Wolf, when questioned about this, said that during his period in office such problems were not dealt with in the State Security Ministry council, nor had this been part of the duties of the externally-aimed espionage service, which had been largely autonomous.

In response to a further question from Schmidt, Wolf said that it was true that the reports which the Stasi staff sent from the grass roots to headquarters gave a very precise portrayal of the situation, and that dissatisfaction with the prevailing conditions extended right to the top of the ministry. It is probable that the "tragedy of our development" was that the various opposition forces in the country had not sought to cooperate, particularly after the introduction of perestroyka in the USSR. He went on to confirm that former GDR citizens had been under surveillance abroad with the aid of Stasi employees in GDR missions.

Stasi Colonel Wiegand Defects to FRG

AU1306105790 Hamburg BILD in German 13 Jun 90 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Stasi Colonel Wiegand: Left His Family; in the West With his Secretary"]

[Text] Berlin—Colonel Frank Wiegand, chief of the Stasi [State Security Service] Working Group for Foreigners ("AGA"), defected to the FRG via Switzerland together with his secretary, BILD learned from security circles in Berlin. He left his wife and his children behind.

Wiegand mainly dealt with the Arabs who lived in the GDR and with their underground organizations. He is considered to be the one who knew about the bomb attack on the Berlin discotheque "La Belle," which killed two people and injured 164 in 1986. After the attack Wiegand's unit, which comprised about 50 men, was twice awarded the "Dr.-Richard-Sorge pennant," the highest collective award of the state security minister.

Police Cooperation Between Berlins To Increase

LD0806192490 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1740 GMT 8 Jun 90

[Excerpt] Berlin (ADN)—Representatives of the administrations for internal affairs of the City Council and Senate [of East and West Berlin, respectively] and of the GDR Interior Ministry discussed on Friday [8 June] the more intensive cooperation of the police organs of East and West Berlin, as well as further procedures for the unification process.

According to a City Council statement, joint working groups are to prepare political decisions, such as the initial and further training of the police, structure, equipment, standardization of the law, and telecommunication. There is also agreement on redefining security policy for the eastern part of the city, in which particular attention will be paid to constitutional principles and data protection. [passage omitted]

Berlin Authorities in First Joint Session

LD1206124990 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0917 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Excerpt] Berlin (ADN)—The city authorities of East and West Berlin have met for a joint session for the first time in 42 years.

Mayor Tino Schwierzina Social Democratic Party [SPD] told the press this meeting was an historic event. The most important thing for him is the fact that the two Berlin municipal authorities have had a joint session.

West Berlin's Mayor Walter Momper (SPD) also stressed the special importance of the meeting. Answering a question from ADN, Momper said he felt good in the Red town hall, even if things there are not yet running quite as smoothly as in Schoeneberg. Momper said the home for a future all-Berlin parliament should be the Red town Hall with its rich tradition.

The head of the GDR Christian Democratic Union parliamentary group, Roland Jacob, expressed his hope that the two municipal authorities will carry out decent policies for Berlin. In the future the Magistrate and the Senate are to meet once every two weeks. [passage omitted)

Forum Urges Berlin as Capital

LD1206125790 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1234 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Excerpts] Berlin (ADN)—Elections for a joint land parliament will conclude the political unification of East and West Berlin. This process should take place as soon as possible, but in a responsible way, and social issues should be considered where necessary. This was stressed by the East Berlin Magistrate and the West Berlin Senate in a statement issued today [12 June]. Berlin should be the capital and seat of government of the new, united Germany.

The statement welcomes the Soviet proposal to establish a new institution of the CSCE process in Berlin. It also supports the plan that the Olympic games in the year 2000 or 2004 should take place in Berlin.

Gysi Letter to Party Members Published

AU1306083190 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 6 Jun 90 p 2

[Letter from Party of Democratic Socialism Chairman Gregor Gysi to party members and sympathizers; place and date not given: "We Will Neither Be Dissolved Nor Eliminated"]

[Text] Dear Comrades, dear Sympathizers:

Last Tuesday's [29 May] People's Chamber resolutions, which are in contradiction to the GDR Constitution, are aimed against the rule of law and democracy and they rescind the separation of powers. The chairman of the Christian Democratic Union [CDU], as the premier of a government consisting of the CDU, the Democratic Awakening, the German Social Union [DSU], the Liberals, and the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD], will appoint a commission which will hold the property of some government parties, the trade unions, and the Party of Democratic Socialism [PDS] in trust and prepare its expropriation. Everybody makes it quite clear that this measure will almost exclusively be directed against us. The commission will obtain powers which are otherwise only due to legal organs—confiscation, the searching of houses, the blocking of accounts, the hearing of witnesses. All citizens are obliged to "support" the commission. Although this would have been required, the GDR Constitution was not changed, and there was no two-thirds majority. All parliamentary control has been eliminated. The concept "enabling act" is not exaggerated. The resolutions were passed without an announcement—that is to say, as a planned surprise attack. The reason— manipulations should be ruled out. The government parties presented the motion, so they knew of it beforehand and had the time and the opportunity to do what they impute to us.

However, more important than the legal side are the political strategies of the authors. The objective—that is, the liquidation of the PDS—is clear. In my opinion, there are far-reaching connections. The GDR's sovereignty is considerably restricted by the State Treaty. Instead of a transition period to adjust the economy's efficiency, it is being destroyed with far-reaching social consequences. No large-scale investments are to be expected from the monetary union, but a new, very profitable market for West German enterprises. Leading GDR trade executives are already thwarting the sale of GDR products to ensure the sale of West German goods. This attitude will be further intensified. The eastern part of the future united Germany is to remain the poorer part of Germany. Low wages and longer working hours will be maintained here, and prices will increase. Social and legal guarantees, however, will be reduced with the argument that otherwise investments could not be expected at all. Resettlement in the present FRG will become increasingly difficult because relevant support will be canceled. Without work and housing this will also become impossible in practice. Of course, exceptions for specialists and gaps in the FRG labor market are not ruled out. The monetary, economic, and social union primarily serves West German capital. Ownership and usufructuary rights of GDR citizens are seriously endangered. Count Lambsdorff's demands become increasingly massive. Who will try to represent the interests of the former GDR citizens in a united Germany? The CDU, the Democratic Awakening, the DSU, the Liberals—and, via them or the DSU, probably also the Democratic Peasants Party of Germany—and the SPD will be merged with the respective parties in the FRG. Then their members will be a minority within the united parties. They will not even be able to effectively participate there and even less so in the all-German parliament.

In the case of the PDS it is the other way round. Even if it extends to the whole of Germany, it will continue to be especially committed to the rights and interests of former GDR citizens. However, such a representation of interests is not wanted. First the PDS and, in the end, the GDR citizens' enterprises, real estate, and apartments will be expropriated.

Even more important is Europe's reorganization. According to the ideas of the representatives of German capital, the united Germany is to play a hegemonic economic and military role in Europe. When the FRG chancellor says that the next 10 years should become years of the Europeans and not of the Japanese, he means a German Europe which is to eliminate Japanese competition first (the Americans come later). He also means a Europe which will isolate the USSR, also in security politics. Walter Momper from the SPD took the same direction when he accused the PDS in the Bundesrat of starting to sell its property to foreigners. He meant the planned contract with Maxwell on the Berlin Publishing House. Maxwell is undoubtedly a capitalist, and "left" or "right" cannot be at issue here, only German and non-German. However, somebody who dares to involve foreigners in German media policy must be expropriated, also in the opinion of leading German Social Democrats. Thus, the point is the character of the unified Germany, of which many people in Europe are vaguely afraid because of past experiences. Its planned character becomes increasingly clear. There is the danger that this Germany will become expansionist and rightist. The PDS can only be a nuisance there.

If its liquidation is achieved, further steps can be taken against others. Niemoeller's words should be recalled. Nobody should forget that there will be no GDR after unification and thus also no pressure to be more democratic and social than the GDR.

The way in which the People's Chamber and the GDR Government are used for this purpose as instruments by the FRG Government is alarming. They refuse to give us a constitution, a constitutional court, and other bases of the rule of law. They quickly make decisions and create facts which would be inconceivable under FRG law and against which legal action could be taken. When this kind of "work" is done, the way is open to unity with the complete FRG law, without securing ownership and usufructuary rights of the former GDR citizens, and without the FRG Government assuming responsibility for what happened before.

The fact that the SPD even initiated such decisions is deplorable. It is above all concerned not with the citizens' interests, but with party politics and with the elimination of an unpleasant competitor in elections; but the consequences are dangerous, also for itself. History loses its value if nobody learns from it. Let us not forget that we were warned by the FRG. If we continue to be a local party, they will leave us in peace, but if we become an all-German party, massive action will be taken against us. The Federal Intelligence Service is already "dealing" with us, and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution is preparing for us.

There are many reasons in favor of a strong PDS, those mentioned here as others' motives for liquidating us are enough for me. Socialist ideals must also be kept alive in Germany. Capitalism is not the last word of history as it does not really contribute to solving global questions of mankind (disarmament, ecology, social justice in the country and in relations with the so-called Third World).

Solidarity in our party is increasing. Precisely now sympathizers should stand by us and consider party membership, even if there are still some reservations. Your contribution to the further renewal of our party is more important than ever. All democratic and leftist ideas must be preserved in the unified Germany, even though it is intended to make this financially and materially impossible for us. We get encouragement from West Berlin, the FRG, and from abroad. We are not alone and precisely now we must stand the test as democratic socialists. Leftism will not be easy in a united Germany, but our objectives justify our efforts and one feels better if one believes in them and therefore professes them.

Support the party when donations are requested and, if possible, make higher contributions.

Participate actively in party life, especially in the discussions on our renewal.

Follow calls for rallies and demonstrations.

Everybody has to realize that we are integrating ourselves democratically, but that we will not be dissolved or eliminated. We are and remain inconvenient and will continue to oppose any attack on democracy and the rule of law in the future.

Do not give up the fight!

Gregor Gysi.

60,000 Enterprises Established in 1990

AU0806120890 East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG in German 6 Jun 90 p 11

[ADN/BZ report: "60,000 Business Enterprises Established"]

[Text] Since the beginning of the year, approximately 60,000 business enterprises and craftsmen's businesses have been established in the GDR. As the Economics Ministry reported on Friday [1 June], by 21 May, 61,787 businesses were registered or relevant applications were filed and 57,463 of them have been registered or authorized so far.

De Maiziere Washington News Conference, Activities

LD1206204590 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1926 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Report by unidentified ADN reporter]

[Text] Washington (ADN)—Premier Lothar de Maiziere does not believe that the latest Gorbachev proposals on the controversial alliance membership of a united Germany will bring about a breakthrough. Speaking in Washington's National Press Club on Tuesday, he said of the speech by the Soviet president on the same day that a number of Soviet proposals had been heard already. Mikhail Gorbachev's was one that was being discussed, but not one that would bring the solution.

At a discussion session of Germany experts at the Institute for Contemporary German Studies of Johns Hopkins University, immediately prior to the news conference, the premier set out his ideas on the alliance question in more detail. After the reform of the Warsaw Pact, which has now begun, the reform of the structure and strategy of NATO is absolutely necessary. This also must be expressed in weaponry. Readiness for change should not remain a matter of rhetoric, but should be materially visible. He would prefer it if NATO changes its name. He regards the presence of U.S. troops in Europe as a factor for stability. The head of government would like to see the presence of Soviet units on the territory of the GDR regulated by treaties based on the sovereignty of the country where they are stationed. By contrast with his foreign minister, he mentioned a period of four or five years until the final withdrawal. Markus Meckel spoke of seven years and had expressed the hope that it could happen more quickly.

In his opening words in the Press Club, De Maiziere stressed that the unification of Germany is the unification of two sovereign states. No one should have to see unity as the victory of one over the other. The failure of socialism in all fields has led to the painful discover that for 40 years one has lived a lie. This caused many to experience a pyschologically painful loss of meaning in life.

De Maiziere said in response to a question in the Press Club that weapons no longer needed as a result of the reduction of the National People's Army's personnel strength, including short-range nuclear weapons, will be returned to the Soviet Union. The subject has been discussed with Moscow. In some types of weapons the GDR is not in any position technically to carry out a conversion.

The arrest in the GDR of Susanne Albrecht, wanted for terrorism, prompted the Washington journalists to ask to what extent the former GDR regime tolerated and promoted terrorist activity. There was no unequivocal information, the premier said, that the state security apparatus supported terrorist activities, but also none which fully ruled this out. They were in contact with Bonn as to how Frau Albrecht could be handed over to the FRG. Difficulties arose out of the lack of a relevant legal assistance agreement. The premier refused to give details about the investigations into clearing up the circumstances of the Albrecht case due to the current investigation.

De Maiziere said that the state security ministry has been dissolved. The files kept under lock and key are needed for proceedings, including the rehabilitation of persons falsly accussed. General publication is not possible. The problems connected with the dissolution of the Stasi are completely under the government's control.

Remarks by De Maiziere on the capital of a future Germany also met with great interest. One should not ask a Berliner whether it should be Bonn or Berlin. He believed that Berlin was in a much better position than the present federal capital to manage the integration of the five future laender in a united state. Berlin is available as a bridge to East Europe.

De Maiziere said there are at present 2,000 resettlers going to the FRG a week. That is 2,000 too many. Since 1949 about 4 million people have turned their backs on the GDR. The majority of those who left since 9 November 1989 have probably found a job. However, there are also other cases. As a whole, there is no significant numbers of returnees.

Says Dual Alliance 'Has No Chance'

LD1206183590 Hamburg DPA in German 1742 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Washington (DPA)—Premier Lothar de Maiziere has said that the proposal by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, regarding associate membership for Germany in the two alliances, has no chance of success. De Maiziere told the National Press Club in Washington today [12 June]: "Recently we have heard a series of Soviet proposals for solutions, from Mr. Shevardnadze, Mr. Portugalov, Mr. Falin, and now from President

Gorbachev. I think it is one of the proposals which will be discussed, but it is not a proposal which will be the solution."

Talks With De Cuellar on Unification

LD1206214190 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 2032 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] United Nations, New York (ADN)—A talk with UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar marked the end of the stay by Premier Lothar de Maiziere in the United States this evening [12 June]. The talk centered on German unification and its external aspects, as well as on the GDR's contribution to ensuring stability and peace in the world.

With the unification of the two German states, the number of UN member-states will drop. After Namibia was received into the UN as the 160th member, the unification of North and South Yemen resulted in a reduction to 159 UN. States. Before the GDR flag is finally removed from the UN headquarters on New York's East River, a few technical and organization of questions have to be clarified, quite apart from the official statement on accession under the FRG Basic Law. This includes a decision on whether the GDR mission should simply cease its activity or whether it should be partly merged with the FRG mission. Lothar de Maiziere, for his part, set the signals. He informed the current GDR ambassador to the United Nations, who had represented the Honecker government at the world forum, that his presence was not appropriate at the meeting with Perez de Cuellar.

Reviews Four-Day U.S. Visit

LD1306095490 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0830 GMT 13 Jun 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Premier Lothar de Maiziere considers the NATO strategy of nuclear deterrence to be the "worst conceivable of all security systems." After the conclusion of his four-day visit to the United States, which focussed in particular on East-West issues and their implications for German unity and on economic questions, De Maiziere described the security policy tack being pursued by Gorbachev and Bush as the right approach. During their summit, the leaders of the superpowers for the first time dared to attempt "to define stability and balance as an expression not of conflict but of cooperation," he said.

His talks with President Bush in the White House and with business representatives, congressmen, and other politicians in the capital and in New York, fulfilled all his expectations. "I believe that we made very good progress without arguments," De Maiziere explained, referring in particular to the commitment to ensure that the Soviet Union and the whole of East Europe be firmly incorporated in the process of European unification. The development should in no way be protrayed as a "victory of the West over the East."

It is of crucial importance for the GDR that capital-intensive investors come into the country, and this is something which the government leader repeatedly called for in the United States. "The GDR must not in the future become a consumer market, but should remain a location for industry. If we do not achieve this, then we will maintain the division of Germany in another form, whereby we have a poor sector and a rich sector."

He feels that concrete NATO steps, to which De Maiziere links NATO's "politicization" as a precondition for German membership approved by the Soviet Union, should begin with demilitarization. This includes agreements on particular troop strengths, which should also apply to Germany.

Questioned on the latest Gorbachev proposal on the alliance issue, on which the GDR premier said in Washington that it was not a model solution, De Maiziere now qualified this by saying: "I think that we should place side by side all the initiatives which we have before us at present on this question, in order to determine what the usable elements are, which can link the two together in some meaningful way."

Transitional solutions are now urgently required to take into account the interests of all those involved, given that a synchronization of the unity efforts in Europe is no longer possible. "The German question has not exactly become independent, but it has taken on a tempo of its own, one with which European unification can no longer keep pace." A European security union to include the North American democracies should therefore be created as soon as possible, in order that the industrial states "can finally tackle the genuinely divisive issues of the present-day world."

CDU Proposes Six-Point Plan for Unification

LD1206180190 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1716 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Excerpt] Berlin (ADN)—Speaking in Berlin on Tuesday [12 June], CDU [Christian Democratic Union] press spokesman Helmut Lueck revealed a six-point strategy on the path to German unity.

According to the CDU, accession to the FRG Basic Law under Article 23 should be declared in the summer, with consideration being taken of the two-plus-four negotiations. The group recommends 23 September as a date for Land Diet elections. All-German elections should take place during the period from 2 to 16 December. The Basic Law coming into force in the GDR could, according to the plan, take place between the Land Diet elections and the period from 2 to 16 December. [passage omitted]

Pact Navy Maneuvers in Baltic, North Sea

LD1206090490 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0826 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Excerpts] Rostock (ADN)—Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact are conducting naval maneuvers in the North and Baltic seas. ADN learned from a press spokesman of the People's Navy that the traditional NATO exercise "Bright Horizon" is being held in the North Sea and in the Skagerrak until 16 June. [passage omitted]

The joint squadron of the Warsaw Pact united fleets will continue to be in action in the central and eastern parts of the Baltic Sea until 20 June.

Eppelmann on NATO Role, NVA Reductions

LD1206172890 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1513 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Tokyo (ADN reporter)—The Warsaw Pact will probably continue in existence until the end of 1991, but the GDR will leave this alliance when Germany is united, Disarmament and Defense Minister Rainer Eppelmann told the Japanese newspaper ASAHI SHIMBUN. In an interview published on Tuesday, he says that at the most recent Moscow summit there had been tacit understanding that the GDR would leave the Warsaw Pact when the two German states united. He also had the impression that NATO membership of the united Germany would be indirectly recognized by the Warsaw Pact states.

The Soviet proposals for membership in both military blocs was not acceptable to him. On the other hand, the Soviet standpoint that the military balance should not be tipped by the unification of Germany was clearly understandable. He could conceive, Eppelmann goes on to say, that a united Germany could belong to NATO politically, but would not become directly militarily active. On the territory of the present GDR there should be units of the National People's Army [NVA], but they should not come under the command of the defense minister of a united Germany, but be under the joint command of the five laender still to be formed in the area which is now East Germany. There were historical parallels for this in Germany before the first world war. He had discussed this with the FRG defense minister, but so far no concurrence of views is foreseeable.

Eppelmann announced that the NVA would, by 1993, be reduced from 135,000 to about 100,000 soldiers. As a consequence of the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces and arms, a further reduction to 70,000 men is planned.

At the Moscow summit arguments had indeed been put forward for the existence of the Warsaw Pact. Dissolving it would have negative effects on the Vienna negotiations, for if one side no longer exists, the talks could evaporate. The second point was the need for the East European countries to preserve a joint negotiating basis. Moreover, the Soviet Union—upon the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the continuance of NATO—would be in danger of being excluded from the new security system in Europe.

Eppelmann pointed out that reforms are unavoidable for the Warsaw Pact. The Pact would certainly abolish its military structures and transform itself into an almost exclusively political alliance. Negotiations are continuing on whether the military exercises planned for this year would be carried out as planned, and on which areas the military cooperation would be retained in the future. Reform of the Warsaw Pact would also include the examination of its history, above all the 1968 invasion of the CSSR. The defense ministers will discuss this at their 13-15 June meeting in Berlin.

In conclusion, Eppelmann described the existence of both military blocs as a result of the division of Europe, and called upon NATO to abolish its strategy of attack. It is now up to the Western alliance to send out signals.

Antall on International, Domestic Issues

LD1106222890 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1805 GMT 11 Jun 90

[Interview with Premier Jozsef Antall by "First-Hand Information" program announcer Henrik Havas in Antall's National Assembly office in Budapest on 11 June—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Havas] Good evening. The "First-Hand Information" program today has a single guest, Premier Jozsef Antall. If the quality of the broadcast leaves something to be desired, that is because instead of the usual Brody Sandor Street studio, this time the scene of the recording is Parliament House, or, to be more precise, the premier's office. Starting this morning right up until five o'clock this afternoon [1500 GMT], with the exception of a lunch break, listeners have sent us 115 questions by telephone, and if I reckon that an average conversation lasted five minutes, then I can say that they were asking questions practically nonstop. I ask that you also not telephone any more now during the program, because, I must tell you, we are starting the conversation at half past six in the afternoon [1630 GMT] with Jozsef Antall, who, at the time of the broadcast, I believe will be sitting in the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] Presidium session. Am I right?

[Antall] Yes. Up until now, I have been sitting in parliament, and I have had other discussions.

[Havas] Does your working day always contain so much?

[Antall] Well, generally they start with the morning phone calls at about half past seven, and generally I finish around midnight or two a.m. In the past weeks I have not finished the day much before that.

[Havas] Before I ask you the listeners' questions, we must discuss a few facts. Let us perhaps begin with the fact that last Thursday in Moscow, at the session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Commission, you drew the world's attention to yourself with several things. First, I am thinking of your proposal, according to which one should be dealing not with the Pact's modernization but with its general reexamination. Did you expect your proposal to draw so great a reaction?

[Antall] Well, naturally, we expected it. On the one hand, the Hungarian National Assembly had already dealt with this issue when it decided whether it should debate the question of our leaving the Warsaw Pact with urgency or not. This topic had been raised by Miklos Vasarhelyi. Since then, on the issue of our leaving the Pact, the Hungarian parties, at least the parliamentary parties, have been united in principle. The National Assembly decided to examine this issue, to send out an appropriate committee from foreign political, legal, and military viewpoints. Therefore, when we went at the invitation of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, we went in possession of the stand taken by the Hungarian National Assembly.

The other thing that emerges here is that withdrawal from the Pact is, for Hungary, also a historical, symbolic question, since in 1956 we proclaimed our leaving. Naturally, from the viewpoint of international law, this is in principle debatable, since this was not...this was a unilateral leaving. We adhere, however, to this in principle. At this discussion, we took the stand that following the 1956 principled stance of the Hungarian National Assembly, we submit to the Political Consultative Committee our belief that Hungary should leave the Pact; on the other hand, this must not be carried out unilaterally, but through discussions, and the appropriate viewpoint must be developed during the discussions.

The formal approach to this was that we did not create the impression that we considered this to be a sustainable, existing organization, still suited to functioning, since if we democratize it, or modernize it, or whatever we do with it, then we would have been creating that impression. For this reason we took the stance in the agenda—and I was chairing the morning part of the session—right at the point in the agenda where I modified the formulation in the submission, saying that here we shall modernize, etc., democratize, [and I put it] this way: an exchange of views on the Pact's character, function, and role, and about its eventual radical alteration.

[Havas] With this proposal of ours, however, it seemed that we were left a little bit on our own. Only Czechoslovakia took a stand that was at least similar to the Hungarian one, but not in everything.

[Antall] It was not in this that we remained alone. They adopted this. They did not adopt it in the course of the preliminary discussions, even the foreign ministerial conference had not adopted it a few minutes prior to the opening of the plenary session. The other delegations did not adopt it in the preliminary discussions and did not strive to adapt to it. In spite of this, on the other hand, this is how I opened the session, and there Gorbachev nodded to it: Yes, they will adopt it. [ott Gorbachev rabolintott, hogy igen, elfogadjak]. I immediately asked if anyone had any objection to this. There was none. We therefore declared this in a resolution. That is how it got onto the agenda, and its significance was also that—this went through the process of the discussion—we proposed its reexamination. So, this gave us a framework right away.

In the afternoon session, I was able to deliver my speech, which contained the fact that Hungary wishes to leave the Warsaw Pact, and that in our judgment, by the end of 1980... [corrects himself] 1991, under any circumstances, the Warsaw Pact's military organization ought to be abolished. Now, then, this naturally has its timetable. To this belonged our proposal that a council of ambassadors come into being which would reexamine the issues surrounding the Warsaw Pact, and at the same time we would decide that beginning 1 January we also would take a series of measures in the interest of this.

[Havas] Excuse me for interrupting, but naturally that is what I meant just now, that we remained alone in this, according to which the military organizations...

[Antall, interrupting] Yes, it was, in fact, in this that we remained alone, that no one had formulated leaving the Warsaw Pact in this form. Only we announced that under any circumstance we are in favor of leaving the Warsaw Pact. Now then, leaving the Pact, after all, is not such a simple question, obviously. The fact that we alone announced it in this form shows that this issue cannot be settled simply with a proclamation.

First, it has to be taken into account, in the matter of leaving the Warsaw Pact and of its timetable—in which we are determined that it has to be prepared by December—and that the Vienna troop—well, in actual fact disarmament, troop reduction talks—have to be taken into consideration. We must not endanger that because in the event that we did endanger it, with that everybody would turn, as a matter of fact, against us, and they would not understand our viewpoint.

The other issue is that the Helsinki summit meeting will convene—that, too, must be taken into consideration—where we will take a stance in accordance with this.

The third thing is the German issue. It evidently influences the viewpoint of the GDR and the FRG, that they would not like to endanger the process of German unification in any way. So, that also must be taken into consideration.

Finally, we had to take into consideration the Soviet troop withdrawal, thus, the process as well, and for this very reason, the whole thing. This is such a complex issue, and if we take into consideration that the Soviet Union presently is asking from us a sum of 2.5 billion rubles, in parallel with the troop withdrawal, for the installations left in Hungary, which is more than 50 billion forints, then this is a fairly substantial amount. We took the stance of not recognizing this. On the one hand, the environmental protection damage caused by the Soviet Army, apart from the use of the buildings... but I will not go into details now. So, this is a complex issue. In any case, also regarding this issue, just as in Soviet-Hungarian economic relations, a committee will examine it and then submit [a proposal].

Now then, I do not think that in the last resort we shall remain alone in this. Already the Czechoslovak...[corrects himself] already the German, the East German, defense minister, the disarmament and national defense minister, has stated that in this issue they...how they will...that they too support the Pact's dissolution. The Czechoslovak delegation also came close to this stance, although as a matter of fact they also declared differently, first in Prague, to my knowledge, even on the day of the elections. I have actually just now been informed about it. In fact, everybody was expecting that the world would receive our stance more negatively, and until then they did not support us. But the Soviet delegation also took notice...cognizance of it; Gorbachev also assured us of his understanding, of his stance. President Bush, too, in his preliminary letter, gave a briefing of sorts about what they had discussed with Gorbachev, which was very useful, because in this way I was acquainted in advance with the whole discussion.

[Havas] I was about to ask about this. You received a three-page letter from President Bush on 5 June, and President Gorbachev had also informed you about his discussions. What I would be interested in is whether there were any marked differences in the two interpretations.

[Antall] In fact, both emphasized their understanding of each other. Both emphasized to what extent they agreed on the German question. Naturally, the difference was that in his letter Bush stressed that they support NATO membership for Germany, NATO membership of the united Germany, while Gorbachev has not yet accepted this. At the same time, it was very important during the discussions, that Gorbachev in fact accepted the presence of U.S. troops in Europe. This is important, because in the past months, even before I came into government, I explained this several times at news conferences abroad, in the United States as well, that I was convinced that the Soviet Government would change their viewpoint, and that after German unification was completed, the Soviet Government would not oppose but would in fact agree to the U.S. presence in Europe. This has now happened. It is logical that this serves a certain balance, and I think that the Soviet Union, too, if the direction of Soviet politics does not change, will accept Germany's membership in some form of alliance, which is much less dangerous to anyone than a Germany outside any alliance, for example a neutral one.

What was interesting was that Bush in his letter referred to his intention to propose a reevaluation of NATO military doctrine, which indicates that they want to make a gesture toward a balanced relation.

[Havas] At the end of last week, Polish Premier Mazowiecki was your guest. This is interesting because Poland in fact is of a different opinion about the future of the Warsaw Pact. Poland wants to retain the military organization of the Warsaw Pact and does not regard the Soviet troop withdrawal topical, in light of German unification. You offered Premier Mazowiecki Hungarian mediation. This is interesting because it is public knowledge that your father did a lot for Polish refugees in those days [World War II], and now you could also take on a similar role, in the sense of becoming mediator between Germans and Poles. In your view, are the reservations and fears about a united Germany still alive in Czechoslovakia and Poland, and are these still topical?

[Antall] I think that Germany—now I am talking about the FRG—as a democratic, constitutional, parliamentary system can compete with any other in Europe. I do not regard England, France, or any other as a better democracy than the FRG. This is one point; the other is that German unification naturally means that in Europe an exceptionally strong economic and political power will be created in the form of Germany, but it is a fact that Germany and the German community represent great power. In my view, what always made Germany dangerous was when it was humiliated or offended. Hitlerism never would have come to being in Germany if Germany had not been humiliated after World War I, if they had not tried to ruin it, to offend it, etc. Then Hitler, as a bad, unknown painter, a Schiklgruber [derogatory reference to Hitler's family name], would have disappeared and never would have become an historical person.

I think, therefore, that if Germany is allowed to develop and feels itself in the right place in Europe, then it will not represent any danger.

In addition to Germany, naturally Poland also wants to secure its own position. This is made clear by Poland's political situation, geographical position, its openness in both directions and its historical experiences. Poland simply must have its borders guaranteed. Premier Mazowiecki clearly stated his position that Poland does not wish to have its Eastern borders reexamined. Now Poland lost more than 100,000 square km with this sliding toward the West, so if Poland does not wish to have the change of borders by force—and what else can they do within the present international situation, on the basis of the Helsinki agreement, just like us. Because of this millions of Poles move toward the Western side, so Poland wants to secure its Western borders. Now, if they insist on this, then certain doubts arise. Poland would like it if before the unification of Germany is completed, the two German states would declare, as President von Weizsacker already has, that they regard the borders as permanent. In addition, there are certain points in the German Constitution, there are certain German statutes and regulations that touch on the area beyond the Oder-Neisse, the former German regions, so the Poles feel a need to fix all these now.

What this really means is that they would like to put it on a firm foundation [ket-labra akarjak allitani] with the Soviet Union and with the about-to-be-unified Germany. They want to fix firm borders. This from the Polish viewpoint is understandable, but this is a substantially different geopolitical position from ours. We have no such problems. We have no borders with Germany. We therefore look at it differently.

[Havas] We, however, have other problems. Chancellor Kohl reassured the Poles that just like the ancient French-German differences were eliminated, just like the new German and French generations have been freed from this curse and the border between the FRG and France has really became a conceptual thing, the same must also happen in German-Polish relations. Here, I would like to refer to your discussions with Polish Premier Mazowiecki. The Polish premier assured us that Poland supports the Hungarian proposal concerning a charter on nationality rights, which we submitted, together with other countries, in Copenhagen. When will our borders with Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia become conceptual? When will these differences, with historical roots, which poison the atmosphere here in East-Central Europe, cease to exist?

[Antall] One part of the question is easier—that part which pertains to what Chancellor Kohl promised the Poles. I am convinced that the Germans will in truth fully recognize and acknowledge the Polish-German Border. I think that on the part of Chancellor Kohl there is a legal consideration. By the way, he told me this in Berlin and Bonn. There is a legal consideration, that he thought that as long as the GDR exists in a political sense, he could not make statements on behalf of a unified Germany. It is the unified Germany which must legally recognize the border question. This is one aspect.

The other aspect is that alongside the statement by Chancellor Kohl, there is an obvious political issue. Several million Germans now live in the FRG, who originate from the eastern areas. They went over from east of the Oder-Neisse border, and obviously serious, emotional forces are appearing there. Therefore, if one very emphatically, spectacularly, wishes to renounce these areas—in my view every German politician knows that this is reality, but it is always a different thing to state it—it means millions for the Christian Democratic Union-Christian Socialist Union [CDU-CSU] among the electors. It is not good for anyone if people who have come over from these areas, or other people, think along tlines of voting for right-wing parties such as the republicans, instead of the CDU-CSU. Therefore, my opinion is that the Germans must acknowledge this, and they have acknowledged it, but it must not be demanded spectacularly and emphatically. This is most crucial, precisely for the CDU-CSU.

The other thing: Strauss had a very noteworthy saying: There is a need to take care, in the interests of German democracy, that no party should ever emerge, which is to the right of the CDU-CSE. I consider this to be a very correct principle, and I think that this mistake has taken place in France. As a consequence of the political strategy of the left-wing parties, primarily Mitterrand's political strategy, the Le Pen type of party has come about on the right. In this manner, the French center and right-of-center has become incapable of governing, that is Mitterrand used it to make the right-wing unfit. Giscard and Chirac have great difficulty in entering into a coalition with one another and in obtaining an absolute majority, and thus they ensure an opportunity for the socialists to govern over a long time.

It is possible from a party political viewpoint, but I would consider it more correct if in Germany, no party representing a considerable force were to come about to the right of the CDU-CSU. For this reason, I do not consider it very correct if there is a wish to drive the Germans in this direction, into taking a position which aggravates this. Of course, the logical and the clear, current situation is that the German-Polish border must be recognized. The Germans, Weizsaecker, already said that the unified Germany will acknowledge this, just like we can do nothing else. We, also, acknowledged the Trianon Treaty, and the repeat of the Trianon Treaty in 1947, and on the basis of the Helsinki Final Act we acknowledged that we do not seek an alteration of the borders by means of force.

However, for all this, it is very difficult emotionally, in Hungary, for this matter to be handled without nostalgia. It is possible to acknowledge such an historical verdict. It is possible to acknowledge of an historical situation. But no one expect us to be happy that Cluj or Tirgu Mures are no longer Hungarian, nor are Bratislava or other places. In this connection, several newspapers have written or objected that I said more than a week ago that in a political sense and according to Hungarian law, I am the premier of 10 million Hungarian citizens, but spiritually and emotionally, I wish to be the premier of 15 million Magyars.

Yet, I (?continued) by going on to minority issues, etc. In my view it is the most natural thing in the world that when we recognize the verdict of history, we recognize the situation which has taken shape, and this is how we think.

In connection with this, I believe that East-Central Europe has no choice other than for us to improve our relations with one another—in the case of Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, too. Indeed, regarding our neighbors, our relationship is obviously best with Austria, but I might add that there is room for improvement in the situation of the Magyar minority in Austria, and we wish this, too. We firmly wish this of the neighboring countries, including the Magyars in Felvidek, sub-Carpathia, Transylvania, Delvidek, and everywhere.

By the way, we touched on the matter of the Magyars in sub-Carpathia, recognizing the improvement in their sitaution at the talks conducted with Premier Ryzhkov.

I think that here we have to strive for the improvement of the situation. We have to do everything possible to ease the borders, but I am not too optimisic that this will be a quick process. I think it is enough if I refer to, for example, what would be the consequences of changing over to hard currency accounting with the neighboring countries.

Say we start and in our trade relations we change over to hard currency and account for everything in dollars, as is already happening with the Soviet Union. We have already raised the question of tourism, which is affecting the traffic at small borders [as heard]. We will change over with the Poles as well as of 1 January, we have now agreed on this. This same would apply to the others as well. A completely new situation will be created. The relations will have to be settled. The Polish stance was important because Poland, until the Mazowiecki government, virtually did not accept the existence of national minorities in Poland, there was no education in minority languages. They did not recognize the existence of a German minority, there was emigration from Poland. The nationality rights were only guaranteed in a very limited way by the Poles, therefore the Polish support was missing.

In 1988, when the Transylvanian demonstrations took place, and when we took a stand in the interests of the Hungarians in Transylvania, the Polish Government declared neutrality between Hungary and Poland. Because of my Polish connections, I sent a memorandum to the Polish Government at that time in which I actually called this attitude shameful and demanded they change it. Referring to the fact that in Hungary, during the World War II, to talk about a numerical magnitude, several hundred thousand Polish people passed through or stayed here and said that we are expecting solidarity from Poland.

They immediately invited me to the Polish Embassy and controversial articles appeared in the Polish press, and the foreign affairs spokesman who made this statement even received a warning. So the Poles did make a gesture in this respect already then, this I also mentioned to Premier Mazowiecki. I must add that from the Hungarian side, too, statements about the Poles were not always the best either. Therefore we have certain things to get into order, but the support of Poland on the national minorities question is extremely important. It is the country of the largest population in East-Central Europe.

The others, even if we can get support from them in time—that is, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Romania, Yugoslavia—are interested about this in a different way because of the numbers. Since about 30,000 Romanian [figure as heard] are faced with 2.5 million Hungarians.

In the same way we cannot count on the support of Bulgaria because their position toward the Turkish minority is extremely rigid.

[Havas] I suggest we close the foreign affairs subjects with your two proposed visits next week. You are preparing to go Bonn and Paris. What specific proposals are you taking with you to these two capitals; what are you expecting from these two visits?

[Antall] There is, naturally, an established custom in this. I have already been in both capitals, even as leader of an opposition party; I have been to America, to Paris, to Bonn. I can say we have good relations.

During the Bonn visit with Chancellor Kohl, he described it in these terms: We have what could be called a personal friendship, in addition, the CDU and the CSU are in direct ideological and political contact. But these would not be enough.

Obviously, the FRG has already been the greatest financial supporter of Hungary, in fact, with investments, everything. We have already been enjoying the support of the FRG, and Germany is grateful, too, for the part we played in the German unification, which was directly linked with the letting through of the refugees. We have certain political, moral capital.

What I am expecting from Germany and from the trip is a strengthening and further development of political ties, in practical terms—Hungary is in a fairly serious financial situation. Already, in this transitional period, we have succeeded in obtaining 280 million [currency not specified] in support. this is just now being signed. We are expecting further help and support from Germany, and this includes financial support, industrial support, training of managers, retraining of unemployed Hungarians, assistance to the military, and the training of public administrators. So I can safely say that this is a comprehensive program, and this is what we are working on; the government is preparing a plan for this.

Naturally, this does not mean that we are only concerned with the Germans. We are receiving French support as well. Our state secretaries are going to France and England for study tours, by invitation. In addition to the French and English, we are receiving this type of support from the United States as well, and I even hope that the Canadian Mounties, which is the best such organization, will agree to train Hungarian public security experts. Our idea, and let us say my personal plan, is that within a short time we must create a balance in professional contacts and experience. We should have every conceivable Western contact, and we must achieve this in the most important organisations.

However, we will also urge that there should be a certain exchange of military experience, as well as training. Thus, the objective of this trip, properly speaking, is to meet the Bavarian premier, the premier of Baden-Wuerttemberg, and Chancellor Kohl, and to cover every issue with these same people, and after that to lay the foundations for the development of permanent cooperation.

Then I will go to Paris at the invitation of President Mitterrand. Alongside President Mitterrand, I will meet Prime Minister Rocard. I have just renounced an invitation to Paris from the Union of European Democratic Parties, because it would have been for a day earlier. I would have been the guest of Chirac. Yet this, my attendance there, would not have been expedient from the viewpoint of the Hungarian Government.

What is of importance regarding relations with France is the economic aspect: French investments, French technological assistance. Beyond this, a very important element of French relations is that France take our side on the minorities question. One knows historically how significant French-Romanian relations always have been. Accordingly, we have made endeavors with a view to—I will not say offsetting, but rather rather balanncing out—French-Romanian relations. During his visit to Budapest, I spoke quite a lot about this with President Mitterrand, and I handed over to him a memorandum, resulting in him taking the stand that he supported the Magyar minorities in everything. So this was of great significance.

Therefore, I believe that in this short period of time the government has achieved good results regarding the international system of relations and foreign policy. This is how it could be summed up.

[Havas] Let us turn to internal political matters. When I came in here, into the parliament building this morning, I had the opportunity to have a look at the deputies, and just then Matyas Eorsi, parliamentary deputy of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], was turning to Viktor Orban with a poetic question. He asked whether this was the government Jozsef Antall had promised, made up of experts of international fame. He said to Viktor Orban that he, to be sure, was in agreement that this was not that government. How does the organization of government work stand, and what is your opinion of the comments made by Viktor Orban, or rather Matyas Eorsi?

[Antall] Before the government was formed, I said that what I will strive for is not for party politicians to take part in government, but rather for nonparty experts, and hopefully experts of international reputation, to be in the government. I believe that if I view it from this viewpoint there are, by all means, experts in the government who have an international reputation in their fields of expertise, but I do not believe that this is the only matter at issue here. I think that the decision on what a government is like cannot be taken in the space of two weeks. In my view, the government, including Finance Minister Ferenc Rabar, Bela Kadar [international economic relations minister], Ferenc Madl [minister without portfolio] contains a great many excellent experts and people of outstanding qualifications.

Naturally, it is not such an easy matter in a country where a one-party system prevailed for 40 years to form a government comprised of satisactory experts who cannot be viewed as compromised from a political standpoint, and who at the same time are suited for governing. In such a change of system, where can such politicians be found? Obviously, one viewpoint is that they should not be compromised politically—that is, they should not have taken part in the past decades in state power and in the government side of politics. As a consequence, there are appropriately 11 people of scientific commitment, since this was the sphere where it was possible to function without being politically compromised, but by having satifactory professional qualifications. That is one thing, and it pertains to political state secretaries, too.

However, we chose the administrative state secretaries so that they should be experts who politically could not be viewed as being party politicians, but who up to now took part in government. This is the sole, feasible model of continuity and political renewal. This was done in 1848, 1867, 1918 or 1945. Now, what Viktor Orban and Matyas Eorsi say or think about this are two different things. I do not know what they think, but it is the most natural thing in the world for them to say this because why should someone belonging to the opposition party praise the government? So this does not change things. I think that in the course of its short period of activity, including several government meetings, the government—whether we are talking about the finance minister, or the foreign minister, or anyone, even the international economic relations minister—has performed well.

[Havas] [passage omitted] Mrs. Balazs Horvath, a pensioner, asks: I am not interested in how and when you will leave the Warsaw Pact, but I am interesting in what happens with price compensations. What will we subsist on? Peter Schmidt, from Leninvaros: What concrete, rapid steps does the government plan in the interest of people with low pensions? A very characteristic and recurrent motif: It is proposed that the former leading stratum also should receive pensions amounting to the subsistence level. Mrs. Gyorgy Kis, from Ujpest: What can we expect? Should we go begging? Many people began weeping: Mrs. Bela Lakatos, a 70-year-old pensioner: A rise in pensions was promised for 1 May, but there is nothing. We do not have time to wait. I will not continue; this is what the pensioners' questions were like.

[Antall] Naturally, all of us know this, and the government does not have a member who does not feel the greatest responsiblity and sympathy regarding this. Nonetheless, I have to say that the matter of people with low pensions and a number of other matters—for example, the former internees, detained, and people awaiting rehabilitation—all are raised in a period of crisis, like that in which the country finds itself now. I also understand that questions are phrased as to show that they are not interested in leaving the Warsaw Pact, or not being interested in this or that. For all that, these questions are not so far removed from one another.

I know that every pensioner would like to receive tomorrow a sum which would give them a feeling that everything is balanced out, that the indecent devaluation in pensions that has taken place is balanced out, or that the same is done for those who feel that they worked throughout their life and paid in the appropriate percentage of their pensions. Naturally, in awareness of all this, we take what we inherited as our point of departure, now, in Hungary.

That is one thing. The other thing is that everyone feels that tough measures must be taken. They would be pleased if high pensions were withdrawn, stopped, if pensions were redistributed, etc.. Those who were convicted feel, with complete moral justification, naturally, that the victims, the former convicts, should get at least as much as the prison-keepers. This can only be agreed with, in principle, from every viewpoint.

However, in the period of peaceful transition, every such issue is much more difficult. Hungary chose the path of peaceful transition, which means that this country wished to adhere to legal and lawful forms, and if we wish to keep the transformation between the legal and lawful forms, then in the spirit of democracy we cannot begin by evicting anyone from his apartment without any legal framework, or by stripping him of his pension, like in the Rakosi era.

Therefore, we must work this out within the framework of health and social welfare—to use the name of the ministry. We think that we will be able to work out in the coming weeks, in accordance with this, the new regulation in which we will incorporate, in the means offered by law, the possiblity of justice and distribution. Anything that is possible can be asserted only through economic policy.

Inflation is the gravest issue. As a matter of fact, the first thing is that we must do everything against inflation in the interest of pensions retaining their purchasing power. Only on the basis of the re-examination of the budget, the re-examination of social security will we be able responsibly to make a statement on this issue. If a person today, two weeks after the formation of the government, knowing the present conditions, could give concrete replies to this, that person would have to be irresponsible, and would cause the melt-down of the country's economic life. The other thing is that for this we must work out the entire pension system. We are in favor of this. We will work this out and we will be able to take appropriate measures.

I would, however, like to stress that today Hungary is a country in a grave financial, economic crisis. It must be saved from entering the gravest phase of the crisis.

[Havas] I am very sorry that we did not have the means to take a comprehensive look at all the questions. Two more concrete questions: In the category of economic questions, this was the sort of thing that came up: I would like to get back my timber industry factory. Somebody else would like to get back a brick factory. But the most interesting and most characteristic was when an anonymous caller said: When will they sort out the tax? From 100 forints I am left with 12 forints. That is why I steal and cheat. Leave me at least 40 forints and I promise I will be respectable. I would like to sleep soundly. Will it be possible to encourage undertakings?

[Antall] Yes, it will be possible to encourage undertakings. But this year the budget...we must take as the starting point that this year there is an approved budget. What is more, there is a budget where we have to create a budgetary surplus, because otherwise the budget will visibly not remain in balance.

The other question...since time is short: In the question of property, the government has begun preparation for settling property and the appropriate rules of law, and the preparation of the concept. This is one of the gravest issues of the transformation. Here there is naturally no agreement between the political parties. There are political parties which would stress the restoration of the old system of ownership. After the past decades, the restoration of property is a process, and it would trigger off on unstoppable process.

The first question is the land issue, which must be resolved. It is obvious that here too a coalition government will not make its own the program put forward, raised, by the Independent Smallholders Party, a program that is not unified. It will be unable to take it over in its entirety. It is obvious that here too, in a coalition party, there must be a balance, and a compromise, as the agreement [with the Alliance of Free Democrats] from the outset assured this. On the other hand, this to must be adopted by the Hungarian National Assembly.

Now then, the other ownerships, the return of factories...how can these be equitably resolved? If by chance somewhere someone had a barber shop, will he get back the state hairdresser's which stands in its place? Or another person, whose shop has been replaced by a tobacconist, will he not get it back? We would like to create a compensation fund, in any case, where, after the appropriate assessment, the whole issue will be resettled. The property issue, after 40 years, is the gravest problem of the entire transformation.

[Havas] Mr. Premier, thank you for the conversation, and, if I may, I would ask that we return to these questions after an appropriate period, after the lapse of a certain time.

[Antall] I think that perhaps we shall be better able to answer this in about a month's time.

[Havas] Thank you very much.

[Antall] Thank you.

Fur on Pact Membership, Problems With Romania

LD0806222190 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1905 GMT 8 Jun 90

[Interview with Defense Minister Lajos Fur by an unidentified "Panorama" program reporter after the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Conference in Moscow on 7 June—recorded]

[Text] [Reporter] There is the opinion that Hungary should remain in the Warsaw Pact, because this provides some kind of guarantee for avoiding a possible conflict with Romania?

[Fur] I do not think this by itself could be a guarantee, nor do I believe that a conflict could occur between Romania and Hungary, which would necessitate the intervention by such a large military organization. There are unquestionably serious problems between the two countries. These have mounted up over the decades, and, in recent times—as is well known—they erupted into extraordinarily wild and aggressive events; such symptoms were visible. But these, perhaps, can be solved by other means, partly through negotiations between the two countries and partly by European diplomacy and European public opinion. The thinking public of Europe could have such an impact that these phenomena will hopefully disappear from the relations between the two countries.

[Reporter] Whose allies will we be in the Warsaw Pact?

[Fur] As we recently stressed repeatedly, we would like to be allies to the whole of Europe, not of one side or the other. Plainly what we would like is that parallel to the end of our membership in the Warsaw Pact, a European security system could be created, covering the whole of Europe, of which Hungary would also be a member and as such, the total European security would guarantee our national sovereignty and the independence of our country as well.

Goncz Describes Talks With Gorbachev

LD0806230990 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1905 GMT 8 Jun 90

[Interview with Interim President Arpad Goncz by unidentified "Panorama" program reporter after the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Conference in Moscow on 7 June—recorded]

[Text] [Reporter] How did Gorbachev receive the Hungarian position?

[Goncz] It came as a surprise to me as well that he received what we did with complete agreement and approval. We said we were being honest, we talked straight, not hiding our aims under the table. We will not allow Hungary to become a starting point or bridgehead against the Soviet Union. At the same time, we would like to completely retrieve our sovereignty over the Hungarian Army and our own sovereignty.

[Reporter] What did you expect before the summit, if, as you said, his viewpoint surprised you?

[Goncz] Partly, since we were leading the action to revise the Warsaw Pact, or as some described it, the fundamental change of it. I thought we would meet, if not rejection, at least a certain coolness. But we met an exceptionally warm and friendly reception, in which he repeated several times our equal status and recognized the similarities of our interests and difficulties. I have met an extraordinarily warm and open—and as I have already said—man with smiling eyes. This was for me, no surprise.

[Reporter] Wasn't this viewpoint born of necessity, since Gorbachev could hardly do anything else? The Hungarian position is now rather committed and determined.

[Goncz] I do not know his motivations, I did not ask his motives, only his opinions.

[Reporter] In your opinion, if Gorbachev is sacked, since his position is rather unstable, a new Soviet leadership could have a harder voice. Could you stand up to this?

[Goncz] In the interests of Hungary, we will stand up to anyone, we can stand up to anyone. I am not qualified to make a statement about the Gorbachev's future. Perhaps I know the Soviet internal situation, but I do not know Gorbachev's internal reserves, his psychological reserves, his moral credit, moral reserves—I do not know. We can imagine that he has these.

[Reporter] What kind of Soviet Union would be good for us, from the viewpoint of our interests?

[Goncz] One with which we can establish relations on a perfectly equal footing. The Soviet Union's existence, the Soviet Union's presence here can not be denied. We foresee Hungary as a free country and not one which is under one-sided obligations, one which has relations with all its neighbors as equals. It would be simple madness not to take into account the Soviet Union as a trading and political partner either now or later, and in whatever form of state it will be. Russia was not created the day before yesterday, and will not disappear tomorrow. I said Russia just now deliberately.

[Reporter] According to this, you see the future of the Soviet Union as a united state?

[Goncz] I did not say that. Quite precisely what I said was that in the first place, Russia has been, is, and will be. Whether it will be a fededral structure, how large it will be, who will be its leader, how it will solve its relations with neighboring countries, I can not say.

[Reporter] Didn't Gorbachev talk about this?

[Goncz] We could not talk about the future of the Soviet Union and historical questions during such a short time.

[Reporter] Did you talk about the question of nationalities?

[Goncz] It did not arise.

[Reporter] The Hungarian minorities, the lower Carpathian Hungarians?

[Goncz] It was not raised on this occasion.

[Reporter] At what level will Soviet-Hungarian relations continue in the future? What can be expected, what kind of diplomatic moves?

[Goncz] There were no discussions about specific diplomatic steps. Presumably they will continue at the previous, high levels. I can see no reasons for reducing the present level.

Cuba To Recall Students From Hungary

LD1206193290 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1900 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Havana is to recall Cuban students studying in Hungary. According to the measure, at the end of the academic year, 70 university and high school students will have to return to Cuba.

National Assembly Adopts Law on Amnesty

LD1206174690 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1700 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Report by Anna Lengyel from the National Assembly; date not given]

[Text] The plenary session has just concluded. The National Assembly, with 207 yes vote, 34 against and 41 abstentations, adopted the law on amnesty. In accordance with this, the punishment of those sentenced for not more than one year imprisonment for premeditated crime and those sentenced for not more than three years imprisonment for crime out of negligence will be annulled. The duration of punishment for others is also to be reduced. The amnesty for pregnant women and old people is to apply to a greater extent.

Criminal procedures cannot be started and cannot be continued for crimes committed before 1 June 1990 and for which the law prescribes the punishment of not longer than three years imprisonment, except the crimes of the misuse of authority, bribery, and fraud. Those, who within three years, will get to prison again because of a premeditated crime, their sentence, which was dropped presently, will become valid again.

MSZP Seeks Presidential Election Referendum

LD1006093490 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0800 GMT 10 Jun 90

[Text] The Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] is launching a nationwide action starting tomorrow. The party wants to collect 100,000 signatures in support of the demand that a referendum should decide about the method of electing the president of the Republic. The party's Kaposvar and County Baranya organizations have already collected 10,000 signatures. Independent deputy Zoltan Kiraly also supports the referendum. Unlike the government coalition, the MSZP would like the people to decide on the person of the president of the republic. MSZP National Secretary Imre Szekeres told VASARNAPI HIREK [Sunday News] that the MSZP at present has no candidate for the presidential post.

State Secretary Matolcsy on Economic Problems

LD1106092690 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0445 GMT 11 Jun 90

[Interview with State Secretary Gyorgy Matolcsy by "Morning Chronicle" program reporter Zoltan Farkas; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] In Moscow on Friday, Premier Jozsef Antall conferred with Soviet head of government Ryzhkov. State Secretary Gyorgy Matolcsy, the premier's economic-political adviser, took part in the discussions. He is the guest of the "Morning Chronicle" [program] and Zoltan Farkas talks to him here in the studio:

[Farkas] Let us begin perhaps by asking what inheritance the Antall government rreceived. Two things are known: first, there is in force an agreement which says that starting 1 January 1991, trade with the Soviet Union will be in convertible currency. The other dates from two weeks ago, according to which the export of Hungarian machines is being made difficult in the Soviet Union. They have introduced a system of import permits as a result of which we are unable to deliver the amount we had planned. What light did these two decisions cast on the discussions?

[Matolcsy] Both decisions are very important. The first relates to the fact that after 1 January 1991 foreign trade will be at world market prices and in dollar accounting. In one point, however, the matter is fairly uncertain, and that is what will happen with the presumably very big Soviet surplus of between $500 million and $1.5 billion. The Hungarian Government, the new one, stated that it considers a Soviet surplus of such an extent as inconceivable and intolerable. The Hungarian balance of payments cannot cope with this. [passage omitted]

The general agreement on a transition to dollar accounting should be followed by an actual concrete agreement about the fate of the surplus arising from the world market price accounting of Soviet energy deliveries. We have said that the Hungarian balance of payments cannot cope with such a big surplus and we asked the Soviet side to consider some concrete solutions. [passage omitted]

From the one-on-one discussions and the conversations in the corridors it became clear that we have to handle with caution even those promises which the Soviet side makes with the best of intentions. [passage omitted]

The fact is that a further R60 million worth of Hungarian machine exports has become uncertain. While in 1989 Hungarian machine exports totaled 2.5 billion [currency not specified], we have now had to reduce it to 1.6 billion this year. This would have to be [word indistinct] by further reductions.

[Farkas] What consequences could all this have?

[Matolcsy] Well, a further reduction in machine exports would further undermine the situation of the big machine industry enterprises.

[Farkas] That is obvious. Is there any kind of connection showing how big the resulting unemployment could be, or how big the drop in production? Do we have figures on this yet?

[Matolcsy] We do have figures. A 30 percent machine export reduction from 1989 to '90 will alone, it is estimated, result in an unemployment burden of 40-50,000 people. I say estimated, because if bankruptcy proceedings start with regard to these big machine industry enterprises that are really (?near to) bankruptcy, then that is how many unemployed we can expect. At present, however, this has not yet started, whereas these are the big bankrupt enterprises which are acutely, or rather lastingly, forming a line.

[Farkas] Soviet-Hungarian relations are somewhat burdened by the Yamburg-Tengiz investment. [passage omitted]

[Matolcsy] As economists we have been loudly demanding, since the turnabout and the reform, that we halt the Yamburg-Tengiz investment. This stand was quite in order more or less right up to the mid-point. Actually, by now we have invested 50 billion forints; the investment is 75 percent ready. If we withdraw, well, then we shall neither get any gas, nor will our positions improve in the other negotiating areas—that is, our oil and electrical energy positions—not to put too fine a point on it. The only real solution would be if the Soviet side after '91, accounting its natural gas supply in dollars, would likewise recognize in dollars the pre-1991 Hungarian goods deliveries and work carried out. We raised this in a hard, businesslike manner. The Soviet head of government rejected this, or rather he referred it for further discussions and said that rather in its place we should find a simple solution, for example, in prices, they would [word indistinct] Hungarian deliveries in lower prices. [passage omitted]

[Farkas] It is known that the Soviet Union would like to buy more agricultural goods from Hungary. [passage omitted] What did you find at this meeting?

[Matolcsy] Exactly that, unequivocally, that is to say the Soviets wish to buy foodstuffs, consumer goods, and light industry products.

[Farkas] Anything but machines.

[Matolcsy] Anything but machines. [passage omitted]

[Farkas] It has emerged from this conversation that as of 1 January 1991, we shall trade with the USSR in dollars. How might this affect small border trade? What consequences might it have?

[Matolcsy] This will basically affect tourist traffic, and within this, the travel possibilities of the 200,000-strong Magyar minority in the Carpathian-Ukraine. The switch-over to dollars will change the situation completely, and some sort of solution must be found. The new government has now broached this very vigorously.

[Farkas] What can be broached? That we should not trade in dollars there?

[Matolcsy] There are two real solutions: One is that we should conduct goods-turnover accounting in dollars, while tourist traffic is accounted in local national currencies and that the difference in balance between the national currencies, if, for example, more Soviets travel, is offset in dollars.

The other solution which we raised is that after 1991, the local republics will have considerable dollar revenues, because the Soviet side will distribute the dollar revenues so that they are broken down into three parts, and money will be given to the enterprises, republics, and the central budget. Out of these dollar funds, they should ensure a separate fund for tourist traffic, within this for Carpathian-Ukraine traffic.

[Farkas] The fact is, no matter how unfortunate, that the switch-over to dollars can in practice paralyze the tourist traffic of Central Europe and East Europe, and this might be so not only for tourist traffic with the Soviet Union, but the Hungarian economy would also be paralyzed if the Soviet Union were not to deliver oil and gas to us. What is the situation? What can we expect in the third and fourth quarter?

[Matolcsy] At present, there is an interstate agreement, but there is no private-law contract for crude oil deliveries, for crude oil deliveries in the second half-year. By the way, contrary to rumors, in the first half-year the Soviets made satisfactory deliveries, indeed there are surpluses. We have lost out regarding the concluding of private-law contracts for crude oil.

[Farkas] So, is the situation entirely uncertain at the moment?

[Matolcsy] The situation is uncertain in that as long as there is no private-law contract, deliveries will not come to a halt, but we could face uncertainties regarding whether the entire contractual quantity will come in.

[Farkas] What can we expect?

[Matolcsy] We can expect that the two sides will agree in the coming months that we should receive the quantity of oil. However, we must deliver the entire quantity of mass consumers' items, light industry goods, as laid down in the agreement.

[Farkas] A final question. The Hungarian Government raised—and perhaps this is interesting—the idea of opening an agricultural market in Moscow.

[Matolcsy] Yes, a previous Hungarian government raised this. It was rejected. Now, Premier Ryzhkov has made a very exciting offer: We should set up several agricultural markets—not in Moscow, but in the west Siberian region...

[Farkas, interrupting] Excuse me, but for whom is this exciting?

[Matolcsy] Well, I hope that it will be exciting for the Hungarian producers and traders. After 1991, if we make deliveries for dollars and at world market prices, it will be in our interest to break into Siberia. There should be a solvent, market demand.

[Farkas] And not in Moscow?

[Matolcsy] Moscow will not have the (?dollars).

Statistics on Economic Performance Published

AU1206113390 Budapest MTI in English 1040 GMT 6 Jun 90

[Text] Budapest, June (MTI)—

	1989 in percentage of 1988	1989 months 1-4	1990 months 1-4
		in pc of the corr. period of previous year	
	retail trade		
sales (current prices)	116.7	115.9	115.7
sales (compar. prices)	98.9	100.3	92.3
within that: - foodstuffs and luxury goods	99.2	97.8	91.4
- clothing	88.9	94.6	86.5
- consumer durables	100.8	103.6	94.0
	consumer price index		
food	117.7	115.0	132.0
luxury goods	111.1	111.7	122.7
clothing	118.2	119.9	119.5
home heating	111.4	100.9	125.2
consumer durables	117.6	115.7	120.2
other consumer articles	122.4	120.5	123.9
services	116.6	114.5	123.1
total	117.0	114.9	125.0
	foreign trade (current prices)		
imports	113.6	117.6	100.0
non-convertible	100.6	107.1	77.7
convertible	123.5	126.5	116.1
exports	116.0	119.7	104.9
non-convertible	105.4	109.9	60.7
convertible	123.7	128.2	138.1
	foreign trade balance (including transport costs)		
	1989 Jan - April	1990 Jan - April	
rouble trade, million roubles	" 92.4	- 305.8	
convertible trade, million USd	- 6.2	" 276.0	
total, billion forints	" 2.4	" 9.5	

Jaruzelski on Reshaping Warsaw Pact

LD0806224890 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1905 GMT 8 Jun 90

[Interview with President Wojciech Jaruzelski by unidentified "Panorama" reporter after the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Conference in Moscow on 7 June—recorded; Jaruzelski speaks in Polish with superimposed translation into Hungarian]

[Text] [Reporter] What fate awaits the Warsaw Pact?

[Jaruzelski] I believe that a lot depends precisely on you. In my view, in the current historical situation, there is a need now for a Warsaw Pact to be more modern than the current one, whose structure is reshaped by us, and whose purpose is also different. Such an organization could be the basis of a dialogue with the West.

[Reporter] Especially for you. You perhaps are alarmed that your neighbor will again turn into a greater Germany.

[Jaruzelski] I would not call this a concern; it is a sense of responsibility, so that the process of the unification of Germany should be constructive, and should strengthen the security of all its neighbors. Naturally, our being members of the Warsaw Pact strengthens our sense of security in this complex moment of European history.

Polish Official Cited on Warsaw Pact Changes

LD0906112190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1630 GMT 8 Jun 90

[Excerpts] This afternoon in the parliament building our reporter Joszef Laszlo interviewed [Polish] Deputy Defense Minister Bronislaw Komorowski, who has come to Budapest in the entourage of the Polish head of government. [passage omitted on discussion that Polish stance is different from the rest of the Warsaw Pact in that it is more concerned, owing to its special geographic position, about the unity of Germany] [Begin recording] [Laszlo] The Polish Government's stance is that at this stage it would prefer to see the united Germany within NATO, because they are afraid of a neutral Germany; they have simply had bad experiences. Such a solution would go hand-in-hand with the fact that in the present territory of the GDR Soviet troops would remain. However, it is not this which presents the best solution for them; this only provides a sense of psychological comfort. The long-term solution is the shaping of a European security system, with the two processes taking place simultaneously.

Does this also go hand-in-hand with the fact that the sovereignty of Poland would still not be complete as foreign troops would be stationed in Poland?

The answer was yes. The presence of Russian troops is still seen by a proportion of Polish society as a threat, although it must be taken into account, too, that foreign troops are stationed in other European countries as well, on the basis of interstate agreements. Of course, the Polish Government has taken an unambiguous stance. They are seeking the departure of Soviet troops. This applies primarily to units carrying out strikes [csapasmeroe]. At the same time, they think those units which provide backup [utanpotlas] for Soviet troops stationed in the GDR may remain. [passage omitted pointing out that Czechoslovak and Hungarian positions may differ in this respect because it is Poland which is the link to the GDR for Soviet troops. Komorowski did not assess the Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow, but welcomes sovereignty for each Army]

In your view, was the Hungarian Government right in proposing negotiations about the abolition of the Warsaw Pact?

[Apparent Komorowski quote read by Laszlo] This proposal was born after the appraisal of Hungarian possibilities and needs, but our geopolitical situation differs fundamentally from the Hungarian one. What is important for us is that Hungarians should understand this and that they should not make more difficult the transformation of the Warsaw Pact into a kind of partnership organization. [end recording]

Skubiszewski on Summit, NATO, Germany

AU1206115190 Warsaw TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY in Polish 10 Jun 90 p 4

[Statement by Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski to TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY on 31 May; place not given: "Nobody wants Any Spheres of Influence Today"]

[Text] I do not think the Bush-Gorbachev summit creates any threat to Poland, so any comparisons with Yalta are mistaken. After all, Polish affairs are not going to be discussed in Washington, but merely a few global and European problems that also concern Poland.

Of the global affairs, a considerable reduction in nuclear weapons is important to us. We advocate far-reaching disarmament, and processes like this have to be agreed upon between the powers. However, Poland is taking part in other disarmament talks, such as the conferences in Geneva or Vienna. Therefore, in the sphere of disarmament, the Washington summit in no way clashes with Poland's interests.

Of the European affairs, the Washington summit is going to discuss in particular the question of German unification and the most difficult aspect thereof, in other words the future political and military status of Germany following unification (German membership in NATO). It is mainly the great powers and Germany itself that are concerned about a solution to this question, and Poland should not impose its own position on them.

Nevertheless, our position is well known. We oppose a neutral Germany. In other words we accept the possibility of this country's membership in NATO. This membership should be agreed only with the members of this alliance.

Will this affect the European balance? Yes and no.

If Germany unites and joins NATO, the USSR will suffer certain losses. However, these losses should be made good to a certain extent. That is why there is talk of a further, temporary deployment of Soviet forces in the eastern part of Germany. Although the USSR is currently saying that this scenario is no longer valid, talks on this subject are nevertheless in progress.

Do meetings between the powers make any sense? Yes, because it is only very recently that the relationship between the powers changed. From hostility and confrontation, they are proceeding toward cooperation and the search for joint solutions, and not just global issues, but possible local conflicts, too.

However, the fact that the superpowers are dealing with local conflicts does not mean they can reach decisions without the participation of those sides that are directly involved in a given dispute. The best example of this is the Middle East and relationships between Israel and the Arab states, where the powers are rather powerless. Nevertheless, they have to be interested in this conflict because a major threat stems from it.

I therefore see no danger of a new Yalta emerging from the Bush-Gorbachev summit. Generally, such fears are a fantasy today because there is no longer any possibility of a "new Yalta" now that the satellite countries have regained or are regaining their sovereignty. The summit is a negation of Yalta rather than a repetition of it.

However, the question emerges whether the new situation will produce a system of European security that will replace the powerful role of the two superpowers. It should do, but that is a question for the future.

First, we know that the United Nations, which was set up for this very purpose, has not at all replaced the superpowers, nor cooperation between other groups of countries.

Second, while building a Europe-wide security system, it is important to create ways of preventing disputes and of solving them if preventing them proves unsuccessful. When such mechanisms exist, the role of the superpowers will assume secondary status.

Third, right now it does not look as if NATO will diminish or be dissolved. There is an asymmetry here vis-a- vis the Warsaw Pact, which has to expand while it exists. Nevertheless, as long as NATO exists, the United States will continue to play a major role in Europe. Removing the United States from Europe by sending the U.S. forces back across the Atlantic would diametrically alter the situation in Europe, for the role of the United States in Europe has been to stabilize the situation and create the kind of system of security that we want.

From this angle, a united Germany's membership in NATO need not be viewed as a threat to European stability. Although the USSR has lost its satellites, it is still a power, even with all its economic, ethnic, and political difficulties. Due to the USSR's military strength, European equilibrium still exists despite all the changes in the Eastern bloc. Transferring the military frontier from the Elbe to the Bug rivers would be of secondary importance, especially because there is for the time being a consensus about Soviet forces remaining in Germany for a few years.

These few years, however, will quickly pass, and the following question will arise: What next? One should forge European unity, accompanied by a system of security safeguards, but this system must cover every country. The previous situation whereby some countries were protected by one power and others by another power cannot continue, or else we will very quickly revert to spheres of influence, and no one wants that.

Jaruzelski Previews Upcoming Visit to Spain

LD1006223290 Warsaw PAP in English
1752 GMT 10 Jun 90

[By PAP reporter Ryszard Ginalski]

[Text] Madrid, June 10—"Neighbours cannot be changed," the Madrid-based EL PAIS daily headlined an extensive interview with Poland's President Wojciech Jaruzelski published on Sunday [10 June].

The Polish president expressed great interest in his visit to Spain to start on Monday, June 11. He accentuated his great respect for Spain's King Juan Carlos I.

Jaruzelski admitted that the day of December 12, 1981 when he had to take decision on the imposition of martial law in Poland was the most difficult moment in his life.

Referring to the participation of Polish soldiers in the Warsaw treaty intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the president admitted tha it was a great mistake of history.

Announcing President Jaruzelski's visit to Spain, the Barcelona-based daily LA VANGUARDIA of June 10 cites excerpts from his statement for the EFE agency to the effect that Spain is a particularly useful point of reference for the process of democratization in Poland.

Leaves on Official Visit to Spain

LD1106080890 Warsaw PAP in English
0729 GMT 11 Jun 90

[Text] Warsaw, June 11—President Wojciech Jaruzelski and wife left for Spain today to pay an official visit there at the invitation of King Juan Carlos.

He was bidden farewell at the airport by Sejm Speaker Mikolaj Kozakiewicz, Senate Speaker Andrzej Stelmachowski, members of the government, and ministers of state.

Lists Goals for Visit

LD1106115590 Warsaw PAP in English
1038 GMT 11 Jun 90

[Text] Warsaw, June 11—President Wojciech Jaruzelski and his wife went on an official state visit to Spain today [11 June] at the invitation from King Juan Carlos.

At the Okecie Airport, the president was seen off by speakers of the Sejm Mikolaj Kozakiewicz and the Senate Andrzej Stelmachowski, members of the government and ministers of state.

Before his departure, Jaruzelski said this to PAP journalist:

"Poland and Spain are two large European countries. Relations between us are good and develop successfully but I think that there are still many untapped opportunities particularly in the economic and scientific areas. There is a need for new stimuli and this is how I understand one of the goals of this visit.

"There is also another goal. Spain covered an unusually long, interesting and instructive road to democracy. That country was able to remove a very deep gulf that divided this painfully torn people and to harmoniously build future in the spirit of reconciliation, after all with excellent results.

"There is also the third goal. The two parts of Europe get increasingly closer to each other today. We discussed this at a session of the Warsaw Treaty's Political Consultative Committee in Moscow recently. I think that contact, dialogue and development of Polish-Spainish relations can be one of the important elements of rapprochement of these two parts of Europe and the two treaties. I think that exactly these essential goals will be pursued during my visit."

Meets Fernandez-Ordonez

LD1106152490 Warsaw PAP in English
1356 GMT 11 Jun 90

[Text] Madrid, June 11—Poland's President Wojciech Jaruzelski started his three-day official visit to Spain today, the first such visit paid by the head of the Polish state to this country.

Jaruzelski's visit takes place eight month after King Juan Carlos and his wife visited Poland.

At Madrid's airport, Barajas, Wojciech Jaruzelksi was greeted by Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez.

In his airport statement for journalists, Wojciech Jaruzelski said: "The visit by King Juan Carlos to Poland was the first step on the road of development of relations between our states. I hope that my visit will also add to this process."

Meets Entrepreneurs, King Juan

LD1106221690 Warsaw PAP in English
2132 GMT 11 Jun 90

[Text] Madrid, June 11—Poland's President Wojciech Jaruzelski started today [11 June] an official state visit to Spain.

Wojciech Jaruzelski was visited in his residence by premier of the Spanish Government Felipe Gonzalez.

Shortly afterwards the Polish president met with Spain's King Juan Carlos I who entertained Jaruzelski and his wife to a private luncheon in the Zarzuela Palace.

Meanwhile, Spain's Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez gave luncheon for the Polish presidents' entourage, Minister of Foreign Affairs Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Minister of State Jozef Czyrek, and Minister Witold Trzeciankowski among them.

In the afternoon President Jaruzelski met with the leadership and members of the entrepreneurs confederation, CEOE.

Stressing the pioneering role of Poland in the process of democratic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe, CEOE Chairman Jose Maria Cuevas stated that Spanish businessmen are interested in extending the economic cooperation with Poland. They see possibilities for investments in food industry, tourism, agriculture and light industry.

Referring to the statements, Wojciech Jaruzelski underlined that the changes going on in Poland and the whole region make favourable conditions for this. The development of such cooperation would also contribute to rapproachment between both parts of the continent, to unification of Europe, he said.

Next President Jaruzelski held a meeting with Poles living in Spain and employees of the Polish missions and their families in Poland's Embassy here. Polish Ambassador to Spain Marian Renke hosted the meeting.

In the evening Spain's King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia gave a dinner in the royal palace in honour of President Wojciech Jaruzelski and his wife Barbara.

During the dinner, attended by the president's entourage, Premier Felipe Gonzalez and invited guests, both heads of state delivered toasts.

In his toast, Wojciech Jaruzelski said among other things:

I am glad to have the opportunity to stay on the Spanish soil. One of the sources of European culture and identity, among the nation which created so much and, at the same time, suffered so much. I wish to express my sincere joy from this visit.

We have inherited 1,000-year-old Polish history, her splendours and miseries, the periods of glory and bitterness. These experiences accompany us on our way to a united Europe. Today, this is a complex process of building the parliamentary democracy, switching the economy into the market-oriented one. Gradually, a new political culture in the conditions of pluralism is being shaped. The society is learning how to function within the framework of liberal economics. We are taking our own, Polish adjustment test.

It is our ardent desire to see the Polish-Spanish friendship filled, to a greater extent than so far, with vivid and concrete contents. There are still areas of cooperation in many domains that have not been fully utilized, ranging from industry to culture, scientific and military contacts, youth exchange and tourism.

I am convinced that the favourably developing political dialogue will foster the elevation of relations between Poland and Spain in all domains to a new, higher level.

It has been another time in the history that the world entered a stage of accelerated transformations which are particularly fast and profound on our continent. They mark out a new rhythm of history, allow to cherish the conviction that Europe will not share the fate of mythic Atlantis.

Transformations on our continent give new meaning to the hitherto understanding of security as a function of military potentials alone. The problems of economic and ecological security, the protection of universal human values start to predominate in the consciousness of the Europeans.

The times are conducive to this. There is no return to ideological crusades and black-and-white stereotypes. The recent meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush was a significant step towards materializing the world without war. I had an occasion to see it for myself during the meeting in Moscow last week.

The progress in negotiations on radical cuts in armaments in Europe arouses hope. Stronger is, though the process is too slow, the infrastructure of economic cooperation between European countries.

I think that Poland and Spain, sharing similar type of social structure, models of national pride and culture, can play a considerable role in the construction of European unity, also on the plane of building confidence and cooperation of political and military blocs under reforms.

We give our attention and respect to the attainments of Spain on the international arena, to her activities aimed at dialogue and mutual rapprochement in Europe. We appreciate your efforts aimed at solving regional conflicts through peaceful means, particularly in Central America, Maghreb and the Middle East.

Poland, through her numerous initiatives, an active policy of opening, has her contribution to the construction of a new, uniting Europe. We wish that in the framework of this historic process, created were complete conditions for the secure development and mutually favourable, equal-rights cooperation of all countries and nations.

Reports on Warsaw Pact Meeting

LD1206081990 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 0600 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] General Jaruzelski will today [12 June] have his first offical meeting with the Spanish prime minister; yesterday they had an initial meeting. During that meeting the head of the Polish state reported to Felipe Gonzalez on the recent meeting held in Moscow by the Warsaw Pact—a meeting which discussed the need to progressively demilitarize the bloc to strengthen other levels of relations between the member countries. Felipe Gonzalez and Gen. Jaruzelski also discussed Europe, its security and process of unity, because of the changes that have taken place in Central and East Europe. Gen. Jaruzelski learned that the prime minister believes that it is essential to support those processes, most especially those taking place presently in the Soviet Union, because the success of the European plan depends to a large extend on the success of perestroyka.

Skubiszewski Talks With Counterpart

LD1206170890 Warsaw PAP in English 1616 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Madrid, June 12—Polish Foreign Affairs Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, accompanying Polish President Wojciech Jaruzelski on his official visit to Spain, met here today with his Spanish counterpart Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez.

I can state that prospects for the development of Polish-Spanish economic cooperation are very promising, minister Fernandez-Ordonez told newsmen after the meeting.

Poland is doing lot in this field, also the Spanish side is showing increasing interest in cooperation with Poland. It is reflected by the growth of the number of representatives of Spanish enterprises visiting Poland and of established contacts with Polish partners, said the Spanish minister.

Minister Skubiszewski stressed that during the talk the two devoted considerable attention to problems linked with the unification of Germany.

"Unified Germany will constitute a special element in the new European configuration. Poland wishes to maintain good relations with Germany. The Polish Government wishes to finally end the border discussion and to lead towards the signing of a treaty with Germany on this issue. Furthermore, one has to guarantee the respect of rights of states neighbouring with Germany, including the rights of the Soviet Union," said the Polish minister.

Skubiszewski also stressed the importance of the recent agreeemnt of heads of Warsaw Treaty members states on the start of a discussion on major changes in that treaty.

Spanish Reportage on Visit

WA1306133090

For Spanish reportage on the visit to Spain by President General Wojciech Jaruzelski and Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, please see the Spain section of the 13 June West Europe DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

Western Embassies' Treatment of Poles Criticized

AU0706153590 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 2-3 Jun 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Poles Are Also Human Beings"]

[Text] Members of the Polish Helsinki committee have written to Minister Skubiszewski about the treatment of Polish citizens at Western embassies: "It can be said that obligations stemming from the Vienna CSCE Final Document are being disregarded. We ask you to take vigorous action aimed at making it possible for Polish citizens to travel abroad in a way that will allow them to retain their feeling of personal dignity."

The committee also appealed to the Governments of Great Britain and the United States as well as to other Helsinki committees, asking them to exert pressure on their governments.

The committee writes that these two states refuse visas to Poles particularly often. The U.S. Embassy turns down 60 percent of applications, and the British Embassy in reality turns down more than the 12 percent of applications that it says it refuses. The French and Italian Embassies refuse to provide any information at all on this subject.

The members of the committee also wrote about the difficulties that are, in their opinion, the result of a deliberate policy toward Poles. They include:

—Prices of visas that in many cases exceed one-half of the average monthly wage in Poland; the British Embassy charges a high fee in advance that it does not return if the application is turned down.

—Many embassies take several weeks to reply (Australia—two months; Italy—5 weeks), and one can wait for up to half a year to have an application dealt with by the U.S. Embassy.

—"The talks to which applicants are invited take the form of interrogations," is what we read in the letter about the practices of the Embassies of the United States, Canada, and Great Britain.

—There are numerous cases of visas being canceled by border officials in Greece, the United States, Great Britain, and the FRG.

—Polish tourists are treated roughly at the Greek and Austrian borders.

We asked Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski to comment on the letter:

"The Foreign Ministry is aware of the problems that were raised in the letter. We share the views that were expressed in it. We are also familiar with the arguments that many countries put forward to justify hindering free travel by our citizens, such as there being Polish tourists who engage in illegal trade or work without permits.

"We believe that such arguments, important as they are, do not justify the restrictions. That is why the Foreign Ministry has made, and will continue to make, appropriate efforts so that the citizens of our country are not discriminated against and so that the principle of collective responsibility for the illegal actions of individuals or groups is not applied to them. The Helsinki Committee letter will provide significant assistance in further talks with our partners."

Mazowiecki Discounts Instability in Poland

LD1206103190 Warsaw PAP in English 0850 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Geneva, June 12—Poland's Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki met with the Polish community in Switzerland at Geneva University on Monday [11 June].

The meeting, which was organized by the Polish Association in Geneva, was opened by its chairman Dr. Jan Venulet who said that for decades his emigre countrymen waited for such a moment.

"In you we see the architect of transformations. We wish you to complete this work," Venulet said, adding that "the Polish community in Switzerland stands for people with know-how who could be useful for Poland. We must do more to capitalize on this."

In reply Mazowiecki said: "I can assure you that Poland is already Poland," that there is independent judiciary, self-government and that over 60 draft laws were prepared by the government in just nine months." [question marks as received]

"You must not fear—as people do in the West at present—that a breeze of instability can threaten investments. Poland is a stable country. Strikes will not undermine it as conflicts are a normal thing in a democratic society, especially in the midst of such tremendous changes," Mazowiecki pointed out.

Asked whether there was a threat from the extreme right in Poland, the premier said: "We wanted political liberties, so we have them," adding that trends of this type, just as clerical-nationalism and anti-semitism were not dominant in Poland.

Mazowiecki Assesses Walesa LE MONDE Remarks

LD1206202190 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1730 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Excerpts] Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki is in Geneva. The main point of the agenda at today's [12 June] special International Labor Organization [ILO] session was the speech by Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki. [passage omitted] At yesterday's meeting with Swiss Polonia, the premier addressed the statement of Lech Walesa for the LE MONDE daily on the lack of social support for the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki:

[Begin Mazowiecki recording] I have respected and do respect Lech Walesa. Certain (?criticisms) of this type, as this one here is presented, do not appeal to me, of course, because I think that this government has social support, which is shown by all the research. Perhaps one day we will lose it, but for the time being this is our most valuable resource, and always will be our most valuable resource. I judge that one cannot straightforwardly say that there is no social base. I think that many of these matters would demand public debate. I express myself on this subject with care, as I know very well how bad such public debates or conflicts can be. On certain matters it is difficult for me to avoid certain things, but I count on the fact that some rationales, greater and higher ones, will dominate here. On the other hand, I would say that somewhere around these matters, or else behind these matters, there is hidden a deeper problem for me, which is not personal, a deeper problem, which I cannot pass over on the agenda. This problem is called: What will Poland be like (?in a few years time)? [end recording]

Railway Workers Accept Wage Increase Offer

LD1206211190 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 2000 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] As a result of negotiations, it has been decided that as of 1 July, remuneration for workers of the Polish State Railways [PKP] will increase on averge by 180,000 zloty. Also as of 1 July this year, the mileage rate for crews will be increased. The trade union side states that the expectations of railway men have not been realized in full regarding remuneration. However, taking into account the taxation regulations currently in force and also the reduction in receipts as a result of the significant fall in passenger traffic on the railways, the trade union centers have decided to accept the offer of the general directorate of the PKP.

Kuron, Solidarity Officials Discuss Rail Protest

LD1206223990 Warsaw PAP in English 2103 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Warsaw, June 12—On June 10, members of the Solidarity National Commission Michal Boni and Marian Krzaklewski met with Minister of Labour and Social Policy Jacek Kuron, reads a communique signed by the interlocutors and conveyed to PAP today.

The goal of the meeting was to discuss reasons for the protest of Slupsk railwaymen. The Solidarity representatives assessed negatively the leadership of the Ministry of Transport and Maritime Economy and the Polish state Railways PKP management holding them responsible for provoking social unrest, the outbreak of conflicts including.

The Solidarity representatives suggested that people responsible for such serious social tension should suffer far-going disciplinary and cadre consequences.

Minister Kuron acknowleged with understanding the stand of the unionists.

The finance minister's decree correcting the September basis for calculating remunerations free from taxes was considered a good starting point for wage changes. But thorough organizational and technical changes and far-reaching restructuring are the basis for PKP independent, efficient functioning in long term.

Undersecretary of state in the Ministry of Transport and Maritime Economy Ewaryst Waligorski, government plenipotentiary for PKP reform, presented a schedule for such reforms. It was agreed that a preliminary assessment of implementation of the reform programme may be made at the turn of next September.

PAP Notes May Economic Indicators

LD0906063190 Warsaw PAP in English 2143 GMT 8 Jun 90

[Text] Warsaw, June 8—The same trends were characteristic of Polish economy in May as in previous months. Industrial sales fell by 28.6 percent against May, 1989. Foreign trade recorded a surplus reaching 2 billion roubles and 1.6 billion dollars. Retail prices rose by some 4 percent, compared with forecast 2.5 percent. In five basic sectors of the socialised economy and average pay, excluding extra payments based on enterprises' profits, totalled 79,257 zlotys and was higher by 8.1 percent against last April.

A central budget surplus rose by 1.8 trillion zlotys, reaching 7.2 trillion zlotys after five months.

Enterprises' profitability indicator dropped after four months of this year (May results are not known yet). It totalled 34.6 percent while after March it climbed to 36 percent.

Council of Ministers 5 Jun Session Reported

AU1206165290 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 6 Jun 90 pp 1,3

[Dariusz Fikus report on the Council of Ministers meeting in Warsaw on 5 June: "The Course Is Correct, but Adjustments Are Necessary"]

[Text] Tuesday's meeting of the Council of Ministers, chaired by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, was dominated by one theme—namely, the assessment of the economic reform program and the conclusions which stem from this. Leszek Balcerowicz reported on the state of the economy.

The program adopted by the government in October 1989 set itself two aims: first, to stabilize the economy—namely, to eradicate inflation—and second, to transform the economy into a free market one, structurally similar to those in the West. The first five months of the government's efforts show that the decision to go for both aims simultaneously (although allowing a longer time for the attainment of the second) was correct. Regardless of difficulties and the social costs of the operation, it was not possible to postpone tackling inflation until the economy had been restructured and market principles established. It was essential to attack on both fronts simultaneously. There was no other way out. Bringing stability to an economy dominated by monopoly practices and a state sector is certainly more difficult and causes many abnormalities, but to have tolerated an increase of inflation would have been disastrous.

Looking back at the three months of 1989 and the five months of 1990, it can plainly be seen that successes have been achieved in both fields. The stabilization program and the institutional changes have been reinforced. It goes without saying that the achievements within the program of stabilization are greater than in the institutional changes. Deputy Premier Balcerowicz summed up the institutional changes as follows:

—An almost total abolition of all forms of administrative division of goods and services;
—A widening of the range of uncontrolled prices from some 50 percent to 90 percent. This means that goods and services are fully within the market mechanism, although this market is far from being ideal;
—A clear liberalization of foreign trade;
—An initiation of demonopolization programs in production and trade sectors; for example, the sugar and meat sectors have been demonopolized and this has allowed competition in the marketplace;
—A unification and stabilization of the zloty rate and the introduction of exchangeability. Everyone who has zlotys can purchase foreign currency, for example, for imports; again this extends the chances of competition in the economy;
—An initiation of the process of "small privatization." In April, there were 100,000 active private enterprises, of which 30,000 were founded in 1990.

So much for the sphere of institutional changes.

The implementation of the stabilization program required the introduction of a severe pay, budgetary, and monetary policy. This reduced inflation running at 2,000 percent (annualized rate) at the end of 1989, to 78 percent in January, 24 percent in February, 4.7 percent in March, 8.1 percent in April, and to four percent in May. This produced a complete change in the market. The huge shortages disappeared. This fact is important for both the consumer and the producer. The price paid by society was a high one. Unemployment appeared. This is unavoidable, will be lasting, and accompanies every free market economy. There was a clear fall in real incomes. In the first quarter, in the state sector these were 35 percent lower that in the analogous period last year. But in all honesty it had to be said that the real worth of pensions dropped even lower. There was a serious drop in production of sold goods. During the course of the past four months, in state and cooperative sectors this fell by 27.4 percent, in other spheres it fell a little less.

The social cost that we have paid for the positive effects of our economic reform was seen by the Council of Ministers as the basis for discussion in relation to the steps to be taken in the future. There were voices claiming that "we were advancing on thin ice" and "we had no right to further lower the standard of living." At the same time however, it was agreed that the basic dilemma is how to counteract the undesirable features so as not to lose all that had been achieved to date with such effort. Not all the sources of inflation had been tackled, and the inflationary spiral could start again. There was a debate whether a liberalization of pay, budget, and monetary policies—signifying an appropriate increase in the amount of money—would produce a strong rise in prices and a weak increase in production, or a small increase in prices accompanied by a stronger increase in production. It was agreed that there was no complete answer. Many signs indicated that, because of its past ownership structure, the Polish economy reacts to any increase in demand by setting higher prices, and not by an increase in production. Additionally, the habits during the period of shortages and the still strong position of monopoly practices and the tendency of enterprises to sit back and wait for the government to loosen its macroeconomic policy, which would enable these enterprises to avoid having to take difficult decisions, still exist. The inflation surge in April 1990, when many people received payments of premiums from profits, boosting their nominal income, was a warning signal.

Overall, the Council of Ministers agreed that the fundamental elements of its economic policy should be maintained. To overcome the problems associated with the stabilization program, more work must be done on the supply structures side. Owing to the results achieved in the budget, payments balance, and the inflation fronts, steps will be taken to ease the severe impact of the instruments of economic reform policies and introduce the already prepared systemic changes.

Above all, these will include the following:

—Preparation of a corrective budget that will enable savings to be made and which will be used to finance territorial budgets, and for example, housing construction, and the milk industry;

—Reform of the coal industry. This will limit the budget subsidies to unprofitable mines;

—A reduction of the bank's percentage rates to the level of inflation;

—A modification of the system of pay restraints;

—More liberalization of foreign trade through the elimination of quota restrictions in exports, and by lowering or eliminating duties on imports;

—A liberalization of the principles applying to foreign investment in Poland by easing regulations on the transfer of profits and by simplifying procedural aspects;

—Further restructuring of enterprises, for example, application of the already prepared principles applying to assisting enterprises that find themselves in difficulties;

—Further demonopolization through more effective regulatory provisions of the new anti-monopoly legislation and an increase of the powers of the Anti-Monopolies Office;

—Wider privatization, including the so-called "small privatization," which aims at internal trade, and the "large privatization," which will be initiated as soon as it is approved by the Sejm;

—Creation of a system supporting entrepreneurship, for example, provision of an advisory service for potential entrepreneurs, special finance rates, and financial incentives for prospective entrepreneurs;

—An easing of the external financial conditions in the economy. This is anticipated as a result of the intensive efforts made to secure a reduction of our foreign debt;

—Establishment of a social security system within which the government's efforts will concentrate on providing social security payments for the unemployed, social security for old age and invalidity pensioners, and development of the whole social security system.

All these efforts should counteract recession and the social and economic effects associated with it. At the same time they ought not provoke another inflationary spiral.

The discussions at the meeting were lively and it was decided to continue them. On Thursday, after the news, Leszek Balcerowicz will appear on television and present the government's economic program for the next few months, to the public.

The article "Without Inflation, or Recession" written by Waldemar Kuczynski, head of the Premier's advisory group, is an extension of this discussion on the economy.

At the meeting, it was announced that in June, work on the budget amendments, the government's agricultural policy, and its regional industrial policy, as well as ministerial decisions on duties and the mining industry, will be speeded up.

Other points raised concerned a Council of Ministers draft development policy memorandum for the World Bank, and the Council of Ministers draft resolution on the principles and methods of acceptance of candidates who are registered on cooperative housing scheme lists and the referral of candidates to housing cooperatives by Voivodes.

Falandysz Named Justice Administration Chief

*LD1206211690 Warsaw PAP in English
1917 GMT 12 Jun 90*

[Text] Warsaw, June 12—Justice Minister Aleksander Bentkowski appointed Lech Falandysz director of the newly set up Institute for Justice Administration.

For over twenty years Falandysz was a scientist at the Penal Law Institute and head of the Criminology Department.

Prosecutor's Office Urges Restoring Order

AU1206184590 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1820 GMT 12 Jun 90

["Political Life: Release From Romania's Procurator's Office"—ROMPRES headlines]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 12/6/1990—The Procurator's Office of Romania considers it is entitled to demand the country's government to exercise its lawful prerogatives and order the necessary measures for the restoration of public order in keeping with the laws in force, shows a release received by ROMPRES on June 12 from the Procurator's Office with reference to the acts of grave violation of legality and public order in the heart of the capital, where a group of persons, flagrantly infringing the law, have been carrying on an unauthorized demonstration for weeks, hindering the traffic of cars and pedestrians.

The release shows that irresponsible persons in the central part of the capital incite to escalation of violence and even to murder. In that atmosphere of disorder and incitement, there were instances of aggression against peaceful people, against representatives of order-keeping bodies who were on duty and even against government representatives so the situation has come to be intolerable.

Every person's free exercise of his rights—the essence of any democracy—is possible only on condition that the country's laws be observed, the release mentions.

Police Begin Clearing Demonstrators From Square

AU1306073090 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 0400 GMT 13 Jun 90

[Text] This morning, starting at 0400 [0100 GMT], law enforcement forces cleared Bucharest University Square of demonstrators and hunger strikers, who had been occupying the square since 22 April.

Pedestrian and road traffic has not yet been resumed, in order to allow the Bucharest Sanitation Department to clean the area. Police have been installed in the area.

We remind listeners that yesterday the Prosecutor's Office of Romania called on the government to exercise its lawful prerogatives and take the necessary measures to restore public order, in accordance with the law. In the communique it issued the Prosecutor's Office stresses that in University Square and its immediate vicinity, the number of unauthorized acts that flagrantly infringe upon the law have escalated recently, and incidences of profiteering, prostitution, gambling, theft, violence, and the use of drugs were spreading. At the same time, violations were covered up and some people, through their insolent behavior, were seriously disturbing public order and offending propriety, disregarding the rights and freedoms of citizens.

On the basis of this disorder and Pandemonium, actions of violence against some peaceful citizens, representatives of the law enforcement bodies, and even against representatives of the government occurred, which lead to an intolerable situation.

Police Destroy Demonstrators' Tents

AU1306065290 Vienna Domestic Service in German 0500 GMT 13 Jun 90

[Text] The Romanian police cleared University Square in Bucharest forcibly early this morning. Eyewitnesses report that units with helmets and truncheons destroyed demonstrators' tents. Opposition members were staging hunger strikes in University Square to protest against the ruling National Salvation Front, which they view as the successor organization to the Romanian Communist Party. The demonstrators called for free access of all parties to the media and a 10-year ban on communists assuming public offices.

Clubs, Riot Shields Used To Clear Square

AU1306065690 Paris AFP in English 0555 GMT 13 Jun 90

[By Marie France Osenda]

[Text] Bucharest, June 13 (AFP)—Police attacked anti-Communist protestors with clubs in a violent operation to end a two- month sit-in at central Bucharest's University Square early Wednesday, this AFP reporter witnessed.

Hundreds of helmeted police, carrying riot shields and clubs, ran into the square shortly after 4 a.m., and began taking away dozens of people who had been sleeping in the square and outside the nearby National Theatre.

The operation was over within two hours. By 8 a.m., police had sealed off the city centre to traffic and pedestrians.

The protestors, some of whom have been on hunger-strike, have been in the square since April 22. At its peak the protest drew more than 10,000 people, although in recent days only a couple of hundred die-hards remained.

The demonstrators held talks with the government on Monday.

When police first moved in, some of the protestors were chased into the entrance of the nearby Inter-Continental Hotel, where they smashed the glass doors as they ran in.

The police beat the protestors, some of whom had blood streaming from their heads, as they hauled them away to nearby lorries.

It was not immediately known where the protestors had been taken.

By 6 a.m., all the protestors' tents, numbering around 30, had been taken down. Police had also stationed buses and trucks across the boulevard that crosses University Square to bar access.

Clean-up teams were sweeping away the tracts, newpapers and other debris that littered the square, and hosing down the sidewalks and street. Firetrucks were also brought in and their ladders used to take down anti-government banners on the university building facing the square.

Police made unsuccessful attempts to clear the square on April 24 and May 31.

The surprise attack came after the Romanian public prosecutor on Tuesday called on the government to "re-establish public order" in the city centre.

In a statement read out on radio, the prosecutor accused the protestors of using drugs and engaging in prostitution and black- market activities.

They had declared the area a "communist-free zone," and were demanding the departure from the government of officials who served under the deposed communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu.

Those officials include President Ion Iliescu, who won a convincing victory last month in the country's first free elections since before the communist regime took power after World War II.

Communique on Police Action

AU1306085690 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 0800 GMT 13 Jun 90

[Text] This morning, the police undertook an action in University Square to restore public order and road traffic, which have been disrupted for some time by groups of persons conducting an illegal demonstration. In connection with the legal grounds for this action, the police cite yesterday's Prosecutor's Office communique, which asks that the Ministry of Interior take appropriate steps to halt illegal abuses in that area. Another argument in favor of those who demanded action is the aggressive and violent acts recently committed against the public order bodies stationed in Victory Square and the television station headquarters.

The police action took place without incident. Police detained 263 people for investigation. This was done under legal authorization stipulated by the Prosecutor's Office communique.

During the police action, persons occupying the square tried to reply with violence; weapons and blunt objects were confiscated. In the presence of two deputy ministers of health, the hunger strikers were granted all the necessary attention and transferred to hospitals, where they will be given expert care.

At this time, the public administration bodies are cleaning the square to allow the resumption of normal use and road traffic.

Demonstration Against TV Converage of 11 Jun

AU1206181090 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1745 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 12/6/1990—Some 200 people, representing the People's Alliance, the December 16-21 Organization, and other persons, demonstrated in Bucharest on June 12, marching from Union Square to Victory Square and up to the television building. The whole time they shouted slogans against the government, the National Salvation Front, and Romania's president-elect. Grigore Eugen, secretary of the People's Alliance, says the purpose of the demonstration is to protest against the way the television covered the previous day's events in Bucharest and he expressed the organization's intention to go on fighting against neocommunism. No incident was reported.

Appeal to Opposition To Unite, Continue Revolution

AU1306072790 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 6 Jun 90 p 4

["Appeal" issued by the Liberal-Socialist Party; place and date not given]

[Text] What was predictable has been confirmed.

Democracy has suffered a great failure in Romania.

Lies, idle promises, fear, opportunism, sloth, and the apolitical attitude of a great percentage of our people kept in political darkness for scores of years have brought about a victory for the National Salvation Front.

It is a victory against Romania, against the interests of the people, and against the ideals of the revolution.

This first struggle was lost by those who conducted the revolution; however, the war is not lost.

Maybe after the elections some people in the opposition will withdraw, worn out; maybe others, discouraged by the election returns, will give up; and maybe still others, pleased with their positions, visits abroad, and promises, will prefer a life of plenty.

What is certain, however, is the fact that the genuine opponents of the Ceausescu regime, those who from 16 to 22 December 1989 were in the streets facing death, those who issued the Proclamation of Timisoara, those who for more than a month once again kindled fresh hopes for victory, and the journalists (of the party, independent, or private press) who, for all these months, had the courage to do their job, namely to write the truth—these people will continue the struggle. They can neither be bought, nor intimidated, nor cheated, nor discouraged.

The revolution has to continue in an organized and concerted way.

The opposition has to continue its activity within a united framework and with a homogeneous concept.

In the belief that the ideals on the basis of which it was set up and carried out its activity these months have to be continued, the Liberal Socialist Party launches the following appeal:

A. The opposition parties must give up (personal or party) ambitions, self-pride, and vanity; complete unity of the whole opposition is needed in this new 1946.

B. Nonpolitical movements, associations, and organizations which oppose totalitarianism need to declare their involvement in political activity; until 20 May their struggle could take place separately from the political struggle; as of 20 May, they must be involved in the political activity, so that their voices are heard.

C. Citizens who—without being members of any political party—are struggling for freedom, truth, justice, and democracy—if they want their struggle to reach its aim—this is the time to join that opposition party whose program-platform seems most realistic to them and the most useful for the country; from now on passive supporters are of no help to us; we need active militants.

D. (Independent, private, or party) newspapers; to ensure that the people learn the truth, all of us have to unite our efforts so that this truth may reach those places which were reached only by lies so far.

We have lost the struggle, but we have not lost the war.

And the first condition for victory is:

"UNITY!"

President of the Liberal-Socialist Party, Niculae Cerveni; spokesman, Dan Cristian Ionescu

Communism Said Reestablishing Itself

AU1306072990 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 6 Jun 90 p 1

[Mihai Enescu article: "The Nomenklatura on the Offensive"]

[Text] Despite the basic interests of the Romanian people, of the active and conscious public in our country, and of the public abroad, which watches in consternation, and despite our country's isolation in the world, communism in Romania advances. Therefore, it is not surprising to meet people whose inner strength has collapsed or people with a very tragic smile on their face, which proves that where they live and work the communist ideology and the people promoting this bankrupt and criminal ideology and the behavior generated by this ideology are once again in their own home. Except for Albania, such a thing is not happening anywhere in the East [bloc]. Romania—one of the richest and best located countries in East Europe, which boasts hardworking and intelligent people, who are easy to govern—is once again caught by the communist trap. A thorough examination of the situation shows that nothing has been accomplished so far except a simple rotation of cadres. Just recall the cynical theory of sociologist and politologist Vilfredo Pareto, who was talking about "lions" turning into "foxes." The "lions" of the Communist Party, pushed to the periphery especially because of their capabilities, finally took over the leadership and amazingly quickly turned into "foxes." They are in a much greater hurry than Pareto could have ever imagined in his cynicism. This fact has particularly destructive consequences for our country's proper progress toward democracy. At this point, this road is virtually blocked.

What political and social dialogue can there exist in our country after the events in University Square? What political and social dialogue can there exist in our country after incorrect elections and a monochrome Parliament? And especially, what dialogue can there be with an opposition that is constantly reprimanded and attacked by all the tremendous means of the communist system? For five months the whole mass media system, the Securitate, and activists did nothing other than deal blows, with all their weapons, to the traditionally democratic parties. Even now, after the elections, these parties—those which can still function—are dealt blows by the power ruling our country without any scruples. The plotters who have come to power shun no means or method. The same cruel blows are dealt to civic organizations and organizations, whose members are made up of the 21 December 1989 fighters, organizations whose members once again have been on the barricades of Bucharest's University Square ever since 22 April 1990.

Communism is advancing in today's Romania. An evil that tormented us so much is reestablishing itself in somewhat changed forms in all sectors of our life. The wave of freedom that swept East Europe stopped at Romania's borders. With an economy that has been touched up a little, we continue to live with a quarter of perestroyka and no glasnost.

This is why the University Square demonstration continues. This is why our newspaper DREPTATEA—the daily of the National Peasants (Christian Democratic) Party—grants moral support to this civilian action by trying to describe, as objectively as possible, the large anticommunist demonstration in the heart of our capital.

Initiated by public organizations, the demonstration in Bucharest's University Square is, at this point, the hope of the struggle for democracy and freedom in our country with everything significant that is happening there. And the fact that, despite the tiredness, terrible stress, and psychological pressure exercised by various means by the authorities, the demonstration continues, illustrates that its ideal has a solid supporter in the Romanian realities of these months and weeks: the anticommunist struggle.

which has just begun and is constantly better organized, all the more so since the nomenklatura is now on the offensive.

The revolutionary slogan launched as early as January, "Memorize five words/Everything is as it was" became—after the "free" elections—more topical than ever in the wake of 22 December 1989.

Protest Against Hungarian Consulate in Transylvania

LD1206194190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1700 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] The National Unity Party of Romanians of Transylvania has protested against the establishment of the Hungarian consulate in Romania.

The statement sent to the Romanian Government, on behalf of the majority Romanian population, rejects the establishment of a Hungarian consulate office in Cluj or in any other town in Transylvania. The political organization of the Vatra Romanesca extremist national group states that the Hungarian consulate in Cluj carried out anti-Romanian activity in the past and thus incited the Hungarians living in Transylvania toward revisionism and separatism.

The National Unity Party of Romanians of Transylvania also accuses Hungary of the same crimes, stating, for example, that after the Romanian December revolution, certain Hungarian leaders and political parties incited the Hungarian minority of Transylvania to secede.

Meanwhile, the Romanian Foreign Ministry has promised the Hungarian Consul that the old building of the Hungarian consulate in Cluj will soon be vacated.

Sudden Liberalization of Prices Not Possible

AU1206192390 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1718 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 12/6/1990—It is not possible to suddenly and fully abandon centralized prices, said Mr. Theodor Stolojan, first deputy finance minister, in an interview with the newspaper "DIMINEATA" of June 12. In Romania's specific conditions this would be tantamount to an explosion of prices and a prices- wages inflationary spiral, with all their negative consequences on the economic and social life as a whole. Referring to the arguments behind that consensus reached by Romanian experts, Mr. Stolojan mentioned the current price system, which is highly distorted (in the case of basic raw materials and electric power) and which entails distorted prices for the whole gamut of products, as well as the marked physical disbalance between the demand and offer of commodities, of basic consumer goods included, the manufacturers' monopoly on the fabrication of a substantial number of products and the restrictions in the area of hard-currency balance, which do not allow imports to act as an incentive for a sound market competition to the due extent.

Like arguments, as well as others, Mr. Stolojan also said, highlight the practical impossibility of accepting a rapid liberalization of prices in the current stage. Like step, Mr. Stolojan added, would be an adventure and its effect would be a hardly imaginable disorder.

On the basis of a pragmatic assessment of all problems, the minister also said, criteria were defined which should underlay the liberalization of prices in this country. These principles could be summed up as follows: Ensurance of the continuity of price (?level), a process that has already started, the achievement of a reform of the prices of raw and subsidiary materials, of fuels and other basic products in industry, and other steps apt to take the price system nearer to a real balance, the respective reform being accompanied by social-protection measures, the liberalization of the (?prices) of a growing number of products, more particularly those manufactured by several producers, the maintenance of state control over the prices of products of essential importance for the quality of life (energy, housing, meat, milk, sugar, etc.) as well as of a number of raw materials that directly influence the general level of prices.

Roman on Gorbachev, Perestroyka

AU0906155390 Rome ANSA in English 0847 GMT 9 Jun 90

[Text] Milan June 9 (ANSA)—Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union have not gone far enough, according to Romanian prime minister, Petre Roman, in an interview with a local television station here.

In excerpts from the interview released Thursday, Roman said: "We have sympathy for Gorbachev and his policies, but the Soviet economic model does not interest us. Perestroyka so far has been a choice which has not brought a total restructurization of the economy and has not given the expected results. We want to make a more important step, a more radical and rapid one."

He stressed his country's good relations with the Soviet Union and expressed the hope that the Warsaw Pact will become more of a political than a military organization in the future.

Cooperation Protocol Signed With Italy

AU1206192590 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1715 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 12/6/1990—A protocol was signed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on cooperation in the field of diplomatic archives between the Romanian Foreign Affairs Ministry, on the one hand, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Italian Republic, on the other.

The protocol stipulates exchanges of archivist publications and information, consultation of diplomatic archives, on mutual terms, by researchers of the two countries, the joint drafting of works on Romanian-Italian cooperation in science and culture.

Belgrade Protest Meeting Attended by '35,000'

AU1306142390 Ljubljana Domestic Service in Slovene 1330 GMT 13 Jun 90

[Text] A protest meeting started in Republic Square in Belgrade precisely at 1400 [1200 GMT]. It was organized by five Serbian opposition parties. After all the leaders of these parties spoke—Vuk Draskovic, president of the Serbian Renewal Movement was greeted most boisterously—a crowd of 35,000 began to move along Marshal Tito Street toward the Serbian Assembly.

Although the speakers appealed to the crowd to be dignified, nobody can guarantee that no incidents will occur. All the roads leading to Belgrade are so to say blocked: Everybody arriving in the capital this morning had to tell the security forces what the purpose of his journey was and when he would be returning. In Republic Square, the militia did not intervene.

Opposition Behind Protest

LD1306140190 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1331 GMT 13 Jun 90

[Text] Belgrade, 13 Jun (TANJUG)—The protest meeting by Serbian opposition parties held in Belgrade, during which the authorities were asked to convene "free and democratic elections in the republic" ended just half an hour after it began.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the organizers invited the participants to go together to the Serb Assembly building and hand in a written demand which had been the reason for the meeting.

Jovic Addresses Cooperative Economy Congress

LD1306054190 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1734 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Portoroz, 12 Jun (TANJUG)—Changes and the economic situation in East European countries and reimposed consideration on whether to give priority to private or public property are initial topics at the 18th Congress of the International Center of Research and Information on Public and Cooperative Economy (CIRCEC) which opened in the Yugoslav summer resort of Portoroz today.

Around 600 participants, economy experts from Yugoslavia and 20 other European countries, the U.S., Canada and Japan, in Portoroz will discuss economic reforms in socialist countries, new forms of cooperation of West and East enterprises and their activity on the single European market.

The congress was organized by a Yugoslav CIRIEC section, under the patronage of the Yugoslav federal government.

A welcoming address of Yugoslav Presidency President Dr Borisav Jovic sets out the conviction that the gathering will contribute to the comprehensive, successful cooperation of Yugoslavia and European institutions and organizations in the field of economy, the further development of Yugoslavia, which is a step closer to its inclusion in Europe.

Possible Merger of Serbian LC, SAWP Reported

Trifunovic Addresses Committee

AU1106154890 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0744 GMT 11 Jun 90

[Speech by Bogdan Trifunovic, president of the Central Committee Presidium of the League of Communists, LC, of Serbia, at the Central Committee session in Belgrade on 11 June—live; broadcast in progress]

[Text] ...Any delay or vacillation would be dangerous. We must act in a new way, carry out many specific initiatives and changes, and fight for a reputation among the people and for the citizens' support. The interests and progress of a Serbia exposed to many challenges, dangers, and pressures will be our foremost task.

The League of Communists [LC] of Serbia is today acting under considerably different economic and political conditions. What is involved are quick, dramatic, and thorough changes in Yugoslavia, as well as in other countries. It has been confirmed that the basic political orientations we adopted at our 11th Congress were good, but we must make them more specific and supplement them quickly, that is, make ourselves capable of acting, in terms of a program, organization, propaganda, and cadres, in the newly arisen and future political situation.

I shall briefly present the essential elements of this new situation, which we discussed a great deal during our debate. After initially good results, along with some troubling ones, such as a fall in production and liquidity shortage, the reform has entered its crucial stage. The constitutional setup and the stability of Yugoslavia have been threatened by the strengthening of confederational and disintegrational processes, as well as overt demands and gestures in this respect on the part of new authorities in Slovenia and Croatia. The Constitution and federal laws are being openly violated. Forces and tendencies that have an essentially identical orientation have broken up, that is, are breaking up the LC as a united organization and trying to make any democratic changes impossible that would make it a modern and influential party of the left at the Yugoslav level.

There is a new aggressive assault on the part of Albanian nationalists and separatists in Kosovo, which enjoy support both from the country and abroad and which have been, more and more, winning over and using legal organs and institutions for their ideas and aims.

On the other hand, a large number of political parties has been founded which have appeared with their own programs and are fighting for members and voters. For many of them, anticommunism, negation of everything that has been done in the postwar period, and advocating revanchism are the main points of activity. Because of all this, people are very concerned about Yugoslavia, its democratic development, peace, and the equality of peoples and nationalities.

The debate has confirmed the suggested orientation of the Central Committee document and the continuation of this course was resolutely demanded. The LC of Serbia has decided in favor of programmic changes that should enable us to act as a party capable of finding modern, democratic, and socialist answers to essential questions of today which pertain to the development of society and progress of Serbia.

In a multiparty system, the LC cannot continue to be a sociopolitical organization of the past, with its monopoly and role guaranteed by the Constitution. We have called into question all kinds of monopoly ourselves, which means that we must change our role and the method of political activity.

The LC was created for the so-called nonparty democracy, different relations in the political system, and essentially different programs. During the past three years, we in the LC of Serbia, and Serbia in general, have essentially changed both the economic and political programs and practice. We are no longer and we can no longer be the LC of yesterday. Here we bear in our minds the simple and unpleasant political fact that the LC of Yugoslavia, enjoying a virtual monopoly position for a long time, has lost the mobilizational abilities it used to have, because they cannot be possessed and maintained without a permanent and real competition. We are today an organization, that is, a party [stranka] which is setting up a modern democratic socialist program which above all expresses the interests of the working strata.

During the public debate, it was particularly pointed out that the LC of Serbia must pay attention to modern social conditions so that its political struggle for the interests of the working strata and for democratic socialism can be successful and enjoy broad support. We would threaten our own position if we neglected this fact and tried to go back to the organization and method of activity of a communist party. The name would not suit the program and practice of the LC of Serbia which is now already essentially changed, and the past methods would not suit these times and the strong demand for the democratization of society, opening the party toward young people, pluralism, sharp political competition, and so on. Such a party would quickly be pushed to a political margin.

A huge majority of the members have said that they are against going back. The membership wants us to be a dynamic party on the democratic left, capable of following and instigating progressive changes in society and making an active impact on them, all in the interest of the people who live from their work, in the interest of a united Serbia and its progress.

It would suit political opponents of the LC of Serbia, who act primarily from an anticommunist platform, if the LC of Serbia were not to change, develop further, and implement a good economic, social, and democratic program that enjoys the support of the people. It is exactly in our political interest to stress those essential and great changes that have occurred in the LC of Serbia during the past three years: changes in its economic, political, and ideological orientations, in its relationship toward the vital interests of the people and the Republic of Serbia, in rejecting other people's tutelage and pressure, in a new policy toward Kosovo, and so on.

Our new identity is based on the processes initiated at the Eighth Session [of the Central Committee of the LC of Serbia held on 23-24 September 1987] and confirmed and elaborated at the 11th Congress which have lead to new economic and political programs and practice. This policy has meant a return to those democratic [corrects himself] good democratic traditions of our socialist movement and the LC when they opened themselves to the people and relied on it and had programs that attracted progressive, young, capable, and honest people.

In fact, the LC of Serbia already has the main program orientations which are supported by the grass roots and, what is even more important, it has achieved very significant results in the past three years. With all our initiatives and actions in Serbia, with all that we were doing and have done, we have shown that we, the LC of Serbia and the republican leadership, have firmly decided in favor of deep democratic changes in society. Here I mean both the economic reform and the true reform, democratic reform of the political system, and the struggle for Serbia's unity.

The time and events have confirmed that it was good that the LC of Serbia did not wait for the culmination of the crisis in the Socialist Republic of Serbia to reach the point when no positive turnabout would be possible, and for the LC to break apart and be pushed to the margins of the political life. It was good that it did not wait to see when the processes would begin in other republics and the way that they would happen, or to see the way the changes would develop in the countries of so-called real socialism. Instead, it resolutely set about dismantling the bureaucratic system and practice and started carrying out thorough reforms of the economy and society in the direction of democratic socialism.

We have proceeded from the fact that, fettered by the monopoly of one party and the voluntarism of bureaucracy, the Yugoslav form of self-managing socialism has in many ways compromised in practice the humane and emancipating ideas of self-management, ideas that have made it a historic, more progressive, and more humane social system. It was clear to us that the existing system has exhausted its ability to undergo endless transformations, (?as well as) partial reorganizations, and sporadic embellishment.

We have not repeated the mistake of the previous reforms. After the program of economic reforms, a year ago, we in Serbia adopted the well-known document on the far-reaching democratic reform of the political system in general. We have decided in favor of a market economy with mixed forms of ownership, and, in politics, a multiparty and parliamentary democracy, a united Serbia and federal Yugoslavia.

The program of economic reform in favor of which the LC has decided meant a radical break with the model and practice of the consensus economy, national economies, the concept of economic organization according to the Law on Associated Labor, social property without an owner, and so on. It is based upon a united Yugoslav market of commodities, labor force, capital, and knowledge, independent enterprises, the strengthening of entrepreneurship and managership, equality of the forms of ownership, and the introduction of new technologies, and the like.

With this aim in mind, as we know, many specific measures have been taken in Serbia: the reform of social activities and the public loan for economic renewal, a new investment cycle, mergers of large economic systems, joint investment with foreign capital, stimulation of so-called small businesses, a new agrarian policy, the reduction and reform of the state apparatus, and so on.

Our political program is based on democratic freedoms and rights of citizens as basic political subjects, as well as national sovereignty. All institutions of the political system— free elections, independent judiciary, national assembly, and so on—will be built and will function in conformity with these rights and freedoms. We have already manifested this in the constitutional changes carried out in 1989. In our opinion, the proposal of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia to draft a new Serbian constitution rounds off a complete democratic project.

The LC of Serbia has expressed the vital interests of the Serbian people, as well as of other peoples and nationalities in Serbia, in establishing the unity of the Socialist Republic of Serbia. Working under extremely difficult conditions, with its successful struggle among the people and together with the people, the LC of Serbia brought about the constitutional changes in 1989 and the qualitative changes after which the LC of Serbia became a united organization. The integrity and unity of Serbia realized together with the people is a historic achievement and a priority aim of our party. During the past several years it carried out a successful and consistent policy of the unity of Serbia and its free and modern development. At the same time, we shall continue to strive for the policy of full national equality, both in Serbia and in Yugoslavia. The constituent part of this policy has been and remains the attitude toward Kosovo, and that is the vital question for the Serbian people, of the integrity of Serbia and the SFRY, of the national equality, and of the democratic setup of the country. As concerns this grave problem which was poorly solved for several decades—something for which many people, not only outside Serbia, but in it, as well, were to blame—the LC and our republic now have another, clear, and complete policy toward Kosovo, the policy which enjoys the broad support of the people and which is firmly backed by the Serbian state. We can see that this policy is being implemented in all firmness and consistency, despite huge resistance which best shows the range of the policy.

The policy of the LC of Serbia concerning these questions has marked a radical break with the policy carried out by former leaderships in Serbia and Yugoslavia and has decisively influenced the setup of a united Serbia and its position in the SFRY and beyond. Therefore, what is involved is a real result, and not an orientation (?written down) only today.

The attitude and views of the LC of Serbia toward Yugoslavia were clear and politically and morally pure. We still see Yugoslavia as a democratic federal state and not a confederal union of states, as a community of equal peoples and nationalities and not an arena of mutually quarreling and hostile tribes, as a unified market, and not a customs union. We think that a new Yugoslav Constitution made through a joint agreement of all republics, should clearly establish those rights and duties of the Federation which express joint interests. Within this framework, conditions should be ensured for Yugoslavia as a federal state to act in a sovereign and efficient way, both in decision making and implementing federal laws. Without this, the existence of any kind of a joint state has no purpose. We will remain at this stand, but will not impose it upon anybody, or pull somebody into a state in which he feels threatened or hampered in his development. Serbia does not think that it is more responsible for Yugoslavia than the others are, that it is called upon to defend it and suggest its transformation more than the other republics are.

(?We are convinced) that federal and democratic socialist Yugoslavia is in the present and historical interest of all Yugoslav peoples and their republics, their equality, and joint progress. This orientation of ours does not mean that we are prepared to accept at any cost and under any conditions demands of others which are introducing inequality or privileged status for some. We shall not accept any solution which would proceed from a weak and disunited Serbia.

With its new and democratic orientations and results, the LC of Serbia has strengthened its standing among the people and shown itself to be the great force of changes, that it is capable of looking forward, that it is capable of fighting for vital and progressive national and democratic aims and interests, as well as the interests of the broadest strata [corrects himself] working strata of society.

However, one cannot live solely from what has been achieved, but must bravely continue in this direction. Only in that way can we find the way out of the blockade, the economic, political, social, and moral crisis of society, and rally and win over new, above all young forces, for the new democratic project of society.

In this sense and by implementing democratic and socialist orientations, the LC of Serbia meets all conditions to remain a very strong and influential political factor in Serbia and Yugoslavia, the factor of progressive changes and advances. Therefore, we shall make no delays, nor will we be confused by retrograde and rightist attacks or unfounded assertions made by individuals to the effect that we are allegedly copying somebody, that we are frightened by the events in the so-called real socialist countries, and the like. It is in the interest of both the LC of Serbia and the citizens of Serbia to continue bravely and unitedly with progressive changes required by the present times and our real situation. Today being brave means to go into such changes and not mark time. We must not and will not allow various already manifest antisocialist forces to push us from the scene due to our passivity or vacillation about new steps toward democratic socialism.

The LC of Serbia, as a party which is fighting for democratic socialism, has been building into its new identity all democratic and freedom-loving traditions of the Serbian and Yugoslav workers' movement. We stress with pride that we are continuing the progressive ideas of the socialist and workers movement in Serbia. We are proud to be continuing the traditions of a movement that has never caused war or oppressed people, but has contributed to their liberation and emancipation. We respect and cherish the progressive achievements of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and of the workers class struggle between the two wars, during the National Liberation Struggle and after the liberation of the country.

The liberation of the country from fascism and the preservation of the territorial integrity and independence of Yugoslavia can by no means be separated from the contribution of the Serbian and Yugoslav communists. In this process, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has played a key historical role.

The National Liberation War and the revolution are not outside the traditions of the history of the Serbian and other Yugoslav peoples, but are among their deepest and most glorious events. This part of our past is, in its full meaning, the continuation of national history from the point of view of the continuity of the defense of freedom and independence in 1804, in 1914, and in 1941. Observed from a national and international point of view, the National Liberation Struggle of the Yugoslav peoples has already been affirmed and scientifically verified, and all opposite views are violent and unconvincing revisions of the Yugoslav and world history of World War II.

Thanks to the Communists, the National Liberation Struggle was revolutionary, successful, and internationally recognized. It has brought new social forces of the people onto the scene and renewed Yugoslavia as a federal state. These founding principles upon which it was only possible to organize a broad people's liberation movement, irrespective of all major inconsistencies and mistakes made after the war, are still the only pivots on which a new Yugoslav democratic society and state can be based.

Other political forces in the country which are now invoking their roots, ran away from the country, openly or secretly sided with the occupiers, and shared their fate. Led by their narrow class or other interests and ideological hatred and preconceptions, they turned their backs on their own people, betrayed it, and met the end of the war on the rubbish heap of history.

By making the great turnabout in 1948 and separating from Stalin, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia became the first party in the world communist movement that managed to win an independent status. Our heritage consists of the independent, nonbloc status of Yugoslavia, preserved in the times when Europe was an arena of cold war. We have broken with real socialism by developing self-management and independence of enterprises, achieving economic, educational, cultural, and social progress for the country, opening borders, and strengthening links with the world.

Affirming all these major progressive achievements, we have simultaneously broken with everything in the communist movement and policy that was inhuman, undemocratic, and contrary to the interests of the Serbian people and the interests of other peoples and nationalities.

The League of Communists [LC] of Serbia has clearly said that it does not accept the Stalinist purges in which numerous most distinguished representatives of Serbian Communists perished. We condemn the killing of innocent people during the so-called leftist deviations during the National Liberation Struggle, as well as the brutal treatment of the peasants during the forced deliveries and the formation of the peasant working collectives, as well as the rule of Tito's personality cult.

We are aware that the isolation of declared Cominformists was indispensable, but we wish to say that Goli Otok and other similar forms of constant inhuman repression constitute a legal blot in our recent history. We have nothing in common, and we do not wish to have anything in common, with the settling of internal party accounts, with moral, political, and professional persecution of political adversaries and liberal people, with the unashamed utilization of numerous official privileges, or with the demagoguery of asserting that the rule of the workers class, democracy, and well-being of the people have been achieved.

Leaving such methods to the past and to the judgment of history, we are firmly resolved to struggle, as much as possible, to correct their consequences and, what is even more important, to create the conditions so that such methods will never again be a part of political practice in our country.

We particularly denounce those leaderships and individuals who despite decades of unlimited power failed to work for the integration of Yugoslavia. Because of the personality cult and its being aped in republican and provincial leaderships, because of unsuccessful experiments in the sphere of state and social system, Yugoslavia has been reduced to a shaky and disintegrated community, in opposition to the historical interests of the Yugoslav people and in opposition to the movements in postwar Europe. The disintegration currents have particularly affected Serbia, which, with the constitutional reform in the early 1970's, was brought, not without intention, to an unequal position as against the other republics. With the active or passive support of the most responsible officials in Serbia, in other republics, and in the federation at the time, a second Albanian state was formed in a part of Serbia's territory under the name of an autonomous province.

The anti-Serbian feelings were systematically worsened in several republics, and without interruption since 1918, the Serbian people have been tendentiously accused of having hegemonistic pretensions. Can there be any greater irony, and historical and moral injustice against a people like the Serbia people, who built 1,250,000 sacrifices into the foundations of the first Yugoslav state between 1914 and 1918 and reached the threshold of being biologically endangered, who invested their independence and statehood into this state, and who made at least as many sacrifices again in World War II and the national liberation war and were exposed to genocide by the fascist Ustasha Independent State of Croatia? Such people, then, are given the epithet of a hegemonistic and oppressive people!

The seventies were marked by the destruction of some of the greatest values of the liberation ideas of the Yugoslav Communists, or rather the Yugoslav communist movement. The party became a center of nationalism. Polycentric statism grew. Serbia was deprived of its quality as a state and was broken up. An unhindered rise of great Albanian chauvinism took place, a deformed confederalism arose which increasingly oppressed and destroyed the national identity of the Serbs all over Yugoslavia, the anti-Serbian coalition indulged in overt activities, the state and party leaders (?lived as thought they were at court), and so on.

Three years ago, the Communists of Serbia broke this mold. Great democratic changes were introduced in the LC and society. However, this process has not yet been brought to its full conclusion and it must be continued with the engagement of all the democratic forces and means.

The LC of Serbia, as the party for democratic socialism, with a new program and new people, does not wish to, and cannot share responsibility with those leaderships and individuals who have brought the country to its present state. Both history and the state organs will make a comprehensive judgment of the past when the archives are open. The membership and the present leaderships of the LC of Serbia and the Socialist Republic of Serbia cannot bear responsibility for failures and distortions on which they did not take decisions. Their present work is, and must be, exposed to the critical judgment of the public, and they may or may not obtain confidence in democratic elections.

We believe that no big talk is needed for democracy. We will encourage this process with bold democratic and economic changes, and by liberating the energy of capable, worthy, young people who will constitute the necessary broad political basis for the reform processes.

Such a firm determination shines from the great majority of the proposals made in the public discussions in the LC of Serbia, in which a resolute break is demanded with the inherited model of the party which is basically bureaucratic. Therefore the demand that we should transform ourselves into a modern socialist and democratic party [stranka], which is to say the Party [partija] for Democratic Socialism, was so strongly expressed both in the political practice in Serbia in the past three years and in the public discussions.

The party with its new identity and program will not exhaust itself in hopeless battles (?about its past). The tasks facing Serbia and our society are too great to permit us to turn our back on the present and the future. Our political adversaries would wish to make the themes of the past our exclusive preoccupation. Their political leaderships pretend not to know the past of their predecessors, the bourgeois parties, their affairs, corruption, and historical errors ranging from authoritarian restrictions of freedom, deep social injustice toward workers and peasants, dungeons, persecution, bloody settling of accounts, and political murders, up to treasonable attitude toward the occupiers.

Of course, the present generations and citizens who join these parties now do not, and cannot, bear responsibility for the conduct of their predecessors. They take the positive traditions and build on them their own programs for the present time, just as the members of the LC of Serbia and the people in its present leaderships cannot bear responsibility for the decisions and distortions in the past of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the LC of Yugoslavia.

To implement its program goals, the LC of Serbia decided to organize itself as a Party [partija] for Democratic Socialism, open to all the citizens who accept its program and statute. The social foundations of our party [partija] are the working strata of society, creators of material and spiritual values, people who live from their work.

Our party will primarily express the interests of all the creators in production, science, culture, of workers, peasants, young people, and all the citizens who, voluntarily joining the party, want to build a democratic socialist society. We will pay special attention to the young people, women, and all other citizens who may be exposed to various forms of deprivation of rights. Religious convictions are no obstacle to the membership of the party. We are not and we will not be an organization in which party political elites will have the main say. As a democratic left party we will cultivate and develop the relations in which the members' initiative and will are decisive, and have leaderships that will know how to accept such an initiative and that will be enterprising and aggressive themselves.

The program and organizational unity and the political strategy of the party will be determined in a free democratic discussion. The differences in opinions on some questions cannot be a basis for settling political accounts. On the contrary, we advocate that the minority should have the right to democratically express its views and positions, and to request a reconsideration of decisions adopted; we advocate that a party member should express and advocate his view even when it differs from the positions of the majority. However, the party must not be blocked by friction between the majority and the minority. Decisions will be adopted by a majority of votes, and everybody is obliged to respect the decisions adopted in this democratic way and to implement them properly.

The stand of the majority of the LC members in the public discussion that the party should be organized on the principles of territory and the place of work is above all an expression of our social basis, and our ties with the working strata whose interests we represent. This should not be confused with the manner of work, holding of meetings, and the present activities in enterprises. Our forms of organization will not take over the role and the function of the trade unions. We will not work in enterprises as an organization interfering in the process of production and management.

We will search for new content of work that will serve the implementation of the economic and social reform and the protection of the position of workers whose interests we express. At the same time we will develop other forms of organization.

We are particularly interested in cooperation with the trade unions and the youth organizations that base their activities—in protecting the workers interests or the interests of the youths, promoting modern education, accelerated employment, creativity, research spirit, culture, and inventiveness—on the same or similar programs. Therefore we call young people who support a democratic and socialist program to be members of our party.

Young people do not need patronage of anybody, but they need an opportunity to prove themselves and to develop their potential now, not waiting for tomorrow, and they desire openness themselves in their own way. Therefore we will work on our part to organize youth forums as suitable forms for such an involvement.

We have decided to set our relations of respect with other legal parties [stranke], proceeding from the premise that cooperation and tolerance is needed in democratic Serbia when general social interests are at stake. The parties compete with their programs in election contests, and they inevitably must have a critical attitude towards each other, but this attitude should not fall below the limit of human dignity and morals.

The members of the leaderships of some parties have lately been developing their activities and (?appearing) in public exclusively with attacks on the LC in which there has been much intolerance and unscrupulous unfounded accusations, and revanchist and revengeful threats.

The brandishing of daggers, the resurgence of Chetniks, vandalistic and destructive attacks, and the uncivilized and aggressive upsetting of the citizens must be stopped to avoid their threatening of Serbia's democracy and citizens' peace and calm. Serbia needs democracy and peace today more than ever before to advance economically, successfully oppose great Albanian separatism in Kosovo, and become a reliable partner to democratic forces in other parts of Yugoslavia, and especially a pillar of the Serbian people whose national and civil rights are increasingly being threatened in some parts of Serbia.

It appears that the logic of some parties is that all means are justified if they are used against the LC. One cannot build democracy on fanaticism and (?waves) of hatred and intolerance. The motto the worse the better, and the malicious joy over the violence against citizens, as well as a search for justification for the phenomena of violence in our past and similar events in other countries, and I quote, pacts with the devil with the aim of eliminating the LC, are hitting another target, democracy itself.

We favor cooperation with and the participation of all when it comes to general state and general social business, be it the adoption of a constitution or other most important decisions concerning the reforms in our society, even before the multiparty elections. However, we will resolutely oppose in public and political life all activities undertaken from chauvinist positions and the spreading of hatred and intolerance. [Words indistinct] of our party must not wait for any instructions from the leadership to oppose this. We need more organized work on this despite the considerable work that we have done in the state and other organs on creating conditions for economic prosperity and democracy in Serbia.

The leaderships in our party should become meeting places where initiatives, views, and stands of the membership meet with the views and experiences of the members of the party in the assemblies and other responsible posts in the state. The policy of separating the party from the state belongs to the system we are abandoning. The irresponsible behavior by the members of the party with regard to the policy of the party should also be stopped as soon as possible. The crucial thing in winning the trust of the citizens in the upcoming multiparty elections will be the extent to which we have transformed our reform orientations into practice.

The new program orientations and the ability to realize them should keep in our party the socialist and democratically oriented people, the best part of the membership which is in the party because of its ideas and orientations rather than career and other reasons. As a modern party of the left we will attract new young people, some as members, some as supporters or voters. It is probable the we will no longer be a mass party as we are today. The most important thing will be the extent to which the program of our party and its activities attracts the electorate to vote for our program and candidates in the democratic elections.

We will nominate candidates for the most responsible places in our party, deputy places in the assembly, and other most responsible public posts who will be the real representatives of our party, experts, people who enjoy respect in society, who are in favor of democratic changes and who have, above all, moral integrity. We must start on the cadre preparations for the future pluralist elections on this basis immediately.

As far as the present situation in the LC of Yugoslavia is concerned, it is clear that it is remaining as a loose coalition of independent political subjects with joint traditions and similar program orientations. This a realistic reflection of the total state of relations in Yugoslavia. We believe that this is a temporary state of affairs and that it was mainly the result of mutual exclusiveness, erroneous election calculations and predictions by some republican organizations of the LC, and that the political circumstances are already acting as a stimulus toward the renewal of our organization as a strong political party of the left in Yugoslavia as a whole, a party that would constitute itself and act on democratic principles and new socialist program bases.

The LC of Serbia will contribute to this, especially to the joint preparations for the Congress of Renewal in September. We will search together and on equal footing with others for a new identity of the LC of Yugoslavia as a modern party of the Yugoslav left which favors democratic socialism and a federal Yugoslavia.

At almost all meetings discussing basic orientations, a change of name of our organization was suggested. Members explained this political feeling of their being in favor of such a change by the fact that a new identity of the organization we have been forming over the last three years and which will act in new political conditions must be marked not just by a new program, but also a new name and symbols that would make our party recognizable and different from many other parties. This party would reflect (?everything) we strive for, the methods we want to achieve this with, (?in brief), where we are coming from and what we are aiming for.

Almost all those who made proposals held the unanimous view that this new name must reflect the basic directions of our program, socialism, and democracy. Proceeding from this, those who took part in the discussion proposed more than 100 new names. The most numerous proposals were that our party be called The Socialist Democratic Party, The Democratic Socialist Party, and The Socialist Party. At a number of meetings it was proposed that the new name be The Party for Democratic Socialism. At only a small number of meetings was it proposed that the old name of the Communist Party be reinstated.

The new identity of the LC of Serbia will also be based on the reform of all essential economic categories on which the current model of socialism was unsuccessfully carried out in many respects. We are more recognizable by the fact that we were the first to radically criticize the concept of the consensus economy and to opt for the market and economic laws. This was not a tactical move by our party, but a fundamental commitment. We think that on these bases democratic relations could be better developed and personal motivation and conditions for work and living of people considerable improved. In this respect we strive for faster changes in the economy and social superstructure, especially those that will contribute toward increasing productivity and the earnings of enterprises.

We support modern entrepreneurship and sound competition (?in the) development of new technologies, modern methods of organization and managing work and business operations. Every citizens should be provided with conditions to work and earn honestly. This is the best way to fully utilize human, material, and other advantages of Serbia, to join in the currents of modern world developments on an equal footing.

We have initiated changes in the inappropriate ownership structure as one of the key causes of the crisis. Our principled endeavor to ensure under the conditions of ownership pluralism the equality of all forms of ownership is in line with the demands of the market and the democratic development of society. In these new conditions for conducting business operations, social ownership will, like all other forms of ownership, have to confirm its effectiveness on the market. That is why we want ownership deeds to be clearly defined, and rights, duties, and responsibility precisely stated. Therefore, we are not striving for any kind of undefined, economically irrational, definition of somebody's property.

We are opting for the changes that will make social property economically efficient by turning it into social capital, because only as such can it represent the basis of a democratic, successful, and rich socialist society. We believe that such changes in the sphere of social property are possible. We demand that state measures are used to prevent the plunder and the outflow of socially owned property into private pockets through the abuse of one's position in the social sector, speculations, and other similar ways.

We are not ignoring the effects of market laws on the processes of social stratification. We are in favor of harmonized relations between social justice and economic efficiency. The state must ensure to every individual basic economic and social rights, the necessary level of social justice, economic and social security, equality, and solidarity in accordance with economic capabilities, because without these rights man cannot be a dignified citizen.

A modern social state is our constant objective. Without it there can be no successful economic reform or stable development. This is why we would like the state, through the taxation system and an appropriate social policy with well pronounced elements of solidarity, to ensure to our citizens schooling, medical and child care, protection in case of unemployment, as well as other rights.

The major reforms that are underway must not in any way bypass agriculture. When I say this I primarily have in mind the fact that the state authorities conducted an inappropriate and to a great extent conservative and damaging policy toward rural areas. This is why agriculture does not occupy the position and play the role it deserves, considering the available potentials and natural conditions in Serbia.

The new development cycle in Serbia requires that we establish new attitudes toward farmers and agriculture as a whole. These attitudes should be approximately the same as those in developed countries. We favor comprehensive reforms in agriculture which would provide it with a considerably more favorable, that is, a privileged position through changes in the system and measures in economic and development policy. This also applies to the current economic policy measures, the timely setting of purchase prices, and so forth.

A modern and market-oriented agriculture assumes the transformation of social estates into efficient enterprises and the economic strengthening of farmers' estates as modern commodity producers. The freedom of farmers as producers requires that we abolish the limit on maximum landholding and all administrative restrictions concerning the freedom of choice of what to produce and the farmers' methods of organization, and that we guarantee with the Constitution the rights of citizens to ownership and work on farming land.

These are the basic conditions for a faster economic and social development in the countryside, for young people remaining in the rural area.

We are not abandoning self-management which, as the widest democratic project, originated in Yugoslavia and became in the last few decades one of the internationally accepted and guaranteed basic economic and social rights. We know where and why it let us down, and what its objective limitations are. Instead of striving for the unfeasible integral self-management, we will strive for self-management and the participation of workers and all other employed people in the management and decision making concerning important issues, according to the ownership structure of enterprises, as well as toward its separation from management and expert functions.

We will insist particularly that self-management is not abused for the protection of idleness, irresponsibility, a lack of discipline, and as excuses for unsuccessful directors. We have long been a slave to the ideological vision of the fast withering away of the state, when we did not, so to speak, even have a law governed state [Pravna Drzava]. We will all need it for some time, but not an enormous and expensive state, a state lacking authority where it should have it, and having it where it should not, and an irresponsible, unfriendly, and sloppy state. We are in favor of a democratic law governed state whose source and the framework of operations is exclusively the Constitution and law, a modern law governed state which would be in line with the principles of the current world science and practice, a responsible state which would be accountable to the citizens for everything it has done or has not, but should have.

In such a democratic state, in which the citizens, that is, the people of Serbia will be the basic and decisive subject, and in which there will be a division of authority into legislative, executive, and judiciary, as well as a clear separation of their responsibilities, a particular role will be played by and importance attached to an independent judiciary, judiciary that will not depending on other state organs as the strongest mechanism of the law governed state and a guarantee for the freedoms and rights of citizens.

In socialist Yugoslavia the list of citizens' freedoms and rights has always been extremely long and substantive, but many of them were not realized. This was not always and everywhere the consequence of a lack of firm constitutional guarantees and authoritative-bureaucratic interventions, but in many cases, especially concerning economic and social rights, a consequence of a lack of objective limitations of undeveloped and poor society.

The political system which we strive for will be built on the citizen as a political subject and human rights and freedoms that would be in line with the highest European standards. This is why in the proposal for the new constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia we envisaged the reinforcement of and respect for the existing rights and freedoms which will guarantee to the citizen, as a political subject, dignity, the freedom of expression, the freedom of political affiliations, political organization and association, the freedom of assembly and decisionmaking, the freedom of practicing religion, the freedom of press, free elections, and so forth.

We will insist that this includes the protection of personal and family life, the protection of privacy from abuse by other people, state organs, as well as the abuse of information technology. We will devote and the greatest attention and attach greatest importance to these freedoms and rights, as well as the direct forms of democracy, such as referendums, people's initiatives, and so forth. The restriction of these freedoms and rights can only be determined by a constitution, just as the limit to these citizens' freedoms and rights can only be the same rights of other citizens.

Such system of constitutional guarantees of human freedoms and rights, along with the independent judiciary, is the only true (?barrier) to anarchy, the discrimination of people, and the abuse of power.

The public debate extended support to our tenet which opposes the party and anybody else's voluntaristic arbitrage in scientific and artistic creativity, and in the development of these two spheres, but favors the freedom of creativity that corresponds to the achievements of this civilization and positive achievements of our social development.

In social activities, we will strive for the process of the structural adjustment to the demands of the modern development at the threshold of the 21st century to be successfully accomplished, especially as regards its technological dimension. Rationalization measures in this field are certainly necessary to shed ballast and to make work better and more successful. However, one must be careful to ensure that the biggest wave of the economic crisis does not strike here precisely, because the areas of education, science, culture, and health meet vital and authentic human requirements of the broadest strata of the people and create the foundation for further successful development of society.

The social system that we strive for will make education, scientific work, culture, and health protection accessible to every citizen regardless of his social origin, state of wealth, and ethnicity. In proportion to its capabilities, the state should ensure schooling and further training to those who deserve it primarily through their work, knowledge, and intellectual abilities and who regularly fulfill their obligations.

The scope for pluralism in esthetic views and for creative autonomy opened in our country very early but inconsistently, with various taboos and ideological restrictions remain. In the past few years we have been able to note that we have passed the period when tremendous social energies were used for denouncing individual philosophical, scientific, and artistic works and when indisputable values of our cultural heritage were pushed aside and even sacrificed.

We will also strive to see that one ideological exclusiveness toward spiritual creation will not be replaced by another in the future, because that would mean a new subordination of culture to daily political needs, even if of another ideological hue. We will best resist a possible new monism in ideologically directing science, education, and culture by our consistently supporting the criteria of quality and civilizational significance, immanent in creativity in the democratic world. Accepting these criteria is the precondition for the implementation of original socialist and other humanist ideals.

Up to now, we have been for full national equality, not only because of the acceptance of the principles of democracy and humanism, but also because about one third of the population of Serbia are members of other peoples and nationalities, as well as because the members of the Serbian people living in other republics are even more numerous. We understand national equality to be a prerequisite for the democratic development of Serbia, as well as for a peaceful life and mutual trust of citizens and for their feeling that they all live in their own country that guarantees them equal rights and prosperity.

Consistently implementing the policy of national equality, we shall never permit that, allegedly in the name of that policy, the rights of the Serbian people are negated and that the unity of the state of Serbia is broken apart, that the history of the Serbian people, their tradition and culture are suppressed, forgotten, and forged, that the members of the Serbian people in Serbia or outside are placed in an unequal position, persecuted, maltreated, and suppressed, or that a state of another people or nationality is formed on its territory, the territory of Serbia.

We shall advocate the realization of the national rights within the autonomous provinces, too. They cannot be states, but territorial autonomies, guaranteed by the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia. They will be established in keeping with specific national, economic, cultural, and similar characteristics of these regions, which implies a constant cultivation and protection of national culture, language, customs, religion, and so forth. This also implies that in the field of modern national rights, the Yugoslav peoples cannot be subjected to any majority rule in the provinces.

In the document adopted by the Central Committee, we have clearly said what should be done in Kosovo and regarding Kosovo so as to finally ensure a peaceful life in common by all the citizens, a rule of law, economic progress, and democracy, and integrity of Serbia and Yugoslavia. As we know, our assembly has also adopted a special program of activities regarding Kosovo.

The Central Committee program has presented a clear outline of the great economic moves and new investment in Kosovo which open up realistic prospects and chances for young people. It involves new communications, settlements, economic projects, and the development of education, science, culture, and health. We have decided what should be done not only to stop emigration of the Serbs and Montenegrins, but also to effect the return of those who have emigrated and the arrival of those who wish to live and work in Kosovo.

It is absolutely clear that the Serbs, the Montenegrins, and others who have remained would not be able to resist much longer without the arrival of new people and families in Kosovo. With the comprehensive program backed by Serbia as a state and a guarantor for the collection, economical use, and control of spending of the money for this purpose, we will successfully resist the separatist plan for ethnically pure Kosovo.

It is in the interests of the Albanian nationality, too, that this problem be resolved and that peaceful life in common and legal order be finally restored, so that all the people in Kosovo—I repeat, all the people in Kosovo—and all over Serbia would turn to work, development, and progress.

Peaceful and prosperous Kosovo is a vital interest of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, and everything that we do will run in this direction. We are convinced that only such long-term policy opens up the prospects for progress and peace in Kosovo both for the Albanians and for the Serbs and the Montenegrins, as well as for all other peoples and nationalities living there.

We offer peace, equality, and progress. The separatists offer clashes, blood, and the secession of Kosovo. This truth must reach every person in Kosovo, particularly the young Albanians, so that they all may be fully aware of their acts and their responsibility for these acts.

The Socialist Republic of Serbia will never allow anybody to undermine the constitutional order and to split off a part of its territory, nor will it allow terrorism within its borders. Kosovo is a socialist Autonomous province, it is an inseparable part of the Republic of Serbia in which its citizens, which is to say citizens of various nationalities, live and will live under the conditions of full equality and equal democratic and human rights.

Of course dialogue is needed in Kosovo, above all with the people as well as with those political forces that, regardless of their differences in views, accept and respect the integrity and the constitutional system of Serbia and Yugoslavia. Our policy and actions run in this direction.

With inhumanity and the selfishness of the generations we seem to have forgotten that the future generations have the right to live in a healthy, clean, and beautiful environment. We advocate that ecological costs should be taken into account and that the state and the so-called dirty industries should protect human environment in keeping with world standards and ensure for the coming generations that they will able to breath air without fear, to drink pure water, and to eat healthy food. Therefore, we will assert our ecological programs, support the initiatives and movements of citizens, and conduct concrete activities in this field.

We should be a part of the modern European community primarily by creating the European conditions of production, life, and scientific-technological progress in our own country. Therefore, we are in favor of creating broadest cooperation with European organizations and institutions as Yugoslavia, and not divided up into republics, and of being a member of the EEC.

Comrades, the institutionalization of multiparty democracy in Serbia must develop with democratic means, and this means with respect for the existing constitutional order and the creation of normative prerequisites for the organization of political parties, an independent press, free elections, and the functioning of a parliamentary system of government. The LC of Serbia now bears special responsibility for these processes. After all it consciously initiated these processes, and the fullest expression of these processes is the proposal for the adoption of a new democratic constitution of Serbia.

Multiparty democracy is our lasting precept, and we will not desist. Any other way of institutionalizing political pluralism would mean to advocate anarchy, chaos, and an absence of the rule of law. Only the new constitution will create the normative conditions for strengthening the integration processes in Serbia and the functioning of the parliamentary democracy in Serbia.

One must not forget, however, that these processes are endangered not only by the internal activities of the great Albanian separatist movement, and the attempts at homogenization of the ethnic Albanians on the platform of Kosovo-Republic and hatred of the Serbian people, but also by their openly searching for allies abroad and by foreign interference, as well as by the unconcealed strivings in some republics to support such processes in Kosovo in various ways and to endanger the unity of Serbia and the reform Serbia has started.

Therefore, to respect the Constitution of Serbia—until a new constitution is adopted, on the basis of which multiparty free elections will immediately be held—is a vital national and state interest. The political parties [partije] that fail to see this, blinded by their desire to reach power quickly, objectively work against this national interest of the Serbia people, other peoples and nationalities, the unity of Serbia, and the peaceful course of the reform.

This is not a matter of the LC of Serbia fearing to face elections, as some people want to present the situation. Because of what we have initiated, because of the results that we have achieved, because of the trust that we enjoy among the citizens, we have no reason to fear elections. However, the LC does not agree that the constitutionality and everything that has been done in the past three years with the support of the people for setting up a unified Serbia should be jeopardized because of some parties' striving for power. This is a question that we consider above the parties and that must remain so. The Serbian people above all now need a unified and stable state of Serbia.

With its work in the past three years, and with these basic precepts, the LC of Serbia has demonstrated that it is capable of responding to the demands of time and successfully to transform itself into the Party for Democratic Socialism. Our work and our program precepts that we are to adopt constitute a final break with a party of the bureaucratic type in the ideological, program, organizational, and even cadre respect.

Utopian visions of socialism as society without conflict, a dictatorship of the proletariat, and ideological scientific and theoretical exclusiveness are behind us. We do not plead (?for the role of) an exclusive interpreter and protector of socialism. The forces whose aim is democratic socialism will be, we are convinced, more and more numerous. They will prevail over the nationalist, rightist, and disintegrational tendencies and their advocates.

The process of democratization and the transformation of the LC into a modern political party is thus not completed. We have made a huge advance from the beginning. It is true that we were the first to initiate the economic and social reform, but we are only now creating the overall program of new democratic socialism.

We have a political organization that has initiated the changes, but it has not yet completed its own program and ideological transformation, and we must speed up our organizational and cadre transformation. For all this we need a new program, a new party, new people. For the purpose of accelerating and successfully leading these processes, the Central Committee, proceeding from its rights and duties, will adopt a number of political and organizational decisions at its session today and at its immediate following sessions.

Comrades, the concluding part of the public discussion of the proposed document of the LC of Serbia has coincided with the discussion about the changes in the Socialist Alliance of Working People [SAWP] of Serbia, in which the basic dilemma was whether to transform into a party [stranka] or a democratic alliance of citizens. Inevitably the question arose of what the position of the LC of Serbia toward the transformation of the SAWP was, the LC being the latter's collective member.

Bearing in mind all the chief demands by the public discussion in the LC—which I have tried to speak about in this report—the decision of the LC could only be in favor of the unification of all the socialist democratic forces in Serbia. From this follows the key decision—the decision by the Presidium of our Central Committee and the Presidium of the Republican Conference of the SAWP—on the unification of the two organizations and the creation of a Socialist Party of Serbia [Socijalisticka Partija Srbije].

The new and successful political actions in the past three years, the LC of Serbia has definitively abandoned the image of a state party. It may be proud of the results achieved in this period, and it has no cause to abandon its policy. Therefore, it has no need to append some sort of additions to its present name.

In fact, a stage in our development has been completed. For the purpose of our further successful influence on the democratic processes in Serbia and for the sake of the prosperity of the Serbian people and other peoples and nationalities, and all the citizens of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, our organization appears now as the initiator of the creation of a strong Socialist Party of Serbia.

In the past period, the LC of Serbia did not work alone. In the same period, during the constitutional struggle for the unity of Serbia, through the rallying of people at meetings for solving the problem of Kosovo, in various activities to solve the everyday problems of people, the SAWP has indeed confirmed itself as the broadest popular organization that has rallied the people favoring a united Serbia, democracy and socialism, and Yugoslavia.

The LC of Serbia and the SAWP of Serbia have worked together all this time on the same job and with congruent programs. Proceeding from this fact, from the look forward which will not be dictated by a passively deciding for one or another option offered by others, but by real processes in Serbia, the Presidiums of the Central Committee and of the Republican Conference of the SAWP have jointly launched a unification of these two organizations into a united party that would work under the name of the Socialist Party of Serbia.

It is logical, and we think it is justified, that the two organizations which are close to each other in their programs should jointly form a new party as a strong foundation for the rallying of the left and democratic forces in Serbia. Now when the socialist ideas and forces of Yugoslavia are being more and more pushed aside by retrograde and rightist ideologies and forces, we are convinced that this initiative strongly expresses the interests of the democratically oriented people.

On its new program precepts, organizationally and cadre set up as a modern party of the left, the Socialist Party of Serbia will rally progressive and young people, workers, peasants, the intelligentsia, all those who are prepared to get politically involved in favor of democratic socialism, unified Serbia, and unified federal Yugoslavia.

This then will not be a mere merger of the two organizations, but the creation of a new socialist party which will be a strong and influential democratic political factor in the social life of Serbia and Yugoslavia. This is a chance for the left forces in Serbia not to be scattered, fragmented, and even confront each other, but for them to appear united in elections.

I am convinced, comrades, that we as the Central Committee will express the wish not only of the membership of the LC of Serbia but also of the majority of the citizens of Serbia if we propose Comrade Slobodan Milosevic as president of the new Socialist Party of Serbia because of everything that he has done and because of the prestige and support he enjoys among the people. [applause]

The congress of unification of the LC of Serbia and of the SAWP of Serbia, and of forming the new Socialist Party of Serbia should be held, as the Presidiums of the two organizations assess, by the middle of July.

We have much work ahead of us. Let us tackle it boldly, wisely, and resolutely in the interest of the working strata and the people of united Serbia and united socialist Yugoslavia.

Thank you. [applause]

Kosovo SAWP Supports Merger

LD1006223990 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1624 GMT 10 Jun 90

[Excerpts] Pristina, 10 Jun (TANJUG)—The Kosovo SAWP Provincial Conference Presidium today supported the proposal to unite the SAWP and the Serbian LC into the Socialist Party of Serbia. [passage omitted]

The Kosovo SAWP Provincial Conference Presidium has proposed that the candidate for chairman of the future Socialist Party of Serbia be Slobodan Milosevic [president of the Serbian Presidency], of whom it was said that through his work he has acquired the trust of the broad masses across the republic. [passage omitted]

Commentary on LC-SAWP Merger

LD1206022490 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1957 GMT 11 Jun 90

[Text] Titograd, 11 June (TANJUG)—The decision to merge the Serbian LC and SAWP into a single party will, undoubtedly, cause new tremors in the area of the Yugoslav southeast communism, today's commentary of Radio Titograd notes in connection with the proposed merger of the Serbian LC and SAWP into a socialist party.

The very act of the sudden merger and the new name for the joint party, commentator Miodrag Vukmanovic stresses, will hardly impress anyone for the simple reason that no one thinking with one's own head has previously believed there was any substantial ideological difference between the LC and the Socialist Alliance.

The latter organization, Vukmanovic states further, has for decades been a political outpost of the former or its democratic trap for some theologically more lax priests or more talkative artists. The party, witnessing how communists fared at free elections, borrowed its partner's name and image of a front organization. That was all it could take because the Socialist Alliance officials have so far been LC officials.

Since the sudden merger—malicious persons would say annexation—was not preceded by a new program platform, we assume that the Serbian Socialist Party heralds the fundamental LC values in a more populist interpretation. Because the Serbian LC was a part of the LCY, whose centralism the new Serbian socialists have been promoting most persistently, and because they are giving up reluctantly one party system and social ownership, the very change of the name, Vukmanovic notes, says nothing other than that the Serbian communists, between fruitless attempts to impose themselves as the political center of Yugoslavia and the danger to be pushed on political margins in their own republic, decided to save their own skins.

Montenegrin Communists Welcome Union

LD1206185390 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1545 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Titograd, 11 Jun (TANJUG)—The leadership of the League of Communists of the Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro today described, as "one of the most interesting political initiatives in Yugoslavia," the initiative for the merging of the League of Communists of Serbia and the Socialist Alliance of Serbia, the largest sociopolitical organization, into a Socialist Party of Serbia.

After today's session of the League of Communists of Montenegro Central Committee, leader of the Montenegro Communists Momir Bulatovic told a news conference that the initiative of the Serbian Communists was more radical than similar initiatives in other Yugoslav republics.

Montenegro and Serbia, two neighbouring republics, have been closely cooperating especially since large-scale rallies sparked off political changes two years ago.

Montenegrin Merger Proposed

AU1306145690 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 10 Jun 90 p 8

[M.R. report: "The Amalgamation of the Montenegrin LC and SAWP In Sight?"]

[Text] Pljevlja, 9 Jun—A proposed platform for the reform of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Montenegro [SAWP] was discussed in Pljevlja. What was envisaged is the transformation of the organization into an Alliance of Socialists [savez socijalista] or a Socialist, or a Social Democratic Party.

As we have learned, there were also proposals for the amalgamation of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Montenegro and the League of Communists [LC] of Montenegro into a Socialist Party of Montenegro.

Kosovo Human Rights 'Violations' Protested

AU1206095290 Pristina RILINDJA in Albanian 5 Jun 90 p 6

[Unattributed report: "The Necessary Help Must Be Offered to Those Affected"]

[Text] The Pristina-based Council for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms has sent an open letter to the SFRY Assembly and the media, which states:

A decision of the SFRY Assembly on 16 April 1990 lifted the emergency measures in Kosovo, after the Serbian Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs assumed total authority in the field of state and public security in

Kosovo on that same day. Radmilo Bogdanovic, republican secretary of the Serbian Secretariat for Internal Affairs, stated on 23 April that "the rule of law has begun to operate in Kosovo."

We do not intend to describe what kind of situation prevails in Kosovo following "the lifting of the emergency measures." We wish to draw attention to only a few cases of flagrant violations of human rights and freedoms in Kosovo since the alleged lifting of the emergency measures and since "the rule of law" began to operate.

Some Cases of Human Rights Violations

1. At the end of April, the settlement of blood feuds and the active campaign against the vendetta and for the reconciliation between conflicting families assumed major proportions as a result of an initiative by young people and with the involvement of many authoritative intellectuals. In some cases, the enthusiasm with which citizens welcomed this campaign led to mass gatherings of reconciliation, bringing together many conflicting families whose members had remained under what is called home imprisonment for months and even years on end, out of fear of revenge. Such gatherings were dignified and without excesses of any kind. There were cases, in the midst of such enthusiasm, of people raising two fingers in a "V"-sign, which led to the intervention of the security forces. After such a mass meeting in the village of Lug near Decani, the security forces stopped many automobiles leaving the village on the main road near Decani, blocked the highway, made several dozen students leave their cars, manhandled them and beat them up in front of the assembled crowds, and then took them to the militia station. Many of these participants in the gathering suffered serious physical injuries and were sent to the local clinic. There, instead of the doctor on duty and his medical staff offering help, two militiamen assumed the role of surgeons and even stitched the wounds of those arrested, having thrown the duty doctor out of the clinic. After being manhandled and beaten up by the militia, all those arrested were handed over to the Magistrate's Court, but no grounds for charges were found and they were sent home. However, this incident served as a groundless pretext for banning such gatherings to reconcile families in conflict and for slowing down or stopping the entire campaign.

2. On 16 May 1990, a militiaman in a unit of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs stopped the Catholic priest Dom Fatmir Nuiqi, and maltreated and physically assaulted him in the center of Vitina. According to accounts by citizens, he was attacked because the clergy and other staff of the Catholic churches at Binac and Gornja Stubla had been giving first aid to poisoned schoolchildren and other citizens.

3. It was probably for the same reasons that, at 1900 on 16 May, the general practitioner Dr. Enver Berisha was assaulted and beaten with rubber truncheons in his own home in Pec. Two militiamen entered his home and began without any questions to beat him with rubber truncheons.

4. The 45-year-old shepherd Raif Nikoliqi has been under treatment in Djakovica hospital since 16 May, when militiamen stopped him at the entrance to the town and searched him "to see if he was armed." During the search, one of the militiamen squeezed the unfortunate Raif's genitals so hard that one testicle was crushed, requiring the victim's hospitalization.

5. Being stopped for identity card checks in streets, public places, and cars is part of everyday Kosovo life. Such checks are often accompanied by maltreatment and provocations of various kinds which normally lead to blows from rubber truncheons and being taken to the militia stations and beaten. We cite merely one example that was also described on television and in the daily press. At midday on 18 May, the militia stopped the 22-year-old Bashkim Gerlica on the street. His documents were checked and when he was searched, a photograph of Professor Anton Cetta, who has a long time been leading the campaign to reconcile families in conflict, was found on his person. The maltreatment of the innocent young man began there and then, in the street. He was then taken to the militia station and beaten up, and the militiamen forced him to swallow his engagement ring, "so that he would give up for ever the idea of marrying and having children."

Changing the Names of Institutions and Streets Is Not Uncommon

6. It is no longer uncommon for the names of streets and institutions bearing the names of certain personalities from Albanian history and culture to be changed. The name of the Halit Ibishi School, named after a local veteran of the National Liberation War, was changed, as well as that of the Hivzi Sylejmani High School in Kosovo Polje, named after a well-known Kosovo writer, thinker and veteran of 1941. His bust was removed from its plinth, the inscribed plaque shattered, and the plinth demolished. A few days ago, an unknown person also removed the bust of Hasan Prishtina from the yard of the school in Pristina that bears his name, which is in a part of town where many members of the security forces live. All these things have so exceeded all bounds that they have provoked harsh protests and rage among the masses, all the more so when the bust of Hasan Prishtina was found the next day to have been thrown down a manhole into a sewer, and the culprits have not been identified.

7. Some time ago, the Council informed the President of the Federal Executive Council [FEC] that cases of the mass poisoning of school pupils in Kosovo are once again occurring, and the security services are again preventing patients from being treated at health institutions. On this occasion, the Council appealed to the FEC president to intervene personally to put an end to this at once. It is a fact that this evil is continuing without any

respite and we think that it is the duty of a law-governed state to determine the cause and source of this supposed sickness or mysterious poison, to ensure that the sick or poisoned are accepted for treatment, and to prevent this phenomenon once and for all. This is all the more necessary because the number affected is large and increasing daily, and a feeling of fear and insecurity has been created among parents and children, which creates a general feeling of insecurity among citizens not only of the Albanian nationality but of other nationalities also.

These are only some of the cases of the violation of the Albanians' individual and collective rights and freedoms. For this reason, the Council asks you to oblige the responsible organs and institutions to put an end to such cases, and asks for the appropriate assistance and satisfaction to be offered to those affected. This is required not only by feelings of common humanity, but by the legal norms of our country and the international conventions which our country has signed.

Interior Ministry's Role Assessed

LD1206181290 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1542 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Belgrade, 12 Jun (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Parliamentary Council for Internal Policy today concluded that the Federal Internal Ministry acted in line with the law in the course of last year.

However, the ministry was still criticized. Thus, the council members of Yugoslavia's largest republic, Serbia, warned that the ministry could not receive a "passing grade" for its activity in the Serbian province of Kosovo, in which the "organizers of separatist and sabotage acts" have not been discovered yet.

However, parliamentarians of the province of Kosovo—ethnic Albanians—said the ethnic Albanian population in the province continues to endure repressions by state organs which "act under the dictate of daily politics."

They also reproach the fact that the federal ministry reports did not mention the fate of the 238 ethnic Albanian citizens who after the unrest in the province were put under house arrest or temporarily moved to other parts of the country.

Ethnic Albanians Reject Serbian Policy

LD1206225490 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1558 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Belgrade, 12 Jun (TANJUG)—Ethnic Albanians in the government of the province of Kosovo, which is a part of Yugoslavia's biggest Republic of Serbia, refuse to implement the republic's policy in the province, Kosovo Government member Momcilo Trajkovic said today.

Most members of the provincial government are ethnic Albanians and they opposed a conclusion which would oblige the provincial and republican governments to implement a policy whose essence is the autonomy of Kosovo as a part of Serbia.

Ethnic Albanians are the majority population in Kosovo and demand a greater degree of autonomy than Serbia is willing to give.

SDSJ To Work With Croat Assembly, Reopen Ties

LD0906211790 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0953 GMT 9 Jun 90

[Text] Zagreb, 9 Jun (TANJUG)—Representatives of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDSJ] will take part in the work of the Croatian Assembly at its session convened for 20 June. This will represent an unfreezing of the relations between this party and the Croatian Assembly which were discontinued following the assault on the Benkovac SDS Committee president, Miroslav Mlinar.

This was stressed by SDSJ President Dr. Jovan Raskovic in his statement to VECERNJI LIST, which this Zagreb daily carries in today's issue.

Since it is completely certain that the investigation into the "Milnar case" will last several months, Dr. Raskovic holds that the reasons for freezing relations with the new assembly are no longer valid.

We need not agree on everything, but we have to respect the newly elected government in Croatia and cooperate with it. A representative of ours is also planned for one of vice presidential positions in new Croatian Assembly, Dr. Jovan Raskovic said.

Macedonian Party Addresses Serbian Public

LD1206230590 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1906 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Skopje, 12 Jun (TANJUG)—The Macedonian League of Communists-Party for Democratic Transformation Central Committee Presidium [Savez komunista makedonije-partija za demokratksi preobrazaj—SKM-PDP] today addressed the democratic public of Serbia in an open letter and stressed that the press and certain leaders of newly founded parties write and state that an anti-Serbian orientation is spreading in Macedonia. The SKM-PDP leadership is criticized for destroying the League of Communists of Yugoslavia unity, and thus, Yugoslavia's federation. We hope that the absurdity of these condemnations will be unmasked along with abandoning the remnants of state socialist and nationalistic ideologies, the letter said.

Intentionally or accidently, the letter continued, POLITIKA publications write in a proven fashion, with "tried witnesses" about the poor status of Serbs in Macedonia, about an alleged 45-year-long assimilation and depriving Serbs of their rights in Macedonia, about forced Serbians to change their names into Macedonian ones. Recently they started proving that Macedonia has Serbian characteristics, i.e. that Macedonians are Serbs. Actually, the letter said, it was not necessary to wait long to see the final results.

Macedonia, the letter from the SKM-PDP Central Committee Presidium also said, is no longer a country which will be subject to ursurpation, divisions... It became its own master and it will be that forever.

We are addressing the progressive and democratic public and political leadership of Serbia to express our protest and anxiety in connection with the latest tide of anti-Macedonian campaigning initiated by some in the mass media, in speeches of some public and cultural figures and intellectuals from Serbia, said the open letter from the SKM-PDP Central Committee Presidium to the democratic public in Serbia.

DELO Comments on Halt in Development Payments

*AU1006123590 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
1 Jun 90 p 1*

[Ales Stergar commentary from the "Topic of the Day" column: "An End to Remittances to an Unknown Destination"]

[Text] For the second time, the Federal Fund for Underdeveloped Regions is becoming a tool in the political struggle for the economic sovereignty of Slovenia. In February, this concerned the response to the Serbian boycott, and now it is a means of the struggle for different conditions in the (con)federation. The Underdeveloped Fund, this archaic and nonmarket form of aid, in which one does not know who calls the tune (but one knows who pays the piper), has become too great a burden for the impoverished Slovene economy. Fully aware that the consequences of the counter blow by the federation may be painful, the Slovene government—supported by the republican constitution, which makes the struggle for economic sovereignty and the preservation of our own economy possible—has proposed to the parliament that it should stop the unallocated flow from the sack which is rather empty anyhow.

From the very beginning the new government—with the principled skepticism of the neutrals—behaved in accordance with its preelection promises about reducing the burden on the economy and preventing the flow of money from the republic. By the way, a contribution of more than 1.5 billion dinars for the underdeveloped regions, which Slovenia had to make this year, is more money than is "used" by the entire Slovene culture in a year. The previous Slovene authorities tried in vain to change the inefficient system of aid to underdeveloped regions. Perhaps sharper action will be more effective, particularly because the Slovene government is not closing the tap for investment in underdeveloped regions of Yugoslavia under market criteria.

The blow by the federation may be painful indeed. It is even more likely that the sharper action will lead to the abolition of the present manner of credits to underdeveloped regions and the affirmation of such market principles that an investor will see his interest in investment in underdeveloped regions because of tax concessions. There is no doubt that others elsewhere in Yugoslavia also dislike paying their money to the fund as it is now.

Bosnia Court Opposes Ban on Political Group

*LD1206162890 Zagreb Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 12 Jun 90*

[Text] The republican constitutional court has announced its decision that the banning of political organizations on a national scale is not in keeping with the Bosnia-Hercegovina Constitution. This court did not pass judgment on Article Eight of the Republican Law on the Association of citizens, which relates to branches of parties registered in other republics and provinces which desire, after their registration in court, to operate in Bosnia- Hercegovina, because it is constitutional.

Croatian Peasant Party Elects Chairman

*LD0906185990 Zagreb Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 9 Jun 90*

[Summary] Ivan Zvonimir-Cicak was elected by a large majority as chairman of the Croatian Peasant Party [Hrvatska Seljacka Stranka] in Zagreb on 9 June.

New Rijeka Television Service Launched

*LD1006141390 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 0811 GMT 10 Jun 90*

[Text] Rijeka, 10 June (TANJUG)—Rijeka's local television station, established by the Alliance of Socialists of Rijeka, began broadcasting 9 June on television channel 42. The new station will broadcast from 1800 [1600 GMT] to 0000 [2200 GMT] daily. Initially it will only broadcast a teletext information service. This service is located outside the existing Rijeka television center, which is incorporated into Zagreb Television.